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**MAKING NEWS OUT OF AL-JAZEERA:
A COMPARATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN AND
BRITISH PRESS COVERAGE OF EVENTS AND ISSUES
INVOLVING THE ARAB MEDIA**

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by

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my parents.

Without their knowledge, wisdom, guidance, and endless love,

I would not have the goals I strive to reach.

**Making News Out of Al-Jazeera: A Comparative Content Analysis of
American and British Press Coverage of Events and Issues Involving
the Arab Media**

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In recent years that involved the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Qatar-based satellite TV network Al-Jazeera became both an important source of news and a controversial actor signifying a challenge to U.S. foreign policy. This cross-national study compares journalistic responses to the rise of Al-Jazeera in the U.S. and Britain, considering both newspaper editorial policy and national context as possible reasons for differentiation. From multi-theoretical perspectives, the researcher examined the extent to which the two countries' newspapers (1) diversified use of Al-Jazeera as a source of

news, (2) expanded the range of non-official voices in coverage of issues involving Al-Jazeera, and (3) employed normative ideas about journalism to recognize the value of Arab journalism or problematize the U.S. handling of Arab media. The findings indicated that the differences between the pro-war and anti-war press were far more pronounced than were the differences between the U.S. and British press, not only in their editorial view of Al-Jazeera but also in other features of reporting. In addition, the results of a thematic analysis showed noticeable differences between the two countries' anti-war newspapers, in that the *New York Times* frequently invoked themes "defending" Al-Jazeera, while the *Guardian* favored themes "attacking" the U.S. government. Further implications of the findings are discussed.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The early years of the twenty-first century saw a series of global events involving violence: terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, and within two years, the U.S.-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, which marked the Bush administration's foreign policy dubbed the "War on Terror."¹ The recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, comparable to the 1991 Gulf War that highlighted the global impact of news media on world perceptions of the war (Kellner, 1992), brought to light the importance of media outlets in describing how the conflicts involving Osama bin Laden, the Taliban leaders, and Saddam Hussein each unfolded.

Yet there were important differences between the war coverage in 1991 and in recent years. While in 1991 the U.S. cable network CNN claimed a virtual monopoly on war information from Baghdad, during the recent crises in Afghanistan and Iraq the world saw greater diversity in media outlets that attempted to describe and interpret the Bush administration's aggressive foreign policy and its implementation (Schwartz, 2004).

¹In this study, the researcher treats both the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy broadly called the "War on Terror." The Afghanistan War in 2001 was intended to oust the Taliban regime and find Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, known to be the mastermind behind the September 11th attacks. In the case of the Iraq War in 2003, although the official U.S. position was that America was under a serious threat due to Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration officials made implicit assertions of a 9/11-Iraq link to promote public support for the invasion of Iraq. For example, on May 1, 2003, in his declaration of the ending of the major military campaigns in Iraq, President Bush said: "The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began September 11, 2001 and still goes on" (cited in Bennett, 2005, p. 2). Considering this U.S. perspective, the war in Iraq can be understood as a continued implementation of, and not a case separate from, the post-9/11 U.S. policy of a global-scale war against terrorism. With the American media's reluctance to critically scrutinize the White House's dubious claims, a majority of Americans continued to believe, as late as the summer of 2003 — long after facts to the contrary came out — that the Iraqi regime was somehow linked to the event of 9/11, either through direct involvement by Saddam Hussein or through indirect assistance to Al Qaeda terrorists (Bennett, 2005, p. 2).

In particular, the Qatar-based satellite TV network Al-Jazeera suddenly became a major player in the war coverage and one of the most prominent and quoted media sources in the post-9/11 wartime period. Al-Jazeera was the only news service with a correspondent in Kabul before the fall of the Taliban regime and the outlet chosen by Osama bin Laden to release his videotaped statements in which he called on his fellow Muslims to join in a “jihad” against Americans. Soon after the military campaign in Iraq began, the Arabic network infuriated Coalition officials by airing footage of American troops held captive in Iraq and dead bodies of British soldiers. Al-Jazeera’s broadcasting of horrific war images of civilian casualties also sparked controversies related to issues of media ethics and bias.

Launched in 1996, Al-Jazeera quickly gained popularity in the Middle East for its bold news reporting and its televising of political controversy, and *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman (1999) once described it as the “freest, most widely watched TV network in the Arab world.” The impact of Al-Jazeera and other “liberalized” Arab media in the Middle East has been discussed in relation to the rise of the “Arab public sphere,” a political phenomenon amplifying the Arab identity discourse centered on the Palestinian problem as well as the internally sharp disagreements over preferred policy choices (Lynch, 2006). Before 9/11 the influence of Al-Jazeera largely remained within the regional enclave of Arab political culture, isolated from international debates and concerns. During the post-9/11 developments, which involved the U.S.-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank, Al-Jazeera surfaced in global communication both as an alternative source of war information and as a political window into the Arab world and its sentiment. The news channel’s concentration on civilian casualties in war coverage resonated with an

underlying regional perspective linking the situations of Palestine and Iraq in an overall theme of Arab suffering.

The Western media's relay of content from a non-Western news service, not to mention the spotlight it received, is a remarkable phenomenon in the modern history of international communication. Extensive research and a number of debates, including the UNESCO debate in the 1970s and early 1980s, have addressed issues related to the imbalance in international news flow (e.g., Masmoudi, 1979; McPhail, 1983). In the late 1980s, with the rise of global media equipped with satellite technology, the dominance of U.S.-based transnational media firms, including news businesses, was strengthened, which some critics saw as a symptom of extended U.S. global hegemony (Herman & McChesney, 1997). Notably, critics of CNN's war coverage in 1991 argued that the U.S.-based global news distribution system, through the control and strategic use of information by the Pentagon, played an ideological role in glamorizing U.S. foreign policy and military supremacy (Kellner, 1992; Young & Jesser, 1997).

Given the conventional wisdom assuming the ascendancy of Western, and specifically U.S., news media, often in the context of American global hegemony, the meteoric rise of "the Arabic CNN" in recent years is an interesting anomaly. In contrast to the first Gulf War, during the post-9/11 wartime period the White House struggled to control the global stream of war-related information, and subscription to the Al-Jazeera service in European countries skyrocketed. Al-Jazeera's wartime performance signifies "a virtual reversal of the international news that usually runs from the West to the East and to the South" (Hafez, 2002, p.121) and can be interpreted as a daunting challenge to the U.S.-based global media system and its ideological forces.

In a broader context, the recent dynamics in our global informational environment — not only the rise of Arab satellite news media but also noticeable divergences between

American and European media outlets in describing the U.S.-led war efforts and the advent of “blogging” services that enabled numerous individuals on the Web to give their own accounts of the ongoing crisis — suggests how the international flow of information has become more complicated than before. Since the introduction of satellite TV technologies in the 1980s and the expansion of Internet use in 1990s, the reach of varied forms of news outlets, from traditional mass media to the newest ones such as Weblogs, has been steadily, if unevenly, extended beyond regional and national boundaries (Volkmer, 2003). As a result, the world is now watching an emerging transnational communication infrastructure that may be called a “global news arena,” where different versions of reality and related points of view from multiple and often cross-referencing sources compete with each other (Reese, 2004). As the world was watching the U.S.-led “War on Terror” campaign, and especially the invasion of Iraq, Al-Jazeera became important in the arena of global news business and of public deliberation as a supplier of alternative war images and hostile opinions about the American foreign policy, defying the version of wartime reality presented by U.S. and Coalition officials.

The changing landscape of global communication poses a challenge for foreign policy makers in a dominant country such as the United States. U.S. policy decisions and their implementation are now more easily exposed to intense scrutiny and critique by the rest of the world — not only by foreign leaders but also by various kinds of foreign audiences, all of which ultimately comprise world opinion. It is telling that in America’s countdown to the invasion of Iraq millions of citizens reportedly turned out in the streets of hundreds of cities around the globe to protest the U.S. war drive (McFadden, 2003). Although the anti-war movement failed to stop the war, the extent to which the legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy was widely questioned by a tangible entity of the “global public” was remarkable (Lee, 2003). After seeing this hostile mood worldwide,

both Pentagon officials and the U.S. media increasingly emphasized the need for the United States to win, not only the military combat in the battlefields of Iraq, but also the hearts and minds of Muslims in the Middle East and others watching the war.

The globally increased demand for greater transparency of policy introduces a new factor for U.S. journalists to integrate into their procedure of news gathering and reporting, particularly when they cover issues related to U.S. involvement in wars abroad. In time of war, war coverage reporters have high chances of paying attention to foreign news media, tracking the trend of foreign public opinions, physically contacting foreign locals, and exchanging views with foreign correspondents — all of which actually happened in the recent wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Now, with easier access to non-U.S. media discourses and grassroots voices offering harsh criticisms of American foreign policy, journalists who think of their profession as a global business are forced to critically examine their own journalistic practices, which have been accepted routinely in domestic political culture, and ponder universal values in journalism and a cosmopolitan way of reporting beyond national, regional, and cultural lines (Reese, 2004).

Yet the heightened level of global monitoring often comes to clash with the nationalistic political culture sanctioned by the nation-state system. Immediately following the terrorist attacks on September 11 of 2001, American society witnessed a sweeping wave of patriotism that was boosted and amplified by government and military officials who articulated nationalistic themes related to the strength of America's military and the demonic nature of America's enemy (Hutcheson, Domke, Billeaudeau, & Garland, 2004). Throughout the period of major military campaigns in Afghanistan and the ensuing policy debate on a proposal of war against Iraq, this overtly nationalistic mood made it difficult for the U.S. media to question the soundness of the post-9/11 militaristic policy (Buncombe, 2002). Despite this strong nationalistic sentiment,

however, the White House's war drive against Iraq was not without domestic resistance. Despite the virtual absence of dissent in the Congressional debate, dozens of anti-war rallies took place in major U.S. cities, reportedly on a scale reminiscent of the 1960s anti-war movement (Murphy, 2003). The polarization in this country's political culture continued around the time when the U.S. air strike on Baghdad began. While the ratings of overtly conservative media outlets such as Fox News skyrocketed, a number of Americans frustrated with their national media coverage flocked to the Websites of European news media such as the BBC and the *Guardian* to experience a different sense of war reality (Kahney, 2003).

These polarizations in the perception of the post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy — between U.S. opinion and world opinion at a global level on the one hand and between mainstream opinion and dissident opinion at the domestic level on the other hand — posed a challenging task for U.S. journalists of how to balance or reconcile nationalistic values with cosmopolitan ones in wartime reporting. In relation to the rise of Al-Jazeera, the ongoing conflict between the global mood of hostility to U.S. militarism and the domestically inflated nationalistic demand shaped a “political climate of opinion” in which American reporters and editors had to come to terms not only with the abovementioned “counterflow of information” from Al-Jazeera, but also with the war of words intensified by the confrontation between the Arab TV network and leaders of the Coalition. During the war in Iraq, Al-Jazeera's broadcasting of the footage of U.S. prisoners of war met with wide criticism in U.S. society, particularly from Coalition officials who argued that the Arab broadcaster violated the Geneva Conventions (Collins, 2003). Meanwhile, Al-Jazeera accused the U.S. military of “deliberately” attacking their facilities and employees first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq (McCarthy, 2003).

Given all of these circumstances, the U.S. news media's use of Al-Jazeera as a source of news for reporting, along with their coverage of and commentary on the controversies surrounding the Arab network's performance, is worthy of study: it illustrates how the U.S. editors and journalists in charge of foreign news selection and war coverage viewed Al-Jazeera — as either a fundamentally dangerous foreign force generating anti-Americanism and threatening journalistic identity outside their national community, or as a nonconformist yet “legitimate” provider of foreign news and critical opinion to the global forum of debate; it also showcases how American mainstream journalism responded to the dynamic nature of the emerging global news arena, especially when U.S. foreign policy encountered worldwide resistance that was facilitated by the changing global communication infrastructure. This dissertation research project capitalizes on the significance of this situation and focuses on the following question: what were the characteristics of the U.S. media discourse related to Al-Jazeera — discourse which either incorporated some of the information supplied by Al-Jazeera into news content or gave accounts of the events and issues involving Al-Jazeera as part of the journalistic construction of debate — during the period following 9/11?

In determining a research design for this case study, the researcher considered a series of issues related to the selection of media text sources for study. One research issue concerned the choice of a news medium — whether to select TV news programs or newspapers for a case study of the media discourse addressing Al-Jazeera. In recent years, since the rise of the Arab media, there have been some journalistic commentaries and analyses on either the implications of Al-Jazeera-sourced images in American broadcast news or differences in war coverage between Al-Jazeera and major U.S. TV networks (e.g., Hickey, 2002; Jasperin & El-Kikhia, 2003). Yet these reviews focused almost exclusively on broadcast journalism, and little attention has been paid to the

repercussions of Al-Jazeera's performance in the U.S. press discourse. For this case study, the researcher chose the print media for analysis. The print medium of newspapers, compared with television news, has an advantage of ample space that can be assigned to cover a variety of events and issues. Given this medium characteristic, newspapers were assumed to be in a better position to display a wide array of both information supplied by Al-Jazeera and subjects of debate involving Al-Jazeera's controversial behavior as well as the U.S. approach to the Arab broadcaster.

Another related issue for this content analysis project was to determine a basis for the selection of newspapers whose contents would be analyzed. At this stage, the researcher made the decision to adopt a comparative perspective, by which not only American newspapers but also British newspapers would be included in the analysis. This decision was intended both to capture effectively the possible variations within the media discourse involving Al-Jazeera and to interpret meaningfully key differences, if present, between the content from hawkish newspapers and anti-war newspapers by considering the national context in which media outlets operated and responded to their governments' decision to go to war or to enter into alliance with one another. The cross-national comparison of news media posits that the discretionary power of new media is both enabled and bounded by the political culture and the structure of the society, which in combination define the "permissible" intervention by the media in the political process (Semetko, Blumler, Gurevitch, & Weaver, 1991, p.1). The findings from a comparative content analysis were thought to be useful to reveal both similarities and unique features of the media discourse specific to the country's political culture.

In both the American and the British society there seemed to be a deepening polarization in the practice of wartime journalism between the hawkish and the dovish newspapers throughout the period of hostilities that culminated in the war in Iraq. During

America's countdown to the invasion of Iraq, editorial pages of prestigious U.S. newspapers showed a divergence between editorial support for and criticism of the White House decision to go to war. For example, according to a *Columbia Journalism Review* article that reviewed the editorial pages at that time (Mooney, 2004), the *Wall Street Journal* editorially showed strong support for the war without a shade of doubt about the alleged Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction, while *New York Times* editorials criticized the Bush administration for rushing to the war without getting an approval by the United Nations.² In the case of the British "quality" broadsheet newspapers, conservative news outlets such as the *Daily Telegraph* and the *London Times* were editorially supportive of Prime Minister Tony Blair's full cooperation with the White House from the beginning of the "War on Terror" policy, whereas mid-leftist newspaper the *Guardian* and the Irish-owned the *Independent* already began to reveal a critical tone in both reporting and commentary on the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan (Kennedy, 2002).

These apparently parallel phenomena in the U.S. and the British press make it possible to raise the question of whether there also existed in the press discourse about Al-Jazeera some parallel differences between the pro-war and the anti-war news outlets in the two countries. Yet it is equally important to note that the British media's coverage of war seemed to have their own tones and styles. Some observers of British press coverage of the war in Afghanistan have noted that British journalists, regardless of the political stances at their affiliated newspapers, seemed to be more inclined than their American fellows to question official statements and describe the kind of information

²It is worth noting that, as Mooney (2004) suggested, the anti-war position of the *New York Times* may be viewed as having been derived largely from a diplomatic basis, rather than from a fundamental doubt about the soundness of the war-oriented administration policy itself. It is unclear whether this editorial stance truly reflected this news organization's opposition to the war on a purely diplomatic basis, or was a disguised attack on the Bush administration in a climate of public opinion supportive of the war. This point will be made again later in Chapter 4.

contradicting the official version of the reality sponsored by the war managers (e.g., Kennedy, 2002).

If the observation just mentioned is valid, structural factors associated with the makeup of the British press system as well as situational factors in Britain can help explain this tendency. The British press is predominantly a national press and, in terms of readership, there is greater stratification in the British press than in its U.S. counterpart (Semetko, Blumler, Gurevitch, & Weaver, 1991). This stratification leads to differentiations among the British press in terms of not only the “quality” (i.e., the differentiation between broadsheets, middle-brow tabloids and mass popular tabloids), but also partisanship (i.e., the tradition of political alignment with particular political parties). Perhaps for this reason, British journalists have a reputation of being less obedient to the norm of objective reporting (Kennedy, 2002). Situational factors include the British public’s relatively low or short-lived support for the post-9/11 U.S. policy that involved the war in Iraq. Although the level of British public support for the Iraq War reached as high as about 60% in May of 2003 — around the time when President Bush announced an ending to the major military campaigns in Iraq — the British support of the war remained lukewarm throughout the phases of pre-war debate and then of the military campaigns (PEW Research Center, 2004).³ Thus, it seems that, although British leaders showed unswerving support for the Americans-led military campaigns, the British public as well as the British media was not overwhelmed by the kind of patriotic mood that American society manifested immediately following the attacks of September 11.

All of these considerations make it possible to identify conditions enabling a comparative analysis of newspapers, based on both the similarity between the United

³The short-lived high rating of support for the war mentioned above is illustrated by the results of an international survey that, just ten months later, the British support for the Iraq War dropped down to about 40%. At the same time, in May of 2004, American support for the war still remained at 60% (PEW Research Center, 2004).

States and Great Britain (i.e., the government policy to go to war in Iraq) and the dissimilarities between pro-war and anti-war newspapers (i.e., the news organization policy toward the government decision) and between the national contexts in the U.S and Britain (i.e., the national issue culture or the cultural basis from which each country sought to understand, interpret, and act on the issues and concerns causing, surrounding, and influenced by the war). This content analysis study thus adopts a two-by-two factorial research design, by introducing two factors of newspaper editorial policy (pro-war versus anti-war) and national context (American versus British).

With this research design, this case study examines three areas of possible differences across newspapers: specifically, possible differences in the extent to which a newspaper (1) diversified use of Al-Jazeera as a newsworthy source of information, (2) expanded the range of non-official opinions in coverage of the issues involving Al-Jazeera, and (3) recognized the value of Al-Jazeera as a legitimate institution of journalism or problematized the intimidation of the Arab broadcaster by outside forces. For this task, the researcher identified three objects of examination in the media discourse concerning Al-Jazeera: media discourse addressing Al-Jazeera as (1) a source of information, as (2) a subject of media-mediated debate, and as (3) a normative issue of journalism.

These objectives of research and their related key terms were developed through the review of three theoretical topics in communication research. Chapter 2, which begins with a case preview, extensively examines this review:

1. The first topic is the traditional concern for imbalance in international communication, along with an insight into the changing landscape of the emerging “global news arena” in the age of globalization. For the purpose of

- research, the researcher focuses on the problem of how challenging and meaningful the so-called reversal flow of information from a non-Western news service toward Western media was.
2. The second topic is the U.S. media tendency of heavy dependence on official voices in coverage of foreign policy (e.g., Halberstam, 1979; Sigal, 1973), which is possibly counteracted by “icon-driven” reporting (Bennett & Lawrence, 1995; Lawrence, 1996), that is, a kind of journalistic practice involving use of some accidental events as an opportunity for giving a say to non-mainstream voices. These two different forms of reporting can be applied to the analysis of media accounts of controversies involving Al-Jazeera.
 3. The final topic sheds light on the rhetorical dimension of normative media theories (e.g., McQuail, 1994; Siebert, 1956) familiar to Western society. The focal point of the discussion is how different normative visions of journalistic identities can be invoked, through the filter of a news organization’s editorial policy, in the politicized media debate evaluating Arab journalism and the U.S. handling of Arab media as well. A review of various media-related norms is useful for developing a thematic content analysis scheme, which enables one to capture subtle and nuanced differences in the media text.

All of these discussions lead to the identification of theoretical issues, the definition of key terms, and the statement of research questions at the end of Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, the specific methods used in a series of content analyses are described. The entire coding process involved use of multiple coding units. Chapter 4 presents findings from the multiple sessions of content analyses conducted, providing evidence of similarities and differences between the two countries’ press discourses in the three key

aspects just mentioned. Based on these findings, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings and gives concluding remarks about the cross-national research project. Final comments on the rise of the Arab media in the era of the emerging global news arena, along with the responses seen in the U.S. and British media, are offered. In doing so, this dissertation research provides a systematic, comprehensive analysis of various kinds of content related to Al-Jazeera in the U.S. and British elite newspapers.

Chapter 2

Case Preview and Theoretical Review

CASE PREVIEW

While the advent of global television equipped with satellite communications technology in the 1990s has generated much concern with respect to commercialism and U.S. global hegemony, it has also been credited with facilitating the spread of “modernity” (Thussu, 2000, pp.200-223). Specifically, the globalization of Western or Western-inspired media has been argued to have a “liberatory” potential for nurturing democratic civic culture, particularly in some of developing countries where plurality of opinions and possibilities of open discussion had been greatly obstructed by state control of the national media (Dunn, 1992).

The proliferation of television services in the Middle East since the 1990s has signaled a major change in media business and political communication, making obsolete the conventional wisdom that the Arab media are in the service of powerful states (Ayish, 2002; Lynch, 2006). With the restructuring of government television systems and the launch of commercial services, the landscape of broadcasting journalism in the Arab/Muslim region has evolved into one marked by more professional and pluralistic approaches (Ayish, 2002). In particular, transnational satellite television such as Al-Jazeera has brought disparate local debates together in a manner of promoting central pan-Arab issues, and has emerged as a location of vibrant and open political debates. Some saw this phenomenon as the rise of the “Arab public sphere” (Lynch, 2006).

Al-Jazeera, which translates as “the Peninsula,” was launched in November 1996 by a decree of the emir of Qatar. The then-new emir, after having seized power from his father one year before, decided to create a Western-style news institution as a means of modernizing Qatar and lifted state censorship of the press (Zednik, 2002). Since its beginning of 24 hour broadcasting in February 1999, Al-Jazeera has gained a reputation for its daring approach to sensitive issues such as corruption and polygamy that had previously been untouched by the Arab media (Hafez, 1999). With its rapidly growing popularity among Arab audiences, Al-Jazeera’s bold reporting of news and provocative talk shows often incurred the anger of many Arab governments, which led to tensions between Qatar and those countries. Several Arab countries recalled their ambassadors from Doha to protest the network’s “intolerable” incitements against their leaders and value systems (Ayish, 2002).

Al-Jazeera’s hard-hitting news reporting is often viewed as comparable to American commercial TV journalism in aspects of sensationalism and technically alluring features (Ayish, 2002). Some media critics hailed Al-Jazeera’s political debate programs as cultivating the democratic soil in the Arab world (e.g., Al-Hail, 2000), whereas others saw only scenes of shouting matches with little substance in the satellite TV debates that Al-Jazeera has popularized (e.g., Khouri, 2001). There also exists a suspicion that the Qatari-based network, still partially funded by the state, is reluctant in applying the standard of critical reporting to its host country (Pope, 2000). Despite this criticism, under the Qatari government’s avowed hands-off approach, Al-Jazeera is generally deemed the most independent Arab news institution enjoying press freedom.

Before launching an immediate war in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, the Bush administration apparently recognized the importance of satellite television in the battle for public opinion in the Arab world. Many U.S. officials appeared on Al-Jazeera

programs and claimed that the military action in Afghanistan would not only destroy the Al-Qaeda camps but also liberate Afghans from the oppressive Taliban regime (Zednik, 2002). However, the White House's early hope of leveraging the TV station for its pre-war public relations campaign turned into fury over the network's hostile coverage of the U.S. war efforts. In early October, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell asked the Qatari emir to "tone down" unfriendly broadcasts on Al-Jazeera, which led to Arab intellectuals' criticism of the Bush administration for making a mockery of its free speech rhetoric (Trofimov, 2001).

Worthy of a note is that the aggravated Israeli-Palestinian conflict — which occurred around the time that the White House began to publicly target Saddam Hussein after the ending of major combats in Afghanistan — had direct repercussions in the Arab public's perception of the U.S. policy toward Iraq. The Oslo peace process, which had been intended for Palestinians' final settlement on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and had led to the Israeli troops' withdrawal in 1996 from the regions, reached in 2000 an impasse after failed negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians (Cook, 2003). In the early spring of 2002, the circle of Palestinians' suicide attacks and Israelis' reprisals culminated in the Israeli military's bloody re-occupation of the West Bank. With this backdrop, as Lynch (2003) noted, the Arabs' anger toward the American-led war against terror skyrocketed when the White House treated Palestinian rebels such as Hamas group as little different from the Al-Qaeda terrorists and defended the Israeli raid on them. Markedly, President Bush's depiction of Israeli Prime Minister Sharon as a "man of peace," which came out at the height of the above-mentioned tension, was aired repeatedly by Al-Jazeera and other Arab broadcasters and was viewed by their audiences as offending Arab sensitivities related to the Palestinian conflict.

As military conflicts in Iraq unfolded in early 2003, the battles of the propaganda war became intense, with Al-Jazeera often finding itself engaged in confrontation with the Coalition forces. As noted earlier, Coalition officials roundly blamed the Arab network for broadcasting pre-recorded bin Laden tapes, the interviews with prisoners of war, the corpses of American/ British combatants, and horrible scenes of the civilian casualties caused by U.S. bombing. Meanwhile, Al-Jazeera accused the U.S. military of “deliberately” destroying Al-Jazeera offices in Afghanistan and in Iraq and killing its employees in air strikes (Steinberg & Rutenberg, 2003). The Arab TV network also had some other difficulties; its newly-launched English Website went down by hacker attacks, and its reporters were temporarily banned from having access to the New York Stock Exchange.

Against this background, Al-Jazeera’s wartime performance posed a serious threat to the Pentagon’s implementation of what Louw (2003) called the “PR-ized warfare model” that had been most successfully carried out in the first Gulf War. This PR-ized warfare model comprises a set of “framing strategies,” chiefly the demonization of opposition leaders, the sanitization of bloody war images, and the glamorization of technology-based U.S. military performance (Louw, 2003). Indeed, it is possible that the bin Laden’s hostility-charged religious rhetoric aired on the Al-Jazeera channel actually corroborated, when it was relayed by the Western media, their audiences’ perception of him as an irrational terrorist to be removed. Still, the Arab news outlet seriously damaged the U.S.-branded glamorized war images by concentrating its coverage on civilian damages and the Coalition forces’ military setbacks. Moreover, in its accounts Al-Jazeera provided an “Arab-oriented” perspective that located the American-led military campaigns in the context of — rather than fighting terrorism or the liberation of the

oppressed people — the problematic U.S. policy of supporting Israel and threatening the independence of the Arab world (Hickey, 2002).

In the highly politicized context of a propaganda war, the American/British media's practice of wartime journalism also drew criticism in opposite directions. Coalition leaders blamed their countries' "liberal" media for giving allegedly too much weight to negative war images and the Coalition forces' initial military setbacks (Stanley, 2003), whereas some media critics said that the Western media's war coverage was too "sanitized" and thus failed to get at the truth of war brutality (Wells, 2003). These altercations, along with Al-Jazeera's sudden prominence, provided Western journalists with an opportunity to muse over not only the non-Western medium's controversial behavior but also their own practice and related norms of journalism (Schwartz, 2004). Yet, given the politicized context of debate mentioned above, varying ideas on the normative principles of news media, such as media freedom and media responsibility, were expressed in a manner to strengthen or undermine positions of certain parties (that is, Al-Jazeera or the war-waging forces) involved in the controversies regarding the Arab broadcaster.

THEORETICAL REVIEW

The features of the U.S. and British media discourse related to Al-Jazeera can be examined from three distinct theoretical topics: the nature of international news flow in the age of globalization (which consists of two lines of discussion), the American media's source patterns in coverage of U.S. foreign policy, and the contestant nature of normative ideas about news media in a politicized debate. The following sections cover these three topics.

International News Flow in the Era of Globalization

As mentioned in the introduction, the rise of Al-Jazeera as an important news service in the Arab region, along with the Western media's wartime use of information supplied by the Arab TV network, was a remarkable phenomenon with respect to the usual patterns of international news flow. Furthermore, in a broader and more recent perspective, the rise of Arab media equipped with satellite communications technology can be viewed as an interesting spin-off from the process of what has been termed globalization.

NWIO Debate and International News Coverage

Much research about international news coverage and selection has been directly or indirectly influenced by the historical debate called the NWIO. With its heyday in late 1970s, the NWIO was a UNESCO-sponsored effort to achieve more equalization in the production and distribution of information between the First World and the Third World, or between the developed and the developing world. The forceful demands of the Third World nations reached a climax in the beginning of the 1980s, when the McBride Commission approved by the UNESCO issued a policy report titled "Many Voices, One World," commonly known as the McBride Report. Calling for re-balancing of information flow between the "haves" and the "have-nots" of communication resources, the McBride Report defined a large number of significant concepts involved in the process of democratizing communications at a global level. Many ideas expressed in the key areas of the report (communication policy, technology, cultural identity, journalism, human rights and international relations) were a significant contribution to establishing

“the right to communicate,” more wide-ranging and comprehensive than traditional concepts such as freedom of the press (Mastrini & De Charras, 2005, p.275).

Specifically, the push toward the NWIO was driven by three grievances, cited in Mowlana (1986). First, the majority of international news and information flow runs “vertically” from the developed world to the developing world by the way of dominant Western news agencies. Second, the United States and Western Europe receive the greatest amount of coverage in the world media, while the developing countries (as well as the socialist countries) receive the least. Third, although the “horizontal” news flow does exist within the developing world, this type of news flow represents only a small fraction of the overall international news coverage. In addition to addressing the quantitative imbalances in news exchange, proponents of the NWIO were also concerned with the qualitative aspects of the Western media coverage of the Third World, arguing that developing countries are usually depicted in a negatively stereotyped manner and that these nations’ genuine problems, achievements, and aspirations are largely ignored (for more on the NWIO debate, see Legum and Cornwell, 1978; Masmoudi, 1979; McPhail, 1983; Stevenson and Cole, 1984).

The Third World arguments of imbalances in news exchange and an emphasis on negative news were generally supported by a number of empirical studies (e.g., Hester, 1973; Kaplan, 1979; Larson, 1979; Lent, 1977; Peterson, 1980), although specific findings have also suggested that many factors influence the coverage of foreign events or information flow among countries. Much of the research on international news coverage stems from Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) classical study regarding multiple determinants of foreign news selection (Wu, 2000). Through their analysis, the authors offered a list of 12 factors, such as reference to elite nations and negativity, which constitute a system of “newsworthiness” according to which a certain foreign event is

likely or unlikely to become news. Galtung's other famous work (1971), more strongly reflecting the cultural imperialism thesis (e.g., Schiller, 1976), proposed a "center-periphery" model of news flow. He hypothesized that international news flows primarily from the "center," or dominant countries, to the "periphery," or dependent countries. His proposition can be interpreted as stating that the "eliteness" of a country is a primary criterion for foreign news selection, which was supported by Kariel and Rosenvall's (1984) empirical study.

Since Galtung and Ruge's conceptual framework, numerous studies have highlighted different factors as the main predictors of foreign news coverage and selection in Western countries or other regions of the world. One group of research brought into focus country characteristics, by which certain countries would be deemed by news gatekeepers as more newsworthy than other countries, and tested the influences of some national traits, such as economic development and the size of population, on foreign news coverage and flow. Although some inconsistencies exist, the findings generally have revealed that the economic level of a country, measurable by indicators such as the volume of international trade, was a good predictor of the amount of coverage that a country receives in many countries' news media (e.g., Adhern, 1984; Hester, 1973; Kariel & Rosenvall, 1984; Rosengren, 1977; Wu, 2000).

Aside from the economic level of nations, other factors were also found to be important in determining international flow of news. One important category of the determinants can be linked to the notion of proximity by the standard of geography (e.g., Haynes, 1984; McClelland & Young, 1970; Ramaprasad, 1991) or cultural affinity (e.g., Burrowes, 1974; Hester, 1973; Johnson, 1997; Kariel & Rosenvall, 1984). The general idea is that the higher the proximity of a foreign country is, the more likely an event happening in the country to receive coverage. In many cases, high geopolitical or cultural

proximity can be viewed as implying the political or cultural significance of some “elite” countries, therefore an extension of country characteristics. However, the notion of proximity also relates to the inter-related aspects among nations, and, in this respect, the proximity or its similar criteria may well be grouped within relations characteristics. A variant of cultural proximity comes from the past history of colonialism. Some studies have found that old colonial ties are an important predictor of the news flow among countries, both vertically and horizontally (e.g., Atwood, 1985; Burrowes, 1974; Meyer, 1989; Skurnik, 1981). For instance, Arab and African countries tend to get covered more frequently in the press of the countries belonging to the same colonial group (Atwood, 1985).

Other significant factors of newsworthiness in international coverage include event characteristics, especially the negative nature of events such as violent conflicts and natural disasters. News media preference for “bad news” is certainly not limited to international reporting, but negativity seems to play an enormous role in the U.S. and other Western media coverage of developing countries (Shoemaker, Danielian, & Brendlinger, 1991). As a result, developing countries are rarely visible in the Western media portrayals of the world unless they appear as locations for political crisis, violent conflicts, natural disasters, or organized criminal activities (Giffard & Rivenburg, 2000). In a similar vein, some studies of the U.S. media’s international coverage have found that the “deviance” of news stories was a predominant predictor of foreign news selection (e.g., Chang, Shoemaker, & Brendlinger, 1987; Ramaprasad, 1991; Shoemaker, Danielian, & Brendlinger, 1991). This line of research suggests that, in the context of U.S. media coverage, international events that are deviant in certain ways from the national values and that occur in nations of political and economic significance to the United States are more likely to be covered in the news.

By and large, past research tends to support the Third World's arguments of the bias in the flow of information and Western media's emphasis on bad news. Given this usual pattern, the rise of Al-Jazeera in recent years — which indicates both the popularity of the news channel in the Middle East and the relay by Western news media of the news supplied by the Arab TV network — may come as a surprise, signifying a non-Western media's increased influence in the production and distribution of international news in time of war. There is, however, one important question to be answered; what does the “reverse” flow of news earlier mentioned (Hafez, 2002, p.121) mean, especially for the American (and other Western) media's international reporting? Is it so meaningful as to make the U.S. media coverage of the world (especially the Arab/Muslim world) better? Reviewing the NWIO debate of more than two decades ago, it must be noted that the Third World grievances about the practices of the Western media were not driven simply by too much bad news about the state of developing countries. Rather, the real issue had more to do with the scant coverage by Western news agencies of the problems, concerns, and aspirations of the peoples in the Third World, in a comprehensive manner that would pay due respect to their own perspectives (e.g., Masmoudi, 1979, p.181; Mcphail, 1983). Taking this long-standing concern into account, the political significance of the global news stream involving Al-Jazeera would ultimately rest on the question of whether the Arab news outlet was able to contribute to the discourse in the American (and the British) media by presenting not only terrorist messages of hate but also alternative accounts of war as well as the “Arab-oriented” perspectives on the current problems in the Arab/Muslim world — including the U.S.-led wars in the Muslim countries and the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflicts.

Considering the gatekeeping process on the part of U.S. news organizations, it seems natural that the stories related to bin Laden coming from Al-Jazeera were deemed

highly newsworthy by the American newsroom. This goes well with the past observations (Chang, Shoemaker, & Brendlinger, 1987; Shoemaker, Danielian, & Brendlinger, 1991) that the “deviant” event characteristic in light of American national values is a primary factor influencing international coverage and foreign news selection. Concerning other news stories from Al-Jazeera, such as its war coverage of Afghanistan and Iraq and news reports on the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, however, it is much harder to predict how seriously American (and British) reporters considered Al-Jazeera as an easily accessible alternative source of news. It is possible that the high significance of these issues — the military developments of the U.S.-involved foreign crises were certainly the number one issue at the time, and also the Palestinian problem is arguably one of the most important unresolved foreign issues – may have encouraged journalists to make use of some relevant news contents from Al-Jazeera for reporting. To the contrary, it also can be said that the controversies and hostilities that surrounded the behavior of Al-Jazeera may have made it difficult for the U.S. and British news media to treat the Arab broadcaster as a “legitimate” news organization to which they would turn for getting information. Considering this uncertainty, the diversity of the Al-Jazeera-sourced content incorporated by the U.S. and British press can serve as an interesting subject of research.

Globalization and Reframed Issues

The NWIO debate has waned since the early 1980s, followed by the recent two decades that watched the ascendancy of discourses converging on such concepts as deregulation, information society, and globalization in both domestic and international arenas of policy debate (Carlsson, 2003; Mastrini & De Charras, 2005). The U.S. withdrawal from the UNESCO in 1984 contributed to the weakening of the U.N. body as

an international forum of policy debate (Herman & McChesney, 1997, p.25).⁴ Yet one of the most crucial factors that led to the failure of the 1980's McBride ideas was the success of neoliberal ideas in the 1980s at the world level, which entailed, particularly in the political sphere, the disappearance of the context that had allowed for the development of the NWIO movement (Mastrini & De Charras, 2005). Proponents of neoliberalism argued for limiting the role of government largely to guarding the free market function and campaigned, both domestically and internationally, for the privatization and deregulation of sectors that had previously been under state authority, including telecommunications and broadcasting (Herman & McChesney, 1997; McChesney, 1999). The ascendancy of neoliberalism was further strengthened by the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, which was hailed by many as the final triumph of both democracy and the free market (for a detailed recount of the rise and fall of the NWIO debate, see Carlsson, 2003).

During the 1990s there was a shift in the important forum of debate regarding international communications policy. Replacing the UNESCO, which specializes in education and culture, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) emerged as a new location for a U.S.-led project for a "Global Information Society" (Herman & McChesney, 1997; Mastrini & De Charras, 2005). In March 1994, Al Gore, vice president of the United States at the time, launched a project to build a global infrastructure based on "information highways" at the World Telecommunication Development Conference of the ITU held in Buenos Aires. In his address, Al Gore noted that the inevitable democratization would arise from the new information highways, anticipating a "new Athenian Age of democracy" (quoted in Mastrini & De Charras, 2005). Much of his rhetoric reflected the popularization of the futurist discourse in the

⁴The United States returned to the UNESCO on October 1, 2003.

early 1990s (Mastrini & De Charras, 2005). Markedly, the convergence of different media enabled by the technology of digitalization was viewed by some futuristic thinkers (e.g., Negroponte, 1995; Toffler, 1980) as a technological revolution overriding the traditional distinctions among different forms of media and their respective public communication policies. Although many useful critiques have been provided from academia about the alleged rosy visions of an information society, the ascendancy of the futurist discourse, in the realms of both domestic and international policy debate, worked toward creating a social imagery that mixed a strong technological orientation with the logic of free market and the promise of electronic democracy in a harmonizing way (McChesney, 1999, pp.119-123).

It is worth noting that the emphasis on the circumstantial factors in the waning of the NWIO debate does not mean that the logic of the NWIO itself was not flawed. In hindsight, Hamelink (1987), while recognizing the valuable contribution by the McBride Report, listed its weaknesses in several aspects: the lack of consideration of the specific economic, social, and cultural contexts; the lack of clarity in the process; the limited analysis of the existing process; and the absence of dialogue with civil society. More importantly, the NWIO was limited in the sense that the debate was mainly restricted to the participation of national governments and, to a lesser extent, of business and academic sectors with a varying capacity for lobbying (Mastrini & De Charras, 2005). Because much of the NWIO debate took place within a framework positing that the nation-state is the only viable and privileged actor in charge of democratizing communications, many of the Third World arguments driven by state authority (such as the threat of trans-border spillover by direct broadcasting satellite systems) were prone to attacks by Western media for the alleged reason of proposing state censorship of the press (Herman & McChesney, 1997, p.25). Furthermore, the demands for state regulation of

transnational corporations were regarded by believers of neoliberalism as increasingly losing ground, with the process of the so-called “globalization” that became distinctively visible in the 1990s in many regions of the world.⁵

Although the gap between the developed and the developing countries in communication resources is a continuing problem (Carlson, 2003; Hamelink 1987), the process and its related phenomena of globalization contributed to re-defining many old issues within a new conceptual framework. Certainly, the concept of globalization is too big and complex for this short review to do justice to the diverse array of interpretations about the term that has appeared in the academic circle of debate (For a useful guide of the globalization debate, see Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson, 1995; Robertson, 1992; Scholte, 2000).⁶ Still, it seems that there have been two distinctively oppositional lines of thinking in academia. On the one hand, a host of intellectuals have asserted that globalization is largely an ideology-laden notion, often loosely connected to the neoliberalist and futurist ideas, which have been serving the interests of the transnational

⁵The current phase of globalization has been viewed by many as incurring the relative weakening of nation-states with respect to both national economy and patriotism, although different interpretations may be given about this observation (Pieterse, 1995, p.49).

⁶Globalization is a multifaceted concept that has economic, political, cultural, and technological aspects. In many cases, globalization is described chiefly in economic terms, referring to the growing economic interdependence of countries worldwide as well as the process of lifting government-imposed restrictions on the cross-border movement of goods, services, and capital. In this sense, globalization is a “redundant” term, little different from “internationalization” or “(economic) liberalization” (Scholte, 2000, pp.15-16). However, the phenomenon of globalization has deeper implications. Globalization entails the reconfiguration of geography, so that social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial distances and territorial borders (Scholte, 2000, pp.16-17). Sociologist Anthony Giddens thus views globalization as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (1990, p.64). In this regard, globalization can be defined as “the processes of the compression of the world and the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole”(Robertson, 1992, p.8). Global interdependence and the consciousness of the world encourage individuals and national societies to interpret their very existence as parts of a larger whole. Under this condition of globality, what it means to live in the world as a whole, and how it must be ordered, become universal questions, although these questions may receive quite different answers from individuals and societies. The process of globalization incurs a greater volume of not only economic but also cultural exchanges across borders. One prominent form of the cultural flow is Westernization (or Americanization). Yet the impacts of globalization on cultural patterns seem to be more complex, making it possible to discuss the heterogeneous nature of global (or “glocal”) cultures (Robertson, 1992).

media industry engaged in the process of swamping the cultural autonomy of local communities and disseminating consumerist values around the globe (e.g., McChesney, 1999; Wallenstein, 1998). On the other hand, other groups of thinkers have observed that globalization, or “glocalization” (Robertson, 1995) for the sake of this argument, involves complex interactions between different cultural forces, which would lead to the “hybridization” (Pieterse, 1995) of cultures in pluralistic ways, rather than to a cultural homogenization.

Despite these disagreements, one important consequence of the globalization debate was the popularization of a problematic introducing the polarity of “global-local” (or, as a philosophical variant, of universal-particular), which has replaced the traditional arena defined by West/East division, after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Robertson, 1995).⁷ Within this problematic, the “globalizing” trends are typically understood as in tension with “local” assertions of culture and identities, somewhat resembling the old polemics between the modernization thesis and the cultural imperialism thesis (Robertson, 1995). Some have seen dangerous trends from both sides of the globalizing and localizing tendencies. One famous example is Barber’s (1992) metaphorical juxtaposition of the “McWorld” and “Jihad World,” where the former represents a hegemonic homogenization toward a consumerist culture at the global level and the latter

⁷Concerning the global-local relationship, the global and the local are politically contested concepts. Basically, given that one key feature of globalization is the rise of supraterritoriality (Scholte, 2000), the global refers to something (i.e., thinking, action, values, or the condition generating these) transcendent of territorial demarcations, while the local indicates something place-based or tied with territorial conditions. However, the two key terms are given additional (positive or negative) meanings by critics holding differing perspectives on the globalization. For proponents of globalization, the global largely represents the irreversible trend of spreading a set of “universal” rules and values in the historically evolutionary process. For those criticizing the ongoing process of globalization, the global often indicates the hegemonic or ideological systems that disseminate consumerist culture or support American imperialistic world order. The term local tends to have meanings that are opposite of the global. Positively, the local is viewed as a reservoir of indigenous tradition and a site of resistance to the homogenizing trend. Negatively, the local is deemed as a source of anti-modern, anti-democratic, or irrational ways of thinking and action, such as religious fundamentalism and ethnic atavism.

stands for a particularistic and even irrational way of building local solidarity against outer forces. His proposition, however, met criticism for the reason that he allegedly put too much emphasis on small fractions of extremist tendencies and ignored the complementary process in which the “locality” is simultaneously shaped by and incorporated into the inclusive conception of “globality” (e.g., Robertson, 1992, 1995).

It is not the purpose of this study to delve into the difficult matter of assessing these claims. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the recent series of U.S.-involved crises involving the September 11 attacks, the resulting Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War in 2003, seemed to contribute much to shifting current issues of globalization from the homogenizing trend to the polarizing trend – specifically, the allegedly emerging threat of the “Jihad World” or approaching “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996) between Islam and the non-Islamic West (e.g., Friedman, 2004; Seib, 2004). Of course, even before 9/11, there had been a gradual escalation in U.S. society in its perception of Islamic fundamentalism as an emerging global threat succeeding the old villain of communism (Esposito, 1999; Hardar, 1992; Karabell, 1995). Yet the terrorist attacks of 9/11 seem to have provided to the American mind a decidedly amplifying moment for treating non-Western political communities outside the U.S. control, particularly those within the cultural boundary of Islam, as a present danger to American (often identified with modern) values (Karim, 2002; Seib, 2003).

Considering both the academic debate on the global-local relationship and the alleged emergence of Islam as a global threat, the popularity of Al-Jazeera among Arab viewers, along with the “rise of the Arab public sphere” (Lynch, 2006) mentioned earlier, showcases the ambivalent nature of a “hybridization” between the Western and the non-Western and the global and the local. The birth and operation of the 24-hour Arabic news channel was the result of a combination of several factors: satellite TV technology with a

reach going beyond the boundaries of Arab states, financial sponsorship by the Qatari emir, the hands-off approach by the government allowing editorial freedom, the recruits of BBC-trained staffs by happenstance, and the newsroom decision of adopting CNN-style reporting. As a whole, these factors fit well into an image of the harmonious merging of communication technology, the free flow of information, and a free press without state censorship, wherein there arose a process of globalization virtually identical to the process of Westernization in the minds of Western observers. Yet, after 9/11, as the tensions of the Arab opinion on the U.S.-led wars mounted, the pre-9/11 optimistic visions of U.S. observers who had celebrated Al-Jazeera's role in bringing free and open debate (e.g., Friedman, 2001a, 2001b) were largely replaced by worried remarks on the distinctively "Arab-oriented" nature of its coverage, such as graphic reporting on civilian casualties and a pro-Palestinian tone in the accounts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts (Ali, 2002). As a result, the predictable wartime impact of Al-Jazeera on its Arab audiences became a serious concern for some U.S. critics, "because clashes between civilizations can occur in ways other than armed conflict" (Seib, 2004, p.80).

The complex nature of the recent tensions between the United States and the Arab/Muslim world indicates an increased need for the American news media to pay close attention to what is going on outside their country and to engage in a dialogue with residents of other foreign communities. Ironically, although U.S.-based transnational media firms have been the main driver of globalization disseminating a consumerist culture at the world level (Herman, & McChesney, 1997), American society might remain "provincial" in the sense of intellectual isolationism (Seib, 2004). This worry has some grounds, considering the trend since the 1990s of the decline in international reporting by the U.S. broadcast and print media outlets in both quantity and quality (Bennett, 2005, p.23; Moisy, 1996; Seib, 2004). The usual rationales for limited foreign

coverage in the news business have been the costly nature of international reporting and the conventional wisdom that Americans' interests in foreign affairs declined after the demise of the Cold War (Moisy, 1996; Seib, 2004). Even after 9/11, according to a 2002 PEW study that interviewed editors at U.S. newspapers with a circulation of at least 100,000, 95% of the editors said that reader interest in international news had increased after the terrorist attacks, but 64% expected that this interest would soon decline to pre-9/11 levels (Morris & Associates, 2002). Regardless of its empirical validity, the conventional wisdom held by media professionals about the state of American news audiences may well be a cause for concern to those believing that, in this age of globalization, the American media's view of the world could and should become ever broader (Seib, 2004).

In summary, while the traditional concerns of the U.S. media portrayals of the developing world reflect the massive cries of the Third World for a re-distribution of communication resources two decades ago (e.g. Masmoudi, 1979; Stevenson & Cole, 1984), the recent tensions between the West and Islam suggest an increased need for U.S. media professionals to make efforts to build bridges, rather than dig ditches, between American society and pan-Arab communities (Friedman, 2004). Markedly, the sudden rise of Al-Jazeera as an influential wartime source of news and views critical of U.S. foreign policy came to signify one unpredictable aspect of the ongoing process of globalization. Against this background, the question of the U.S. media's treatment of the Arab TV channel, as both an Arab-oriented source of information and a controversial subject of debate, has relevance to a more profound issue of how willing American mainstream journalism is to offer a fair hearing to a wide array of critical or hostile foreign views, ranging from terrorist messages of hate to reasoned critiques of U.S. approach to Arab-related problems. Narrowing down the focus to specific subjects of

research, one topic was already identified in the previous section – the content diversity of the information supplied by Al-Jazeera that can be found in the American and British press. There are also other approaches in examining the media discourse related to Al-Jazeera. The following sections identify other subjects of research through theoretical discussions.

Media Dependence on Official Sources and Icon-driven Reporting

The scope of the U.S. (and British) media discourse related to Al-Jazeera goes beyond the incorporation of information supplied by the Arab broadcaster for reporting. Reporters of the two countries also covered a range of events and issues triggered by the performance of Al-Jazeera, such as their government's high-ranking officials' responses to the appearance of Osama bin Laden on the Arabic TV news channel. Given that many of the events involving Al-Jazeera implied a confrontation between the Arab TV network and the U.S.-led war forces, a question can be raised with regard to the nature of press-government relations: in their construction of the debate about Al-Jazeera; how critically independent were the news media from the political clout of their government officials? Or, to reverse the question, how uncritically deferential were the news media to the official lines of the day set by high-ranking government officials? This subject can be discussed in relation to the U.S. media's tendency toward heavy reliance on official sources, which has been an ongoing concern among many journalists and scholars of political communication and media sociology.

The nature of press-government relations in the U.S. has been a puzzle to many observers. There is a widespread belief among the American public that journalists are too antagonistic or "liberally biased" (Bennett, 2005, p.25). Some studies (e.g., Patterson, 1993, 2000) show that journalistic negativity in political news stories has been on the rise

since the 1980s, often accompanying a personalizing approach to public issues (Bennett, 2005, p. 40) or with an emphasis on tactical aspects of political life (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Meanwhile, many important studies on media coverage of political news indicate that this country's free press relies perhaps too much on official sources and their perspectives in coverage of public concerns (e.g., Cohen, 1963; Cook, 1998; Gans, 1979; Halberstam, 1979; Sigal, 1973; Tuchman, 1978). For example, Leon Sigal's (1973) pioneering study of the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* over a 20-year period found that, in both newspapers, government officials (domestic or foreign) accounted for almost 75% of all sources in political news; nearly 60% of news in hard news stories came through routine channels, such as official proceedings, press conferences and press releases. U.S. media sourcing patterns, which privilege a small spectrum of official viewpoints, combined with journalistic negativity on a personal level, produce an odd mix of "a narrow range of political ideas, interspersed with cranky criticisms of politicians and the games they play" (Bennett, 2005, p. 153).

The coupling of journalistic adversarialism with institutional deference (Orr, 1980) has been viewed by critical media sociologists as the combined result of routine news-gathering practices and professional norms of journalism (Bennett, 2005). Journalistic work routines, imposed by news organizations to secure a steady supply of news products in culturally familiar forms (Tuchman, 1978), create a social environment for reporters that is largely shaped by their sources and fellow beat reporters (Cohen, 1963; Gans, 1979; Sigal, 1973). Professional norms of journalism are the moral standards, codes of ethics, and guidelines about inserting one's viewpoint into a story — the conventions of objective reporting — that guide journalistic decision making (Bennett, 2005). Media sociologist Bennett (2005) asserts that professional norms of journalism, in an interplay with organizational work routines, contribute to creating "a

ritualistic posture of antagonism between press and government...while keeping most news content to political perspectives certified by authorities” (p.189). A five-nation survey (1990-1992) of journalists by Patterson and Donsbach (1996) yielded an interesting finding: American journalists showed the least diversity in their decisions about whom to interview for different hypothetical stories. This suggests strong norms of objective reporting among American journalists, which leads to the homogenization of the political content of their reporting.

American news media’s reliance on high-ranking official sources is particularly evident in coverage of U.S. foreign policy and U.S.-involved foreign crises (Bennett, 1990; Cohen, 1963; Halberstam, 1979). This tendency was termed “indexing” by Bennett (1990). According to the indexing hypothesis, the press tends to “index” the range of diverse viewpoints on a public issue, in both news and editorials, to the presence of powerful governmental actors or members of the political elite who also share these views. When the indexing norm determines news source patterns, in circumstances where it is hard to find elite voices criticizing the government policy in the governmental or Congressional debate, one likely consequence is the marginalization of oppositional viewpoints of grassroots or activist groups (Bennett, 1990). Bennett (1990) expected the indexing norm to be especially influential in media coverage of military decisions, foreign policy, or areas of issues where a considerable level of elite consensus exists.

As a general notion, the idea of news indexing resonates with a critical view (e.g., Hallin, 1986; Herman & Chomsky, 1988) of the mainstream new media as favoring the establishment position or at least avoiding offense to key principles of governance. As a specific theoretical expression, the indexing hypothesis predicts that the valence of media discussion about a given issue would be determined, regardless of public opinion, primarily by the degree of the elite conflict in Washington. Many studies of news

indexing in foreign policy have yielded findings supporting the original indexing hypothesis (e.g., Alexseev & Bennett, 1995; Bennett, 1990; Dorman & Livingston, 1994; Zaller & Chiu, 1996). Some studies of media coverage of U.S.-involved foreign crises, although they did not directly test the indexing hypothesis, produced findings backing the general notion of news indexing. For example, studies of media coverage of the policy debate and military performance during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis found that, in spite of apparently ample criticisms of the administration policy and its performance, the nature of criticisms reported in the media tended to be procedural rather than substantive (Entman & Page, 1994) or tactical rather than fundamental (Mermin, 1999).

Still, it is important to note that all research in this tradition did not follow suit. Some studies of news indexing in foreign policy found abundant criticisms of the U.S. government even when domestic officials and politicians were unified in their support of the administration's decision (e.g., Althaus, 2003; Althaus, Edy, Entman, & Phalen, 1996; Livingston & Eachus, 1996). These disagreements, although much of the discrepancies may be explained by the differences in ways in which "critical coverage" is defined (Althaus, 2003, p.386), suggest that news indexing as a specific form of a theoretical proposition is subject to a reconsideration. For example, Althaus and his colleagues' study of news broadcasts during the 1985-1986 Libya Crisis concluded that official debate-based news indexing should be interpreted, not as determining the "proportions" of pros and cons about a given policy, but as affecting "parameters" of media debate (Althaus, Edy, Entman, & Phalen, 1996). Furthermore, in his study of evening TV news during 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis, Althaus (2003) found that criticism of the administration occurred independently from the condition of indexing, and concluded that journalists exercised a substantial level of discretion in airing oppositional voices even in the absence of dissent from authoritative sources.

At least two explanations for a possible departure from the media habit of relying on the governmental debate have been suggested. One explanation sheds light on the flexible nature of professional media norms. In her discussion of objectivity as a strategic ritual, Tuchman (1972) noted that one of the strategies that reporters use to demonstrate objectivity is to “present conflicting possibilities” (p.665). This refers to a story-telling imperative by which journalists seek out sources of opposing opinion to meet the condition that every news story has at least two sides. While this tendency, which is usually called fairness or balance in the news, can be criticized as an artificial oversimplification of a complex issue (Bennett, 2005, p. 183), this story-telling imperative may also encourage reporters to actively seek out legitimate oppositional voices, such as foreign elite opinion, outside the official circle of debate, particularly when members of the opposition party in Congress do not dare to challenge a dominant policy position (Althaus, 2003; Althaus, Edy, Entman, & Phalen, 1996; Cook, 1998).

The second explanation stems from the event characteristics of what Molotch and Lester (1974) identified as “accidents” and distinguished from “routine events” through their typology of news events. Many news events covered by journalists can indeed be classified into routine events, such as press conferences, where politicians make considerable efforts to turn media presentation of the situation to their advantage. Some routine events fall into the category of “pseudo-events” (Boorstin, 1961), which are events deliberately planned, carefully managed, and fully controlled by powerful newsmakers to remain ambiguous in relating the presented images to the underlying reality. In contrast, “accidents” tends to have results that are opposite of routine events (Molotch & Lester, 1974, p.109). Accident-driven news differs from the indexing of voices and views associated with the routine news-gathering, and some dramatic accidental events can license journalists to utilize nonmainstream voices and challenging ideas in significant

portions (Lawrence, 1996). Thus, some accidental occurrences beyond the control of official sources can provide “pegs” for journalists on which to hang criticism of a government policy (Althaus, 2003, p.405).

This alternative possibility has been further explored by Bennett and his colleagues in their discussion of “news icons” (Bennett & Lawrence, 1995; Lawrence, 1996). In their definition, a news icon is “an image that lives on beyond its originating event by being introduced into a variety of subsequent news contexts” (Bennett & Lawrence, 1995, p.20). Journalists can employ news icons to symbolically recount news stories about larger issues. For instance, the beating of Rodney King in 1991 was initially just one story but evolved over time into a news icon through the journalistic use of the story as a vivid example of the harassment of African Americans by police force and, ultimately, of the stubborn persistence of racism in American society (Lawrence, 1996). Indeed, only a small number of accidental occurrences can achieve the status of a fully-fledged news icon. Officials may respond to accidental events with a unified voice and successfully depress their effects on political agenda. Lawrence (1996, p.447) specifies this type of accidental events as a “near-icon,” whose repercussions remain at the level of a short-lived prominence of challenging views in news discourse and soon subside. In some circumstances, however, officials may not manage the effect of icon-driven news effectively; fully-fledged news icons may stimulate political dynamics of “damage control,” which is further facilitated by journalistic use of news icons as a means of expanding the range of views in the news (Lawrence, 1996, p.447).

Interestingly, all of the possibilities described so far (i.e., the media dependence on official sources and possible conditions for a departure from routine coverage) seem to be met by the characteristics of the pre-Iraq War climate: the continued post-9/11 nationalistic mood promoted by the Bush administration, the virtual absence of

Congressional opposition to the government policy, the presence of globalized resistance to the American plan of going to war both within the United States and around the world, and the meteoric rise of Al-Jazeera as a global news agent signifying a challenge to U.S.-led wartime PR campaigns. Prior to the war there was a good deal of diplomacy and debate over the U.S.-led war plan among the members of U.N. Security Council, with France and Germany emerging as leaders of the opposition group. Given this circumstance, American news media may well have cited French and German high-ranking officials as legitimate “counterbalancing” voices in coverage of the international-level policy debate. It is much more difficult, however, to conjecture how the American (and British) news organizations may have treated Al-Jazeera, a non-Western TV station that suddenly rose from obscurity to gain global fame, in coverage of the events and issues that often involved conflicts between the Arab TV network and the leaders of the U.S. and British governments.

Under these circumstances, two alternative scenarios are possible. One is that the U.S. news media, either intimidated by government pressure or driven by their own nationalistic mindset, may have followed the government lead and largely dismissed Al-Jazeera as an untrustworthy source of enemy propaganda. The other is that the unprecedented rise of Al-Jazeera, which signified a regional resistance to the U.S. foreign policy, may have prompted journalists to employ the maverick news outlet as a challenging “news icon” or “near-icon” (Lawrence, 1996) and thereby shift the story beyond the confines of the official debate to incorporate nonmainstream voices, especially those of Arab media workers and members of Arab/Muslim audiences. Certainly, it is probable that the American newsroom is neither completely dependent on the official line of the day nor fully independent of the patriotic pressure in wartime, but this cross-national case study can help determine, for the matter of covering controversies

related to the Arab broadcaster, where the news actually falls within the latitude of these two opposing possibilities.

Normative Ideas about News Media in Contest

For the purpose of this research, the previous discussion of source patterns in news reporting can be connected to a question of “who” appeared in news discourse as a voice speaking about Al-Jazeera and its related issues. In addition, media accounts of the controversies involving Al-Jazeera can be examined in terms of “what” was said about Al-Jazeera and the stand-off between the Arab TV network and leaders of the U.S.-led war-waging forces. In a broader context, Western media presentation of the so-called “Al-Jazeera effect” (Trofimov, 2003) — a shorthand in a *Wall Street Journal* headline that referred to the impact of the satellite TV news channel on the perception of the war among especially Arab audiences and others in the rest of the world — constituted an important part of the phenomenon called a “media war” or a “propaganda war.” Discussion of the media war, addressing manipulation of news by political actors and problematic practices of wartime journalism, inevitably brings up underlying concerns related to news media, such as society’s respect for journalistic autonomy and media professionals’ responsible reporting (Schwartz, 2004). In this regard, one possible approach for content analysis is to examine what kinds of normative visions about news media were brought into play in the U.S. and British media accounts of Al-Jazeera’s performance and of the reactions by governmental or military actors of the two countries.

Normative thinking about news media has a considerable status in American literature of news media and mass communication. Much of this line of thinking draws on the widely acknowledged unique status of journalism in democracy (Joseph, 2005, pp. 575-576). For instance, the normative link between journalism and democracy was

emphatically summarized by noted media scholar James Carey, who called journalism “another name for democracy.” In Carey’s view, the practices of journalism are justifiable in terms of their contributions to democratic social order, and, in this respect, journalism without democracy is merely “something resembling a news business” (Carey, 1996). For journalism, its normative character serves as both its legitimization and a yardstick for assessing media performance (McQuail, 1994, pp. 4-5). Within this framework, criticisms of U.S. news media abound, pointing out how the mainstream American journalism falls short of meeting some expectations in light of democratic ideals.

It is worth noting, however, that such normative discourse about journalism and news media emanating from Western, especially U.S., society has often been criticized by advocates of a comparative perspective as legitimizing a Western (or American) ethnocentric tendency (e.g., Curran & Park, 2000; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Josephi, 2005). For example, Freedom House, a U.S.-based non-profit organization judging a country’s news media by the degree of press freedom, for 2005 rated the majority of countries in the world as not free or only partly free (Freedom House, 2006). This yearly practice was viewed by some critics as an example of the attempts, by intentional or unintentional implication, to make journalism a prerogative of leading Western nations (e.g., Curran & Park, 2000; Kunczik, 1999, p.53). While there is little doubt that press freedom as a democratic value has great appeal to media practitioners in most regions of the world (McQuail, 1994, p.130), the practices of applying a normatively-based definition of journalism worldwide have often been regarded as privileging the historical experiences derived from the North American media system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Mancini, 2000). This contentious aspect of the normative discourse of journalism suggests gaps between the proposed scheme and its actual implementation and also, when

political or other interests intervene, inconsistencies between the rhetoric and the underlying reality.

In academia, a host of scholars has made intellectual efforts to describe and sort out normative models of news media around the world. Siebert and his colleagues' (1956) *Four Theories of the Press* has been the most widely-known and influential work on this subject. In the book, the authors suggested that the media system could be classified according to four main types of theory: authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility, and Soviet theory. This classification system carried a bipolarity of libertarianism and authoritarianism, along with historical variants in the United States and in the Soviet Union (i.e., social responsibility and Soviet theories), which was presented in a way largely fitting within the Cold War mentality (Joseph, 2005; Nerone, 1995). Since the *Four Theories*, other scholars have proposed modifications or their own versions of the classification system. For instance, McQuail (1994, p.131) added to the original typology two models: developmental and democratic-participatory media; Hachten (1981) suggested five normative models: authoritarian, Soviet, Western, development, and revolutionary media; Altschull (1984) presented three models of media system: market, Marxist, and advancing media, corresponding to the divisions into the First, Second, and Third Worlds. Altschull also pointed out sizable gaps between theory and practice and concluded that all media systems, in reality, operate in service of the powerful.

Drawing on these proposed normative theories or models, the researcher identifies four underlying core concepts about news media: *free*, *responsible*, *developmental*, and *alternative media*. The last term, alternative media, is a replacement of what McQuail (1994) called a democratic-participatory model of media, following theoretical accounts of alternative media (Atton, 2002) and radical media (Downing, 2001). These multiple

lines of media-related normative thinking were arranged to help examine thematic expressions found in the media presentation of controversies involving Al-Jazeera. Below is a summary of the four normative conceptions of news media that have been formulated in the academic circle of debate:

Free Media. The concept of media freedom has been advocated most forcefully in the classical libertarian theory of the press (e.g., Rivers, 1970; Rivers, Miller, & Gandy, 1975; Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956). As an expression of political philosophy, the libertarian conception of the press emerged through an extension from individual rights to freedom of opinion, speech, and assembly (McQuail, 1994, p.124). Libertarian theory has an origin traceable to the writings of Milton (*Areopagitica*) in Britain, but was fully developed in the North American colonies and during the early years of the U.S. republic. Historically, this theory made a strong case against state censorship, licensing, political control, and the victimization of journalists for reporting a controversial view or refusing to tell lies (McQuail, 1994, p.124).

The libertarian notion of press freedom has been applied to different lines of thinking and rhetoric. The metaphor of “free marketplace of ideas,” which first appeared in the writing of Justice Oliver Holmes in 1919, gained popularity by combining an imagined battle of ideas with the optimistic economic tenet of free and uninhibited trade (Dickerson, 1996; pp.367-368). Another influential metaphor is the journalistic self-conception of “watchdog,” where a free press is viewed as a means for monitoring and challenging the actions of the politically (and often economically) powerful, and by doing so representing and protecting the public interest. This familiar analogy suggests the role of journalism as an adversary to authority within the libertarian framework (Rivers, 1970; Rivers, Miller, & Gandy, 1975).

At the same time, the notion of press freedom has often been identified with property rights and has been taken to mean the right to own and use means of publication without restraint or interference from the government (Glasser, 1986, p.93; McQuail, 1994, p.129). The pure form of libertarian theory has been frequently invoked to protect the owners of media, yet failed to give to an equivalent degree the arguable rights of free expression to media workers within the press or their audiences (Curran, 1991; McQuail, 1994, p.130). Except for matters involving governmental actors, the libertarian theory has largely been ineffective in handling many pressures to which media are subject, especially those arising from market circumstances (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). There are also other criticisms of the classical libertarian theory of the press, such as the vagueness in applying press freedom to broadcasting and the difficulty dealing with various issues related to the flow of information in the digital age (For more debate on this subject, see Curran, 1991; Glasser, 1986; Keane, 1991).

Responsible media. The origin of this idea can be traced most clearly to the Commission on Freedom of the Press (commonly called the Hutchins Commission), which in 1947 issued a report establishing the theory of socially responsible media. This report endorsed the prevailing principle of a free press but made an important change by adding the concept of social responsibility. Social responsibility theory involves a view that media ownership and operation are essentially a form of public trust, rather than an unlimited private franchise. At the same time, this theory states that the press should be free and self-regulated, at least in principle, without government interference. Criticizing sensationalistic media coverage, the Hutchins Report specified the main standards which a responsible press should observe, including: a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context that gives them meaning; a forum for the

exchange of comment and criticism; the projection of a representative picture of constituent groups in society; and the presentation and clarification of the goals and values of the society (Hutchins, 1947).

For the privately owned media, social responsibility theory has been expressed and applied mainly in the form of ethical codes of professional journalism (McQuail, 1994, p.124). Sociological or historical studies of U.S. modern journalism (e.g., Mindich, 1998; Schudson, 1978; Tuchman, 1978) have described key features of American professional reporting that have been advocated in the name of media responsibility. Lance Bennett (2005) summarized this literature and presented six components of professional journalism. Of these, two kinds of journalistic norms have direct relevance to the convention of objective and responsible reporting: the requirement of a journalist to be a politically neutral observer of the day's events and the ethical duty of complying with the public's standard of decency and good taste (Bennett, 2005, p.184).⁸

The ideal of objectivity has been especially influential in the minds of American media professionals, and, as noted in the preceding discussion of the U.S. media's dependence on official sources, a good deal of intense debate has taken place centering around the question of whether objective reporting is viable and desirable. In addition, the standard of decency and good taste has often been criticized, in that avoiding offensive ideas in reporting may lead to removing from public awareness some undesirable but true aspects of the real world (Bennett, 2005, p.193; Ellul, 1973). Although the general concept of media responsibility is sensible to most members of society, the social responsibility theory has never proved easy in reaching effective self-regulation (McQuail, 1994, p.126). Also noteworthy is that the practices of objective

⁸Bennett also delineates other characteristics of professional journalism as a practice: the practices of training journalists as generalists, as opposed to specialists, and the practice of editorial review (Bennett, 2005, pp.184-185).

reporting historically preceded professional norms of journalism. Historical evidence suggests that media norms such as objectivity and balance appeared in correspondence with the development of the news business under market circumstances, rather than with ethical considerations in pursuit of truth (Mindich, 1998; Schudson, 1978). The notion of media responsibility has multifaceted aspects, serving not only as a culturally binding force but also as a means of self-justifying rhetoric.

Developmental media. Unlike the libertarian and social responsibility press theories, the idea of developmental media has been applied mainly to non-Western societies outside the United States and Western Europe. This concept has its roots in developmental communication, which goes back to the 1950s and 1960s U.S.-involved policy debate dominated by the so-called modernization paradigm. Scholars of early developmental communication focused on transferring technology and the sociopolitical culture of developed societies to the traditional non-Western societies (e.g., Lerner, 1958; Pye, 1963; Schramm, 1964). From this perspective, developed Western societies were presumed as the ultimate model that underdeveloped societies should emulate, and attitudes of “backward” people were viewed as obstacles to be removed for modernization. Differences among indigenous cultures were largely understood in terms of the degree of development rather than the unique nature of each. Within this paradigm, the concept of developmental media emerged as a vital means of teaching people modern (and also Western) attitudes, values, and lifestyles (Mohammadi, 1995). This conceptual framework has shaped much of the Western understanding about developmental communication and media in the Third World.

Yet, by the late 1960s, various academic and development communities, especially in Latin America, began to challenge this Western view of developmental

communication. Proponents of dependency theory (e.g., Dos Santos, 1970) or cultural imperialism (e.g., Schiller, 1976) asserted that the prevailing poor conditions of Third World nations mainly came from international structures, where the main interest of the developed nations is to remain wealthy by perpetuating the poor state of the peripheral group of underdeveloped nations. Reflecting this intellectual mood, the aforementioned NWIO (or NWICO) movement in the 1970s called for balancing of international information flow and communication resources and advancing new models of developmental communication more sensitive to the needs of local people and more consonant with indigenous cultures (e.g., Masmoudi, 1979). The normative implications of developmental communication have since become more complicated, vacillating between the Westernization perspectives and the Third World's own aspirations. However, since this case study examines the U.S. and British media's view of the Arab TV network Al-Jazeera, the basic line of Western understanding about the developmental media will be considered for an analysis of thematic expressions in media discourse.

In addition, there have been contentious arguments over the meaning of the related term "developmental journalism." Simply speaking, developmental journalism refers to the kind of journalism underscoring issues related to the relevance of economic or other development projects to national or local needs (Edeani, 1993; Fair, 1988). In a sense, developmental journalism can be seen as reflecting the Hutchins Commission's view of press responsibility (Gunaratne, 1998). However, many Western critics largely equate developmental journalism with a government-controlled form of communication, thus akin to the authoritarian or Communist conception of news media (e.g., Hachten, 1992; Lambeth, 1995; Stevenson, 1994). According to this view, the concept of development itself entails a situation in which the government mobilizes mass media with methods that include the suppression of civil liberties such as press freedom. Meanwhile,

defenders of developmental or development journalism argued against the equation of development-oriented news with government-controlled news, asserting that this model involves critical examination and evaluation of development programs, independent from the government (e.g., Edeaini, 1993; Frederick, 1993; Gurantne, 1998; Ogan, 1982).⁹

Alternative media. As a normative model, alternative media is perhaps the most elusive and underdeveloped in the field of communication. Similar underlying ideas to that of alternative media often go by different names, such as an “emancipatory” use of media (Enzensberger, 1970), the “radical” media as an alternative public sphere (Downing, 1984), the “grassroots” media in developmental communities (Traber, 1985), and a “democratic-participatory” model of media (McQuail, 1994, p.131). However, custom and practice within this tradition appear to have settled on “alternative” as the preferred term (Atton, 2002). In the U.S. and European societies the calls for alternative types of media began in the 1960s and continued, in recognition of technological developments allowing for ordinary people’s use of small-scale media and of increasing criticisms of the mainstream media by public or private monopolies (McQuail, 1994, p.131).

Although alternative media or its similar concepts rarely appear in a fully theorized form in the literature of communication, theoretical seeds can be found in the Marxist tradition, especially from the Gramscian notion of counter-hegemony that have been applied most clearly to working-class newspapers and radical socialist publications (e.g., Allen, 1985; Downing, 1984; Sparks, 1985). Meanwhile, McQuail’s (1994) accounts of democratic-participatory media can be seen as positioning alternative media as an extreme within the framework of liberal pluralism (Atton, 2002). These competing

⁹Edeaini (1993) makes a distinction between developmental journalism and development journalism, largely equating the former with a government-controlled form of communication and the latter with independent and socially responsible reporting. In this writing, however, this belabored distinction is disregarded.

theoretical backgrounds suggest that the blanket term “alternative” encompasses far more than radical or social-change-aiming publishing can. British scholar Raymond Williams noted a difference between alternative practices and oppositional (which may be interpreted as counter-hegemonic) practices, saying that alternative culture seeks a place to coexist within the existing hegemony, whereas oppositional culture aims to replace it (Williams, 1983, p.250). This helps clarify nuanced differences within the ways in which alternative types of communication are organized and advocated through media use, yet it is often difficult to draw a line between the aforementioned two types of audience culture.

The range of alternative media is quite broad in all their forms (printed, broadcast, and electronic), perspectives, and styles. The notion of alternative media has been extended into literary and artistic media producing apparently non-political contents, such as self-published underground magazines (commonly called zines) (Duncombe, 1997) and electronic publishing opposing intellectual property rights (Atton, 1999). Given this diversity, alternative media may be classified as largely a relational concept, depending on what is defined as dominant or mainstream. In addition, theoretical accounts of alternative media (e.g., Downing, 2001) underscore not only the differences in content or medium but also the differences in how communication as a social (rather than simply informational) process is formulated by media performance. Narrowing down the focus to the practices of journalism, the key difference between the mainstream media and the alternative media lies in their selection of news and in the way the selection is made, particularly how the alternative media politicizes the “repression of events” (Fiske, 1992, p.50).

The review of the literature on normative media theory delineated above has been selective and purposeful. The researcher's intent has not been to chronicle theoretical trends but to uncover discernible lines of normative thinking that underlie specific expressions on subjects related to news media or journalism. For the purpose of this case study, the multiple lines of normative thinking about news media identified above can serve as a useful guide for developing a sophisticated content analysis scheme to examine what kinds of journalism-related normative themes were frequently brought to the media-constructed debate over the controversies involving Al-Jazeera in the U.S. and British press. This content analysis strategy, compared with a simple measurement of the media tone in terms of positive versus negative, offers a better way of capturing the richness of the media discourse and uncovering nuanced differences in ways by which certain issue characters were given emphasis through media framing.¹⁰ A theme-based examination of the media discourse can uncover the differences between two positive evaluations of Al-Jazeera, when, for example, the one was based on its developmental media function in the Arab world and the other highlighted its role as an alternative source of information beyond the U.S. control.

¹⁰Political communication scholars in the tradition of constructionism underscore the significance of "framing" choices that government officials, politicians, journalists, interest groups, and other actors make to promote certain perceptions and interpretations that benefit one side in a given controversy while hindering others (Entman, 2003, p.416; for more on constructionism, see Neuman, Just, and Crigler, 1992, pp.17-18). Frames, the outcome of framing efforts, are "thematic categories that integrate and give meaning to the scene, the characters, their actions, and supporting documentation" (Bennett, 2005, p.38). Markedly, constructionist scholar William Gamson has made a link between specific media frames and larger cultural themes, saying that some media frames have more compelling power when they resonate with cultural themes that are widely accepted in a political culture (1992, p.135; See also Snow and Benford, 1988). The relationship between cultural themes and media frames in Gamson's account is similar to the resonance between the socially shared media-related normative ideas and the specific themes applied to matters related to Al-Jazeera. In this regard, the researcher's examination of normative media themes can be seen as a media frame analysis. However, media sociologist Stephen Reese criticizes the trend of reducing a frame into an issue position or a dominant theme identified in an individual story, emphasizing that a frame reflects a culturally accepted and broader way of addressing a range of issues (2003, pp. 13-14). To avoid terminological problems, this study uses the term theme, not frame, to refer to the thematic ideas invoked in the media accounts of the issues involving Al-Jazeera.

In addition, an examination of the media-related themes helps reveal how the normative aspects of journalism could be politicized in practice both by situational factors and by the interference of various interests. During the post-9/11 period of the War on Terror and the Iraq War, as mentioned in the beginning of this section, many analyses and discussions of the control and manipulation of information by key political actors took place in the Western media outlets, which reflected their underlying concerns related to the principles of journalism (Schwartz, 2004). As part of the phenomenon called the media war, Al-Jazeera's rise as an important source of war-related information and its popularity especially among Arab Muslim audiences provided American and British journalists with an opportunity to think about their own practices of wartime journalism. Yet this journalistic self-reflexivity was played out in the nationalistic mood, especially in U.S. society, and also through the filter of the editorial stances of media outlets with regard to the U.S. military intervention within the Arab/Muslim world. Given these circumstances, an examination of thematic expressions in the media accounts related to Al-Jazeera can show how interlocking and competing journalistic visions were mobilized in newspaper discourses, in a way of either undermining the legitimacy of Al-Jazeera or, to the contrary, advocating the Arab media outlet and furthermore utilizing some events or issues related to Al-Jazeera as a means of criticizing the U.S.-led war and its related policy.

SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL ISSUES

Against the backdrop of the wartime rise of Al-Jazeera in recent years, the literature review in the previous sections identified three theoretical issues:

1. Given the much-discussed imbalance in international news flow, what can we say about the so-called “reverse flow of information” from Al-Jazeera to the U.S. and the British media? Is it a genuinely meaningful phenomenon such that the Arabic news outlet provided to the discourse in the two countries’ elite press not only terrorist messages of hate but also alternative accounts of war and “Arab-oriented” perspectives on the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East?
2. Given the tendency of the U.S. mainstream media’s reliance on official sources in coverage of U.S.-involved foreign crises, what is the implication of the mediated public debates over the events and issues related to Al-Jazeera in the U.S. and the British press? In particular, how often did the media attention to Al-Jazeera lead to “icon-driven” news stories in which the journalist referenced the Arab news organization to introduce a wide range of views of non-official sources, especially employees at Al-Jazeera, its Arab/Muslim audiences, or those critical of the post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy?
3. Given the various normative notions of news media and their role in society, what kind of themes related to the norms of journalism did the U.S. and the British news media invoke in describing Al-Jazeera’s performance and its confrontation with the U.S.-led war-waging forces? In the post-9/11 politicized context of media discussion, what rhetorical roles did the thematic elements brought into the media discourse play, in either undermining the legitimacy of Al-Jazeera as an institution of journalism, or advocating the value of Arab journalism and furthermore criticizing the U.S. government’s approach to the Arab news outlet?

To gain a better overview of the media discourse associated with these theoretical issues, this study conducts a comparative content analysis of prestigious U.S. and British

newspapers that editorially took different stances toward the Bush administration's post-9/11 foreign policy, especially the war in Iraq. One basis for this comparison is the commonality of the U.S. and the British government positions – in both countries the government decided to invade Iraq (and, in a broader context, to co-participate in the “War on Terror” campaign). Simultaneously, as described in the Introduction (Chapter 1), the researcher considers two possible causes of differences among newspapers, one being a newspaper's editorial policy toward the war (pro-war versus anti-war) and the other being the national context about the government policy (American versus British).

Thus, by introducing a two-by-two research design into the content analysis, this study attempts to capture potential differences among the two countries' hawkish and dovish press, in both citing Al-Jazeera for news reporting and expressing views regarding the Arabic news channel. This will help determine whether the discourse related to Al-Jazeera was peculiar to the U.S. press or a more general feature of the Western news establishment. In addition, it will help determine how much the discourse concerning Al-Jazeera was a result of political considerations – especially the specific policy position of the news organization. Key concepts and research questions are identified in the following sections.

DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Each of the three theoretical questions outlined in the previous section suggests a focus for analyzing the media text in which the word “Al-Jazeera” occurs in a variety of contexts. In order to make clear what will be examined throughout the series of content analysis, it is helpful to distinguish between different modes of addressing Al-Jazeera in media discourse. In the following conceptualization of three addressing modes, the researcher uses the term *AJ*, an acronym for Al-Jazeera, to indicate that, as a word, Al-

Jazeera occurs in the media text within the specific context outlined in each of the three modes:

1. *AJ as source of information.* In this addressing mode, AJ is referred to as a source of information that American or British journalists describe in news stories. The range of AJ-sourced information includes: contents from Al-Jazeera's own news stories and non-news programs, Al-Jazeera's broadcast of the material originally produced by a third party such as Al Qaeda, and comments from an Al-Jazeera employee interviewed by American or British journalists.
2. *AJ as subject of media-mediated debate.* In this addressing mode, AJ is mentioned as a subject of a media-constructed debate, in which a variety of sources are directly or indirectly quoted as commenting on Al-Jazeera itself or other actor's behavior toward Al-Jazeera. The range of AJ-related subjects covers the characteristics of Al-Jazeera as a news organization, the quality of AJ-sourced information, the conduct of employees at Al-Jazeera, and the behavior of other actors, including the U.S. government and military, toward Al-Jazeera.
3. *AJ as normative issue of journalism.* In this addressing mode, AJ is mentioned in the context of raising a normative issue, by which a variety of themes related to norms of journalism or philosophies of news media can be invoked by either the reporter, a source quoted by the reporter, or the writer of an opinion piece. These AJ-related normative themes reflect underlying notions such as society's respect for media freedom, media responsibility codified into professional conduct, the developmental function of the Third World media, and the role of media as an alternative outlet of news and views.

These three AJ-addressing modes are the key features of the media discourse in the U.S. and British newspapers on which this research project concentrates in developing a set of research questions. For convenience, from now on, the researcher will call these addressing modes *AJ as source*, *AJ as subject* and *AJ as normative issue*, respectively, except when specifying their full names would be helpful for clarification.

For this study's research, the concept of *AJ as source* plays a guiding role in identifying and examining the kind of media content that incorporates some information sourced from Al-Jazeera, while both concepts of *AJ as subject* and *AJ as normative issue* are useful for analyzing the kind of media content that describes, favorably or unfavorably, either the news organization Al-Jazeera or the conduct of other actors toward Al-Jazeera. For the purpose of analysis, the difference between *AJ as subject* and *AJ as normative issue* is that, while the former focuses on the matter of *who* is quoted in media discourse about Al-Jazeera, the latter is concerned with the matter of *what* is said about Al-Jazeera, either by the reporter/writer or those quoted.

STATEMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on all of the discussions laid out so far, the researcher developed the following research questions:

1. During the Bush administration's "War on Terror" period, what were the characteristics of the media discourse with AJ as a source of information in the U.S. and British elite press? In other words, what kind of information was selected from Al-Jazeera by the two countries' journalists for news reporting? How were editorial policy and national context related to use of information sourced from Al-Jazeera?

2. What were the characteristics of the media discourse that addressed AJ as a subject of the media-mediated debate in the U.S. and British press? In other words, who was quoted by the two countries' journalists as expressing views about Al-Jazeera and other actors' behavior toward Al-Jazeera? How were editorial policy and national context related to the extent to which the two countries' journalists quoted official sources and non-official sources for news reporting?
3. What were the characteristics of the media discourse that addressed AJ as a normative issue of journalism in the U.S. and British press? In other words, what kinds of normative themes were invoked in describing Al-Jazeera and the other actors' behavior toward Al-Jazeera in news stories and opinion pieces? How were editorial policy and national context related to the kinds of normative themes invoked?

In short, the three research questions stated above address potential differences among the two countries' pro-war and anti-war news outlets, in terms of (1) what AJ says as a source, (2) who speaks about AJ as a subject, and (3) what is said about AJ as a normative issue. The next chapter describes the methods employed in the research project, including data selection, the development of coding schemes, and the coding procedure for a series of content analyses conducted. In particular, for the purpose of examining the three types of AJ-addressing media discourse, three key variables will be introduced: *AJ-as-source topic*, *AJ-as-subject source*, and *AJ-as-issue theme*.

Chapter 3

Methods

In this chapter, the description of the research methods are divided into three steps: (1) raw data gathering and initial data sorting, (2) an article-unit analysis of AJ-sourced content, and (3) two sessions of analyses of AJ-evaluative content. The examination of AJ-evaluative content involved two separate coding procedures, one for a source-unit analysis and the other for a theme-unit analysis. The three sessions of coding in the second and third steps of research (an article-unit analysis of AJ-sourced content, a source-unit analysis of AJ-evaluative content, and a theme-unit analysis of AJ-evaluative content) correspond to the researcher's aim to analyze three modes of AJ-related media discourse — specifically, media discourse addressing AJ as source, subject, and normative issue, respectively.

DATA SELECTION AND INITIAL DATA CATEGORIZATION

For a comparative content analysis, four prestigious newspapers were selected: the *Wall Street Journal* and the *New York Times* from the United States, and the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Guardian* from the Great Britain. For simplicity, from now on, these four newspapers are denoted in an abbreviated form: the *Journal*, the *Times*, the *Telegraph*, and the *Guardian*, respectively. Of these newspapers, the *Journal* and the *Telegraph* editorially supported the U.S.-led military campaigns in Iraq, whereas the *Times* and the *Guardian* editorially opposed their governments' decision of going to war (See the Introduction for more on their editorial stances). In addition, articles from the

Sunday Telegraph and the *Observer*, the sister Sunday weeklies of the *Telegraph* and the *Guardian* respectively, were also collected and compiled into their respective affiliated dailies' contents. The sister weeklies just mentioned are generally regarded as the Sunday versions of their related dailies. The inclusion of the Sunday editions was done to make a fair comparison between the U.S. and the British papers in the number of stories published throughout the entire week.

Content analysis data were gathered from two online news databases, *Factiva* and *Lexis-Nexis*. Except for the *Times* stories, all articles published by the newspapers were collected from *Factiva*. Since the stories published by the *Times* were not accessible at *Factiva*, the *Lexis-Nexis* database was instead used for the retrieval of the *Times* data. Using the search words "al-jazeera" and "al jazeera," the researcher retrieved both news stories (straight news stories, news analyses, and features) and opinion pieces (editorials, columns, and letters to the editor pieces) from the two online databases.

The time period for research was set up between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2003, beginning with the World Trade Center attacks in 2001 and ending around the time when U.S. authorities announced the arrest of Saddam Hussein in mid-December of 2003. As a matter of fact, the researcher retrieved all articles that had been published by the four newspapers since the launching of the Al-Jazeera channel in November 1994, including stories dated prior to 9/11. Nevertheless, because the number of the pre-9/11 stories retrieved was very small, this study concentrates on analyzing the post-9/11 media content, except when a comparison between the pre-9/11 data and the post-9/11 data would show meaningful findings.

After a series of online searches were conducted, a total of 1,177 articles (1,073 published after 9/11) were collected at *Factiva* and *Lexis-Nexis*. Table 1 shows the overview of articles retrieved from the four news outlets. Worthy of note is that, as

Table 1: Overview of Raw Data Initially Retrieved

Raw Data Type	<u>Pro-war Paper</u>		<u>Anti-war Paper</u>	
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>
News story with substantial length ^a	66.1%	81.5%	79.0%	74.0%
News story without substantial length	13.2	3.4	3.4	3.6
Opinion piece, except letter-to-the-editor	20.7	13.7	13.7	20.1
Letter-to-the-editor	0.0	1.4	2.9	2.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(<i>N</i> of articles) ^b	(174)	(205)	(410)	(388)

^aNews story more than 150 words

^bFigures may not add up to totals because of fractional weighting and rounding.

presented in Table 1, the number of articles retrieved was larger from the two countries' anti-war newspapers (i.e., the *Times* and the *Guardian*) than from the other hawkish newspapers (i.e., the *WJ Journal* and the *Telegraph*). Table 1 also shows, from each newspaper, both the number of news stories with more than 150 words and of opinion pieces excluding letters to the editor. Although the extremely short news stories and letters-to-the-editor pieces were included during the entire coding stages, the researcher will later concentrate on presenting findings based on the analysis of post-9/11 articles having substantial lengths.

The initial raw data included any story containing the keyword, regardless of the context in which the word occurred. Using the individual article as a unit of analysis, the researcher created a preliminary coding protocol in order to determine different types of

raw data, according to the context in which Al-Jazeera is addressed in an article. As a result, four types of articles were identified in the following manner:

(1) *Article only with AJ-sourced content* was assigned to the news stories (i.e., straight news stories, news analyses, and features) in which the reporter identified either the news channel Al-Jazeera, an individual affiliated with Al-Jazeera, or some material broadcasted by Al-Jazeera, as a source of information.

(2) *Article only with AJ-evaluative content* was assigned to the report or opinion pieces in which either the reporter, any source quoted by the reporter (for news stories), or the writer (for opinion pieces), showed a positive, negative, or mixed tone in describing or commenting on either Al-Jazeera, an individual affiliated with Al-Jazeera, or some material broadcasted by Al-Jazeera, or the behavior of another actor toward Al-Jazeera.

(3) *Article with both types of contents* was assigned to the news stories that met the conditions for both the first and the second categories.

(4) *Article without any type of content* was assigned to the news stories or opinion pieces that did not meet the conditions for any of the prior categories.

For further clarification, the articles classified into the category of either (1), (2), or (3) altogether can be thought of as constituting the media discourse that involves at least one of the three AJ-addressing modes laid out in the previous chapter, namely, AJ as source, AJ as subject, and AJ as normative issue. Specifically, the articles containing AJ-sourced content — article type (1) or (3) — can be thought of as the media discourse addressing AJ as source, while the articles containing AJ-evaluative content — article type (2) or (3) — can be thought of as the media discourse addressing AJ either as subject

or as normative issue. In contrast, articles assigned to article type (4) were treated as irrelevant to the purpose of this study and were thus excluded from further coding procedures.

Using this coding scheme, two graduate students participated in the task of sorting out the initially retrieved raw data into one of the four categories listed above. The specific instructions that the coders received in order to identify AJ-sourced content and AJ-evaluative content are described in Appendix B. Reliability across the two coders was assessed on a sample of 100 randomly selected articles from the four newspapers. Letters-to-the-editor pieces and news stories shorter than 151 words were not included in the sample, because the researcher wanted to perform a reliability test on articles with substantial lengths. The inter-coder agreement reached 87% (Cohen's Kappa= .82). These figures are also presented in Appendix A.

The results of the initial data categorization are given in Table 2. The figures indicate that, as already mentioned above, there was a discrepancy in the size of raw data between the pro-war and anti-war newspaper groups. When comparing the proportions of different article types between the newspapers that held editorially similar positions, there was a somewhat noticeable difference between the *Journal* and the *Telegraph*. The *Journal* marked a lower percentage (indeed, the lowest of the four newspapers) of articles only with AJ-sourced content. Given that the *Telegraph* showed the highest percentage on the same article type from all of the newspapers, a somewhat contrasting pattern can be found within the pro-war newspaper group. By both standards of frequency and proportion, the *Journal* was the least likely to relay the information coming from Al-Jazeera for news reporting in a neutral manner.

Of the four types of articles sorted, all articles that included either AJ-sourced content or AJ-evaluative content — article types (1), (2), and (3) — were used in

Table 2: Presence of AJ-sourced and AJ-evaluative Contents in Raw Data

Article Type	Pro-war Paper		Anti-war Paper	
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>
Only with AJ-sourced content	27.6%	36.6%	34.6%	32.7%
Only with AJ-evaluative content	30.5	28.3	24.4	29.1
With both types of content	9.8	13.7	8.1	9.3
Without any type of content	32.2	21.5	32.9	28.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(<i>N</i> of articles)	(174)	(205)	(410)	(388)

further steps of content analysis. Throughout the steps of the coding procedure, three coding schemes were used, with the one intended for coding of AJ-sourced content and the other two developed for coding of AJ-evaluative content. In developing these coding schemes, of prime importance was the task of constructing measures of three key variables, namely, *AJ-as-source topic*, *AJ-as-subject source*, and *AJ-as-issue theme*. Specifically, the measure of AJ-as-source topic was arranged to analyze the AJ-sourced content, and the measures of AJ-as-subject source and AJ-as-issue theme were created to analyze the AJ-evaluative content. These measures of the three variables were vital in answering RQ 1, 2, and 3, all of which were set up to examine the media discourse involving the three AJ-addressing modes (i.e., AJ as source, AJ as subject, and AJ as

normative issue) in the media discourse across the pro-war and anti-war newspapers of the two countries.

The following sections describe two consecutive steps of the whole content analysis procedure taken in this research. The former step involved use of a coding protocol for an analysis of AJ-sourced content, while the latter step involved use of two coding protocols for a series of analyses of AJ-evaluative content.

ARTICLE-UNIT ANALYSIS OF AJ-SOURCED CONTENT

To answer RQ 1, concerning the content diversity of AJ-sourced information in news discourse, an article-unit content analysis was conducted on the news material containing AJ-sourced content — that is, the group of news stories classified into type (1) or (3) — in the four newspapers. The coding scheme employed in this step included measures of one key variable, *AJ-as-source topic*, and two additional variables, *content importance* and *voice within AJ-sourced content*. Below are specific categories arranged for each of these variables:

AJ-as-source Topic. Various categories for this variable were initially created and finally collapsed into the following eight major categories:

(1) *Messages from U.S. enemy*: Information obtained from Al-Jazeera's broadcast of statements by oppositional leaders, including (a) Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda leaders, and (b) Taliban leaders, and officials of the Saddam Hussein regime.

(2) *Military developments*: Information obtained from Al-Jazeera's news content about, or an Al-Jazeera reporter's comments on, the military conflicts in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

(3) *Showing of dead/captured soldiers*: Information obtained from Al-Jazeera's broadcast of the footage that shows either U.S. servicemen or women in Iraqi captivity or dead bodies of U.S. or other Coalition troops.

(4) *Civilian damage*: Information obtained from Al-Jazeera's coverage of civilian damage that occurred in either Afghanistan, Iraq, or a zone affected by the U.S./Coalition forces, except the violent conflicts between Israel and Palestine (For this case, refer to the fifth category).

(5) *Regional Affairs/opinions*. Information obtained from Al-Jazeera's news content regarding either (a) an incident related to Israel-Palestinian conflicts, which may involve civilian damage, and (b) other regional affairs or Arab/Muslim opinions concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or U.S. foreign policy.¹¹

(6) *Performance of Al-Jazeera*. Information obtained from staffs or other employees at Al-Jazeera, regarding the performance of the news organization itself or other Arab media

(7) *Threat to Al-Jazeera activity*. Information obtained from Al-Jazeera's news content or Al-Jazeera employee's statements regarding an incident that can be interpreted as a threat to Arab media freedom, whether it is (a) U.S.-involved or (b) not.

(8) *Others*. Information obtained from Al-Jazeera's broadcast or an Al-Jazeera employee's statements, which is unrelated to any of the prior categories.

Content importance. During the preliminary content analysis, the researcher felt it necessary to control for the importance of AJ-sourced content in a news story. In some

¹¹For coding of Arab opinions cited from Al-Jazeera, the researcher did not distinguish between Arab opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, because the "Arab-oriented" views coming through Al-Jazeera tended to associate the Palestinian problem with the current U.S. intervention in the Arab world and therefore it was usually difficult to distinguish between the two discussion topics.

cases Al-Jazeera was cited as a primary source in breaking news stories or other articles featuring the Arabic TV station, while in other cases the portion citing Al-Jazeera was negligible in the story because the source was mentioned briefly in a passing manner.

The measure of content importance was constructed in terms of three degrees: *high*, *medium*, and *low*. For coding decisions, the location, the quantity, and the informational value of the AJ-sourced content in a story were considered as a composite. Specifically, the content importance was rated as high when the news organization Al-Jazeera or its employee was treated as either the first source in a breaking news story or a primary source in a news analysis or a feature. In contrast, the content importance was rated low when (a) the AJ-sourced content had a full length of no more than one paragraph and, at the same time, (b) either the content was located only at the end of the news story, or it briefly described some “old” information that was covered previously. Finally, the content importance was rated medium when the importance of the AJ-sourced content did not fit in any of the two prior categories and was therefore seen as falling somewhere between the two opposing ends.

Voice within AJ-sourced Content. In addition, a list of categories was created to identify a variety of “voices,” that is, those whom American and British journalists cited in the context of relaying either news content from Al-Jazeera or comments offered by Al-Jazeera employees. The most noticeable example of the voices within AJ-sourced content is Osama bin Laden, who chose Al-Jazeera as an outlet for releasing his pre-recorded statements to the Arab world and other regions of the world. Other examples include the Arab/Muslim voices which were originally aired by Al-Jazeera and then secondhand-cited by American or British journalists for their news reporting. There are also cases in which Al-Jazeera’s own voices — voices of Al-Jazeera representatives and other

employees — were cited in news stories as uttering their own views about some issues in the Arab/Muslim world, rather than narrating news of the day during regular TV programs. In order to code all of these voices found in AJ-sourced content, various categories were initially suggested and finally collapsed into five major categories as follows:

(1) *U.S. Enemy*. Osama bin Laden and other leading members of the Al-Qaeda network, leaders of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and officials of the Hussein regime in Iraq.

(2) *Al-Jazeera employees, not during their news programs*. Al-Jazeera representatives, reporters, staffs, and other individuals affiliated with the news organization, not in the context of describing the content of a news program aired by Al-Jazeera but in other context (e.g., being interviewed by a U.S. or British reporter).

(3) *Palestinian/radical Muslim leaders*. Officials of the Palestinian Authority and leaders of Palestinian factions, such as Hamas, and of Islamic militant groups (Al-Qaeda members are excluded here).

(4) *Other Arab/Western Muslims*. Other Arab Muslims and Muslim residents in the United States and Europe, including both Arab elites and ordinary people.

(5) *Others*. Other sources quoted within the AJ-sourced content.

In constructing the categories listed above, the researcher separated the category of “Palestinian leaders” and “radical Arabs/Muslims” from the category of other non-enemy voices in the Arab world. This distinction was intended to efficiently capture potential differences between the pro-war and anti-war newspapers in delivering radical voices in the Arab world via Al-Jazeera. Given that the violent conflicts between

Palestine and Israel exacerbated during the “War on Terror,” the question of whether the news gate in the U.S. and British press opened to radical Palestinian and Arab/Muslim voices by way of the Arabic news outlet seemed to be meaningful for the matter of judging how seriously the U.S. and British journalists treated Al-Jazeera, not only as a conduit of enemy propaganda but also as a source of alternative points of view from the Arab world.

The coding protocol used in the article-unit content analysis includes measures of other variables, such as time period and article length (See Appendix B and C for details). Using the coding scheme described thus far, three graduate students, not including those who participated in the initial data categorization, conducted the coding task on the news stories that contained AJ-sourced content. A reliability test was performed on a sample of 75 randomly selected articles in which only news stories longer than 150 words were included. For the three main measures described above, the average percentages of inter-coder agreement ranged between 85% and 90% (Cohen’s Kappa ranging between 0.81 and 0.86). Specific figures are presented in Appendix A.

ANALYSIS OF AJ-EVALUATIVE CONTENT

After the news material including AJ-sourced content was analyzed, the next step was the examination of AJ-evaluative content in media discourse. This step consisted of two coding tasks, the one relevant to RQ 2, and the other relevant to RQ 3. For RQ 2, the primary concern was the journalistic selection of sources who were allowed access to the debate of matters related to Al-Jazeera. For RQ 3, at the heart of issue was the invocation of normative themes in media descriptions of Al-Jazeera and its related issues, such as Al-Jazeera’s controversial approach to war coverage and the U.S. military’s alleged

misconduct toward Al-Jazeera. To answer RQ 2 and RQ 3, two key variables were arranged for measurement: *AJ-as-subject source* and *AJ-as-issue theme*.

Considering that one news story (or opinion piece) may contain multiple AJ-as-subject sources as well as multiple AJ-as-issue themes, the measurement of these AJ-related variables involved use of two coding schemes, the one designed for source-unit coding of AJ-as-subject source and the other intended for theme-unit coding of AJ-as-issue theme. Below are the descriptions of the two coding schemes and their related coding procedures.

Source-unit Analysis

A source-unit coding scheme was developed to examine the news stories that were classified into article type (2) or (3) through the initial data categorization. Opinion pieces were excluded in this analysis since they were not relevant to the examination of sourcing patterns in news reporting. The coding scheme rests on one key variable and two additional variables, namely, *AJ-as-subject source*, *news context*, and *source tone*. Specific categories for each of these variables are described below.

AJ-as-subject Source. This type of source covers a range of sources, named or unnamed, who were directly or indirectly cited as those expressing their views on such subjects as the characteristics of Al-Jazeera, the content of some news material aired by Al-Jazeera, the conduct of Al-Jazeera employees, or the conduct of other (governmental) actors toward the news organization. Purely factual statements about Al-Jazeera offered by a source were ignored. When a source commented on the material released by a third party via Al-Jazeera news channel (e.g., Osama bin Laden's pre-recorded statements), it was accepted as an AJ-as-subject source unless his/her comments specifically targeted the

original producer of the message, not the messenger. In addition, a source was also treated as addressing AJ as subject when the source's evaluation, even though it did not directly involve Al-Jazeera, "contextually" favored or disfavored it by affectively describing either other news media by comparison or other actor's conduct toward the Arabic news organization.

For classification, five categories of AJ-as-subject source were used: (1) *U.S./British government/military officials*, (2) *U.S./British others*, (3) *Al-Jazeera employees*, (4) *Arab/Muslim others*, and (5) *others*. For clarification, the third category, Al-Jazeera employees, was applied when an individual affiliated with Al-Jazeera was cited as a voice commenting on the news organization itself or some issue involving Al-Jazeera. However, an Al-Jazeera anchor or reporter was not treated as an AJ-as-subject source when the news story mentioned the person only in the context of describing the content of a news program aired by Al-Jazeera.¹² It is also worthy of a note that Arab/Muslim residents in the United States or European countries were classified into the fourth category of Arab/Muslim others, not into the second category of U.S./British others. This coding decision was made on the basis that ordinary residents in Muslim local communities were typically cited in news discourse as viewers of the Arabic news channel.

In actual coding, while the principle of source-unit coding was maintained, an adjustment was made to enhance coder reliability. Specifically, a unique source was counted only once per article, regardless of the quantity of the quotation (i.e., the portion

¹²For further information, when an AJ-as-subject source was identified as Al-Jazeera employees, it happened because the quotation from this source met both conditions of AJ-sourced content and AJ-evaluative content. Not all views coming from Al-Jazeera employees, however, were accepted as AJ-evaluative content. Only when the remarks offered by an Al-Jazeera employee were directed toward his/her own news organization or the behavior of other actor toward the news outlet, the individual was accepted as an AJ-as-subject source. Otherwise, the quotation from an Al-Jazeera employee was treated only as AJ-sourced content.

allotted to the utterance of an AJ-related view) from the unique source. However, when there existed in a news story multiple unique AJ-as-subject sources, all of whom were codable into the same category, all of these sources were counted. For example, if the news story had three relevant quotes from the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and two relevant quotes from the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, two sources were coded from the story on the category of *U.S./British government/military officials*.

AJ-as-subject Source Tone. In addition, the tone of voice uttered by an AJ-as-subject source was measured per AJ-as-subject source in one of the following terms: (1) *favorable or contextually favorable*, (2) *unfavorable or contextually unfavorable*, and (3) *mixed or unclear*. Here, the term “contextually favorable (or unfavorable)” is applied to the case in which the source in question did not directly engage in the evaluation of Al-Jazeera but, by making a value judgment about either other news media in comparison or another actor’s conduct toward the Al-Jazeera, gave “contextually” an advantageous (or disadvantageous) statement toward the Arabic news organization.

News Context. This measure was introduced to examine the parameters of news discourse that governed both the selection and the gravity of cited voices that uttered AJ-related views. As already noted in the theoretical review (Chapter 2), throughout the period included in this research, a series of unexpected events was triggered by the performance of Al-Jazeera, and U.S. and British government and military officials played “catch-up” with those developments to keep the situation under control. Given the media tendency of relying on official sources in coverage of foreign policy, the two countries’ reporters may have willfully followed their government leads or simply bowed to the

post-9/11 political pressure of patriotism. It is also possible, however, that the continuing performance of Al-Jazeera, along with a number of its associated controversies, may have licensed the journalists to employ the maverick news outlet as a challenging “news icon” (Bennett & Lawrence, 1995; Lawrence, 1996) and thereby bring nonmainstream voices, especially those of Arab media workers and members of Arab/Muslim audiences, into the media-constructed public forum.

These alternate possibilities, each of which might have been realized to different degrees across the newspapers under examination, prompted the researcher to identify two patterns of news context: *beats-oriented news* and *icon-driven news*. Since the coding decision here is essentially article-based, multiple AJ-as-subject sources cited in a news story were classified into the same category, that is, one of the following:

(1) *Beats-oriented news*. A news story was assigned to this category when the predominant voices in the story originated from government- or military-controlled beats, including both the regular ones anchored in “routine politics” and the temporary ones set up by the U.S. Central Command at Doha during the military campaigns in Iraq. This type of news context does not necessarily mean that the first-appearing source in the news story should be an official voice. Even when a news story began with a mention of a news report or a piece of material broadcast by Al-Jazeera, the story was coded as beats-oriented news if the coverage concentrated on depicting the reactions or responses from U.S./British government or military officials, rather than delivering the actual content of the cited material. A battle report was also classified into this category when it was clear or easily inferable that the prevailing portion of war information came from the U.S./British military or intelligence services.

(2) *Icon-driven news*. A news story was assigned to this category when the dominant portion of those voicing a perspective came from either Al-Jazeera employees, ordinary members of Arab/Muslim audiences of the news channel, or Arab media professionals and experts commenting on the news organization. Typically, icon-driven coverage occurs when the journalist either (a) pays a visit to the facilities of Al-Jazeera to observe staff members working there and listen to their views about the news organization and other concerns, (b) goes to the “Arab street” or a Muslim local community to meet ordinary citizens who utilize their viewing experiences of Al-Jazeera channel in expressing their concerns and perspectives, or (c) consults with Arab media professionals and regional experts to gain insights regarding Al-Jazeera’s regional and global impacts as well as their related issues. Although icon-driven reporting does not require the exclusion of American and British official sources in picking up competing points of view, in order for a news story to be assigned to this category, the official voices, if present, should be marginal in the overall tone of the story.

(3) *Other/unclear news context*. A news story was assigned to this category when the story in question did not fit in any of the two prior categories. Specifically, this category was applied either (a) when any group of voices mentioned above did appear but did not dominate in news discourse and therefore it was hard to choose between the two types of news context, or (b) when the news story highlighted other kinds of voices or topics and therefore neither of the two news contexts seemed relevant to the news discourse in question.

Theme-unit analysis

Finally, for all the news stories or opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content, a theme-unit coding scheme was established. The main components of the coding scheme

were measures of *AJ-as-issue theme* and *story tone*. Below are the descriptions of the two measures. Below are the descriptions of the two measures.

AJ-as-issue Theme. This type of theme was defined by two requirements: (1) the theme should be applied to evaluation of either Al-Jazeera (including an individual affiliated with Al-Jazeera and output from Al-Jazeera) or another actor whose interaction with the network was brought into focus, and (2) the theme should reflect some “normative” ideas about news media, not purely performance-based evaluations (e.g., journalistic scoop or business-related assessment).

The AJ-as-issue theme list consisted of 14 theme categories, 7 positive and 7 negative. Each theme group (positive or negative) had 4 norm-based theme categories (which were further divided into subcategories), 2 interaction-based theme categories, and 1 “other/unspecific” theme category. First, tapping into the discussion of normative media models in the literature review, the researcher determined four cultural norms underlying the media discussion of Al-Jazeera: (1) *free/independent media status*, (2) *professional reporting/responsible conduct*, (3) *developmental/educational media function*, and (4) *alternative media role*. For each norm category, two subcategories were arranged as specific criteria based on which Al-Jazeera (including an individual affiliated with Al-jazeera and output from Al-Jazeera) could be positively or negatively evaluated (Therefore, the four norm-based theme categories were divided into eight subcategories, each of which provided positive and negative forms of evaluation). Second, the researcher was also interested in examining how the U.S. and British press characterized and emphasized particular types of interaction between Al-Jazeera and outside actors. Two interaction-based theme categories were identified: *target of bullying* and *enemy propaganda tool* themes. On a situational basis, the former theme was considered

positive, while the latter theme was considered negative. For each interaction-based theme, its “rebuttal” was arranged as an oppositional form of evaluation. In addition, the *unspecific/other* theme category also had positive and negative versions of evaluations.

Below are brief descriptions of the AJ-as-issue theme list. For convenience, all themes are presented only in a positive form of evaluation except the *enemy propaganda tool* theme. For this theme, the original form of theme invocation (not the “rebuttal” form) involved a negative evaluation:

(1) *Free/independent media status*. Originating from the libertarian normative theory of the press, this norm-based category had two subcategories: (a) *free press without outside control*, which was assigned to the themes that described Al-Jazeera in terms of editorial freedom without government censorship or other characteristics suggesting media independence from outside control; and (b) *adversary to authoritarian regimes*, which was applied to the themes that underscored Al-Jazeera’s watchdog role of monitoring and challenging the actions of the powerful in authoritarian regimes of the pan-Arab world.

(2) *Professional reporting/responsible conduct*. This group of themes reflects the normative media theory of social responsibility as well as the professional codes of journalism. Two subcategories were (a) *professional/balanced news reporting*, which was applied to the themes that favorably described Al-Jazeera’s approach in news reporting (or the quality of its news content) using such terms as objectivity, neutrality, impartiality, fairness, or lack of bias; (b) *non-sensational/ethical handling of graphic information*, which was applied to the themes that favorably described the graphic nature of material broadcast by Al-Jazeera (or its decision regarding whether or not to broadcast sensitive images) on the basis of non-sensationalism (e.g., “not emotive”; “not rating-

driven”; “meeting public taste”) or ethical concerns (e.g., withholding of sensitive information that might reveal personal identities).

(3) *Developmental/educational media function*. This group of themes, rooted in a developmental view of news media as an educator enlightening the public or enhancing the conditions of non-Western communities, had two subcategories: (a) *catalyst for Arab democracy*, which was applied to the themes that praised the function, role, or impact of Al-Jazeera as either a promoter of free and open debate or an advocate of democratic reforms in the Arab/Muslim world; (b) *educator of pro-U.S./Western views*, which was applied to the themes that mentioned Al-Jazeera’s efforts to counter anti-U.S./Western extremism or tell its audience some “good things” about U.S./Western societies.

(4) *Alternative media role*. This group of themes is based on an extension into a global context of radical thinking about news media as a means of bringing non-mainstream ideas into the public arena and thereby challenging the hegemony of power holders. Two subcategories were (a) *source of oppressed news/views*, which was assigned to the themes that invoked the role or impact of Al-Jazeera as a source of nonmainstream “Arab-oriented” news and marginalized Arab/Muslim voices, and (b) *antidote of Western bias*, which was applied to the themes that suggested the justifiability of Al-Jazeera’s approach by contrasting it against some problematic aspects of U.S./Western media discourses or stereotypes dominant in Western society.

(5) *Target of bullying* and (6) *enemy propaganda tool*. Unlike the norm-based themes, two interaction-based theme categories were determined on the basis of media presentation of a particular type of interaction between Al-Jazeera and outside forces: the *target of bullying* category was assigned to the themes that described Al-Jazeera in a sympathetic tone by suggesting that this news organization (or an individual affiliated with the organization) was being threatened by some intimidating action of an outside

actor; the *enemy propaganda tool* theme was applied to the themes that described Al-Jazeera in a negative tone by suggesting either the connection with a U.S. enemy group (e.g., “bin Laden’s mouthpiece”) or the absence of journalistic integrity (e.g., “liar”; “false reporting”) for the purpose of serving enemy interests.

(7) *Other/unspecific*. This theme category was applied when the linguistic expression involved a positive evaluation of Al-Jazeera but the basis for the evaluation was unacceptably “irrational” (e.g., a praise of Al-Jazeera for serving enemy interests) or too ambiguous to determine (e.g., “the best news organization in the world”; “good guys”). Similarly, the negative version of this category was applied when a negative evaluation of Al-Jazeera was identifiable but the basis for the evaluation was deemed irrational or too ambiguous to determine (e.g., “Al-Jazeera viewers just happen to be U.S. haters.”; “the news channel doesn’t seem good.”).

Since on the same normative basis Al-Jazeera may be praised (e.g., “Al-Jazeera is an independent news outlet”) or criticized (e.g., “Al-Jazeera is not as independent as it seems”), all the themes found were coded as either “positive” or “negative.” For the norm-based theme categories, coding of a negative theme happened when either (1) the assertion in question involved linguistic elements that were interpreted as contrary to the meaning of a positive theme (e.g., “state-owned media” contrary to “free media”), or (2) a positive theme was invoked but was immediately refuted (e.g., “the claim that Al-Jazeera is an independent news outlet is not true”) ¹³. For the *enemy propaganda tool* theme, as stated above, the original form of theme invocation was coded negative, while

¹³Strictly speaking, both of the two coding instructions were employed to identify negative AJ-as-issue themes for the first three norm-based categories (*free/independent*, *professional/responsible*, and *developmental/educational media*). As regards the fourth norm-based category (*alternative media*), however, the researcher found that only the second instruction (the rebuttal of a positive theme) was sufficient for identifying a theme in a negative form.

the rebuttal of the theme was coded positive. In the coding process, for each passage containing AJ-evaluative content, coders judged the presence of any unique AJ-as-issue theme codable into one of the theme categories listed above. While the unit of coding was a unique theme, coders counted the same theme subcategory within a single story a maximum of three times per article. This constraint was intended both to secure reliable coding and to control for a handful of extremely long articles (that is, “outliers” in article length) that invoked the same kind of themes in a repetitive manner throughout the story. Other detailed coding instructions were offered to enhance inter-coder reliability.¹⁴

Story Tone. As an additional measure, the tone of the entire article toward Al-Jazeera was coded in the following manner: (1) *favorable* or *contextually favorable*, (2) *unfavorable* or *contextually unfavorable*, (3) *mixed* or *unclear*. Since the coding decision here is essentially article-based, multiple AJ-as-issue themes invoked in a news story were classified into the same category. As for the term *contextually favorable* (or *unfavorable*), the same coding instructions were applied as were used in the measurement of AJ-as-subject source tone.

¹⁴Specific coding instructions covered other issues: when a linguistic expression was found to reflect one of the four major norms (e.g., “Al-Jazeera is a professional news organization,” which reflects the *professional/responsible media* category) but was too ambiguous to determine which theme subcategory would be relevant, the assertion was assigned to the first subcategory within the norm (e.g., for the previous example, the *professional/balanced news reporting* subcategory), based on the assumption that the first subcategory for each norm represents the common interpretation of the underlying normative idea. In addition, when some thematic elements were found within a quotation, a coding decision was made as to the inferable intention of the writer. If the writer cited a source in a favorable or neutral fashion, the presence of a theme within the quote was accepted. If the writer expressed doubts about or rebutted the source’s claim, the thematic elements within the quote were ignored (when doubted) or were interpreted as constituting a theme in the opposite direction (when rebutted).

Extra Remarks on Analysis of AJ-evaluative Content

The two coding schemes described thus far, the one intended for source-unit coding and the other for theme-unit coding, included measures of additional variables, such as time period and article length (See Appendix D and E for details of the two coding schemes respectively). Aided by these coding protocols, two sessions of content analyses were conducted. Of the four graduate students who participated in the article-unit content analysis, two students were assigned to source-unit coding, and the other two students were assigned to theme-unit coding.

For each of the two coding tasks, inter-coder reliability was assessed on a sample of 50 randomly selected articles in which one or the other coder recorded the presence of at least one AJ-as-subject source (for the source-unit analysis) or one AJ-as-issue theme (for the theme-unit analysis). For source-unit coding, the percentages of inter-coder agreement among the three measures ranged from 87% to 92% (Cohen's Kappa ranging between .82 and .88), and, for the part of theme-unit coding, the percentages of inter-coder agreement for the two measures were 86% and 85%, respectively (Cohen's Kappa = .83 and .77). Specific figures are presented in Appendix A.

Chapter 4

Findings

This chapter presents findings from a series of content analyses, which were conducted as described in Chapter 3, and compares the nature of the media discourse related to Al-Jazeera in the U.S. and British major newspapers that held different editorial policies toward the post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy. Here the main references for the comparison are the editorial policy (pro-war versus anti-war) of a news organization and the national context (U.S. versus British) for the practice of wartime journalism.

OVERVIEW OF CONTENT ANALYSIS DATA

Table 3 provides an overview of the raw data throughout the entire research period, which was divided into six sub-periods. Each of these sub-periods was labeled so as to refer to the main event characteristic of the period. Below is a brief description of the sub-periods:

1. *Pre-9/11 (12/27/1998 ~ 09/10/2001)*. Al-Jazeera began its service in November of 1996. From the data gathered from the four newspapers, the earliest article containing the keyword Al-Jazeera was found in the Times, with its publishing date of December 27, 1998.
2. *Afghanistan War (09/11/2001 ~ 12/31/2001)*. This second period runs from 9/11 through the ending of major military campaigns in Afghanistan around the end of 2001. On November 12, 2001, the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance, Afghanistan's

- opposition force of the Taliban regime, seized the Afghanistan capital of Kabul, and, during the following month, the Taliban's and Al-Qaeda's major strongholds fell to the Alliance.
3. *Palestinian uprising (01/01/2002 ~ 09/11/2002)*. While small-scale military combats were under way in Afghanistan, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians reached a peak in the spring of 2002. In early April, facing Palestinians' increasing suicide attacks, Israel launched a military operation named Operation Defensive Shield, which led to the re-occupation of Palestinian areas and the apprehension of members of Palestinian militant groups. The bloody violence did not abate until late summer that same year.
 4. *Pre-Iraq War debate (09/12/2002 ~ 03/16/2003)*. On September 12, 2002, President George W. Bush addressed the opening of the U.N. General Assembly, asking the body to confront the "grave and gathering danger" of Iraq. His address signaled the beginning of the U.S.-initiated international debate over the war proposal, with France and Russia emerging as the leaders of the opposition group. President Bush, in his 2003 State of the Union speech, blamed Saddam Hussein for "not disarming," and announced that he was ready to attack Iraq, even without a U.N. mandate.
 5. *Iraq War (03/17/2003 ~ 05/01/2003)*. On March 17, 2003, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein and his sons 48 hours to leave Iraq or face war. Two days later, the invasion of Iraq began when the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom. On April 9, 2003, U.S. forces advanced into Baghdad. In the following days, Kurdish fighters and U.S. forces took control of the northern cities in Iraq. On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end to major combat operations in Iraq.

Table 3: Overview of Study Results by Period

Period	<u>Pro-war Paper</u>		<u>Anti-war Paper</u>	
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>
<i>News stories including AJ-sourced content</i>				
Pre-9/11	4.6%	0.0%	6.3%	3.1%
Post-9/11				
Afghanistan War	26.2	37.9	25.1	24.5
Palestinian uprising	20.0	13.6	13.7	14.7
Pre-Iraq War debate	24.6	18.4	20.0	17.2
Iraq War	12.3	18.4	14.3	24.5
Post-Iraq War developments	12.3	11.7	20.6	16.0
Subtotal	95.4	100.0	93.7	96.9
Total (<i>N</i> of articles)	100.0 (65)	100.0 (103)	100.0 (175)	100.0 (163)
<i>News stories including AJ-evaluative content</i>				
Pre-9/11	2.0	0.0	4.6	0.0
Post-9/11				
Afghanistan War	28.6	39.4	34.5	24.2
Palestinian uprising	12.2	7.7	11.5	6.1
Pre-Iraq War debate	10.2	12.1	10.3	7.0
Iraq War	32.7	28.8	23.0	40.4
Post-Iraq War developments	14.3	12.1	16.1	22.2
Subtotal	98.0	100.0	95.6	100.0
Total (<i>N</i> of articles)	100.0 (49)	100.0 (66)	100.0 (90)	100.0 (99)
<i>Opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content</i>				
Pre-9/11	0.0	0.0	7.0	0.0
Post-9/11				
Afghanistan War	28.6	45.0	32.6	20.0
Palestinian uprising	9.5	5.0	9.3	8.0
Pre-Iraq War debate	19.0	10.0	14.0	4.0
Iraq War	23.8	20.0	30.2	56.0
Post-Iraq War developments	19.0	20.0	7.0	12.0
Subtotal	100.0	100.0	93.0	100.0
Total (<i>N</i> of articles)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (50)
Grand <i>N</i> ^a	118	160	274	276
Grand <i>N</i> , except pre-9/11 data	115	160	258	271

^aSince some news stories were double-coded as having both AJ-sourced content and AJ-evaluative content, the grand *N* is smaller than the sum of the *N*s.

6. *Post-Iraq War developments (05/02/2003 ~ 12/31/2003)*. During this period, the U.S.-backed rebuilding process began in Iraq, yet the U.S. military noticed a gradually increasing flurry of attacks on the coalition troops in various regions. On May 12, 2003, Paul Bremer took over as a U.S. civil administrator in Iraq and, in mid-July, Iraqi's interim governing council was inaugurated. Meanwhile, the U.S. hunt of Saddam Hussein continued throughout the year. In mid-December, Paul Bremer announced the arrest of the former Iraqi leader.

The data presented in Table 3 are divided into three classes: news stories including AJ-sourced content, news stories including AJ-evaluative content, and opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content. With regard to the overall distribution of these raw data over the whole analytical period, three points can be made.

First, the percentages in the two bottom rows labeled “grand total” and “grand total, except pre-9/11 data” in Table 3 show that, from all four newspapers, the proportions of the news stories or opinion pieces prior to 9/11 (and including either AJ-sourced content or AJ-evaluative content) were quite low. Indeed, the *Telegraph* did not carry any pre-9/11 article including either AJ-sourced content or AJ-evaluative content. For the *Journal* and the *Guardian*, the percentages of their respective grand totals save pre-9/11 articles exceeded 97% (115 out of 118 *Journal* articles and 271 out of 276 *Guardian* articles), therefore indicating that, from the two anti-war newspapers, the percentages of pre-9/11 data remained less than 3% of the grand totals. In comparison, the *Times* carried the highest number of pre-9/11 articles including either AJ-sourced content or AJ-evaluative content. Still, even for this newspaper, the percentage of the grand total save the pre-9/11 data reached around 94% (258 out of 274 *Times* articles). All of these suggest that the two countries' media attention to Al-Jazeera was by and

large a post-9/11 phenomenon, mainly initiated by the dramatic appearance of Osama bin Laden in the Al-Jazeera news channel.

Second, the distributions of news stories including AJ-sourced content are presented in the upper row section of Table 3. According to the data here, all the newspapers showed an early surge in the frequency during the Afghanistan War period (09/11/2001 ~ 12/31/2001), which lasted less than four months and began immediately following 9/11. It is no surprise that Al-Jazeera's continued scoops in this period, such as broadcasts of Osama bin Laden's pre-recorded statements and exclusive coverage of Kabul under an imminent attack, captured American and British media's attention in their coverage of events and issues related to the U.S.-led "War on Terror" policy. After this period, the four newspapers continued to produce considerable amounts of news discourse that incorporated AJ-sourced content. During the Iraq War period that lasted about four weeks (03/17/2003 ~ 05/01/2003), the Guardian seemed to be especially attentive to the news content coming from Al-Jazeera, with 24.5% of Guardian stories appearing during this short period. On the other hand, the Times, the anti-war newspaper on the U.S. side, showed a steady interest in picking up information coming from Al-Jazeera for news reporting after the major military campaigns in Iraq ended — 20.6 % of Times stories were found in the post-Iraq War period (05/02/2003 ~ 12/31/2003).

Finally, about the articles including AJ-evaluative content, two sets of data are presented in the middle row section (for news stories) and the bottom row section (for opinion pieces) of Table 3. It should be noted that, since AJ-evaluative content referred to only non-neutral descriptions of events and issues involving Al-Jazeera, the raw data did not include news stories or opinion pieces that provided only event-oriented descriptions of Al-Jazeera in a neutral manner. Given this, the collection of the news stories and opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content did not constitute a complete

representation of the media discourse describing all events and issues involving Al-Jazeera. Still, the percentages in Table 3 suggests that, for all of the four news organizations, much of issue-oriented coverage and commentaries related to Al-Jazeera took place during the two relatively short periods of the U.S.-led military campaigns at first in Afghanistan and next in Iraq. Although some variations existed, all the newspapers had essentially one pattern in common (05/02/2003 ~ 12/31/2003): the percentages both for the news stories and the opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content went up at first in the Afghanistan War period, declined afterwards, and then surged again in the Iraq War period. Markedly, the *Guardian* distributions, both for news stories and opinion pieces, showed particularly high percentages during the Iraq War period, with 40.4% of news stories and 56.0% of opinion pieces classified into this period. Later in this chapter, the results of an AJ-as-theme analysis will show that during the war in Iraq this British anti-war newspaper took an active interest in raising the kind of issues bringing into focus U.S. behavior toward Al-Jazeera, mainly for the purpose of criticizing the U.S.-led militaristic policy in the Arab/Muslim world.

The whole scope of the raw data presented in Table 3 included all articles regardless of article length. The presence of extremely short articles, however, might distort the results of frequency-based analyses. Table 4 presents the same type of distributions as in Table 3, except that this time the raw data were limited to articles of “substantial length.” An article with substantial length was defined as, for a news story, a news report exceeding 150 words or, for an opinion piece, not being a letter to the editor piece (thus it should be an editorial or a signed column).

When comparing the figures presented in Table 3 and in Table 4, the overall features in Table 4 remained largely the same as in Table 3, despite small decreases in the grand totals from all of the newspapers due to the exclusion of extremely short news

Table 4: Overview of Substantial Story Frequencies by Period

Period	<u>Pro-war Paper</u>		<u>Anti-war Paper</u>	
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>
<i>News stories including AJ-sourced content</i>				
Pre-9/11	5.3%	0.0%	6.6%	3.3%
Post-9/11				
Afghanistan War	28.1	37.8	26.3	23.0
Palestinian uprising	21.1	14.3	14.4	15.8
Pre-Iraq War debate	24.6	19.4	19.2	17.1
Iraq War	14.0	17.3	15.0	25.0
Post-Iraq War developments	7.0	11.2	18.6	15.8
Subtotal	94.7	100.0	93.4	96.7
Total (<i>N</i> of articles)	100.0 (57)	100.0 (98)	100.0 (167)	100.0 (152)
<i>News stories including AJ-evaluative content</i>				
Pre-9/11	2.2	0.0	4.6	0.0
Post-9/11				
Afghanistan War	30.4	39.4	33.0	24.2
Palestinian uprising	10.9	7.5	11.4	6.1
Pre-Iraq War debate	10.9	12.1	12.5	7.0
Iraq War	34.8	28.8	25.0	40.4
Post-Iraq War developments	10.9	12.1	13.6	22.2
Subtotal	97.8	100.0	95.5	100.0
Total (<i>N</i> of articles)	100.0 (49)	100.0 (66)	100.0 (87)	100.0 (99)
<i>Opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content</i>				
Pre-9/11	0.0	0.0	9.1	0.0
Post-9/11				
Afghanistan War	28.6	52.3	24.2	20.9
Palestinian uprising	9.5	5.9	9.1	9.3
Pre-Iraq War debate	19.0	5.9	15.2	5.1
Iraq War	23.8	23.5	33.3	51.2
Post-Iraq War developments	19.0	11.8	9.1	14.0
Subtotal	100.0	100.0	90.9	100.0
Total (<i>N</i> of articles)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (33)	100.0 (43)
Grand <i>N</i> ^a	110	152	253	258
Grand <i>N</i> , except pre-9/11 data	107	152	237	253

Note. Only articles of substantial length were analyzed.

^aSince some news stories were double-coded as having both AJ-sourced content and AJ-evaluative content, the grand *N* is smaller than the sum of the *N*s.

stories and letters to the editor pieces. Somewhat noticeable changes were found from the *Journal* (for news stories including AJ-sourced content) and from the *Times* and the *Guardian* (for opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content). The number of *Journal* stories including AJ-sourced content dropped from 65 (in Table 3) to 57 (in Table 4), which was a 12.3% decrease. This change was mainly due to the exclusion of daily news abstracts in the front page under the title of *What's News: World-Wide*. For the *Times*, the number of opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content dropped from 43 (in Table 3) to 33 (in Table 4), causing a decrease by 23.3%. This suggests that the *Times* op-ed pages carried many letters-to-the-editor pieces that expressed opinions usually from ordinary readers about matters related to Al-Jazeera. For the same reason, the number of the *Guardian's* opinion pieces reduced from 50 to 43 (a 14.0% decrease).

In relation to the multiple sessions of content analysis noted earlier, different types of media text were used. Specifically, the news stories including AJ-sourced content were examined through the article-unit content analysis in which the central coding task was to measure AJ-as-source topic. The news stories including AJ-evaluative content were used in the source-unit analysis that involved measurement of AJ-as-subject source. Finally, both news stories and opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content were examined in the theme-unit analysis intended to measure AJ-as-issue theme. In terms of measurement, these three variables (i.e., AJ-as-source topic, AJ-as-subject source, and AJ-as-issue theme) are the foci of RQ 1, 2, and 3. Table 5 presents the different scopes of post-9/11 data examined through the three sessions of content analysis. Within each of the three row sections of Table 5 the raw data are divided into two categories, articles of substantial length versus articles lacking substantial length. Of the post-9/11 stories from the four newspapers, as the figures in Table 5 shows, the percentages of extremely short articles (i.e., news stories fewer than 151 words and

Table 5: Overview of Post-9/11 Story Frequencies by Research Question Focus

Story Type	<u>Pro-war Paper</u>		<u>Anti-war Paper</u>	
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>
<i>For analysis of AJ-as-source topic</i>				
With substantial length	87.1%	95.1%	95.1%	93.0%
Without substantial length	12.9	4.9	4.9	7.0
Total (<i>N</i> of articles)	100.0 (62)	100.0 (103)	100.0 (164)	100.0 (158)
<i>For analysis of AJ-as-subject source</i>				
With substantial length	100.0	100.0	96.5	100.0
Without substantial length	0.0	0.0	3.5	0.0
Total (<i>N</i> of articles)	100.0 (48)	100.0 (66)	100.0 (86)	100.0 (99)
<i>For analysis of AJ-as-issue theme</i>				
With substantial length	98.6	96.5	89.7	95.3
Without substantial length	1.4	3.5	10.3	4.7
Total (<i>N</i> of articles)	100.0 (70)	100.0 (86)	100.0 (126)	100.0 (149)
Grand <i>N</i> ^a	118	160	274	276

^aThe grand *N* is smaller than the sum of *N*s because (1) some news stories were double-coded as including both AJ-sourced content and AJ-evaluative content, and (2) the news stories including AJ-evaluative content were used twice in the analysis of AJ-as-subject source and the analysis of AJ-as-issue theme.

letters-to-editor pieces) were overall fairly low, ranging between zero and 12.9%.

In the following sections, which present findings from the three content analyses, the researcher mainly concentrates on showing the results of the analyses done on the raw data belonging to the category of post-9/11 articles with substantial length. The exclusion of pre-9/11 data was done because this study focuses on the media discourse produced in the post-9/11 political climate and, in addition, the *Telegraph* data did not include any

pre-9/11 stories. The exclusion of articles lacking substantial length was done to avoid the inflation of frequencies especially when the unit of analysis was the article. Nevertheless, in the following sections, the researcher will offer comments on the results of the analyses done on the full range of the raw data when noticeable differences from the main findings were found.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDIA DISCOURSE ADDRESSING AJ AS SOURCE

As noted in the introduction to this study, the meteoric rise of Al-Jazeera in recent years is a remarkable phenomenon which suggests how pluralistic the international flow of information has become than ever. Since the dramatic appearance of Osama bin Laden in the broadcasts by Al-Jazeera, this Arabic satellite TV station has become a major player in wartime coverage and one of the most prominent and quoted media sources in the post-9/11 era dubbed the “War on Terror.” The relay by Western media of content from a non-Western news service may be viewed as a reversal of the traditional flow of international news, which usually runs from the West to the East and the South.

The true significance of Al-Jazeera as an alternative source of regional information and “Arab-oriented” perspectives, however, as discussed in the theoretical review, rests much on the question of whether and how often the Western news services took advantage of the Arabic news outlet, not only as an outlet of terrorist messages, but also as a source of war-related information and regional news and perspectives. Although Al-Jazeera gained global fame largely due to its exclusive broadcasts of Al-Qaeda messages, the broadcasts were only a small part of Al-Jazeera’s wartime journalism in the post-9/11 period of hostilities between the Arab/Muslim world and the U.S.-led war-waging forces. Considering this, RQ 1 was constructed to compare the content diversity of AJ-as-source topic, along with voices within AJ-sourced content, in the media

discourse produced by the U.S. and British news organizations that editorially differed on the issue of the war in Iraq.

Distribution of AJ-as-source Topics

Before comparing the content diversity of AJ-as-source topic in the two countries' press discourses, it is useful to briefly explain the concept of diversity and the index of diversity used here. In mathematical terms, diversity is defined as the distribution of population elements along a continuum of homogeneity to heterogeneity with respect to one or more variables (Teachman, 1980). Indeed, the concept of diversity can be seen as consisting of two dimensions — one concerning the number of categories within a given distribution and the other concerning the allocation of elements to the categories (McDonald & Dimmick, 2003). There is a variety of measures of diversity available in social science, but in this study Simpson's (Simpson, 1949) D is used as an indicator of the diversity of AJ-as-source topic. Simpson's D , which has long been considered as a primary measure of diversity, especially outside the field of communication, is known to be primarily sensitive to the proportions across categories, although the value of D is affected also by the number of categories (McDonald & Dimmick, 2003).¹⁵ The value of D ranges between 0 and 1, with the higher the value, the higher degree of diversity. For the analysis of AJ-sourced content, Simpson's D value is used to represent the degree of the diversity of AJ-as-source topics for a newspaper when the story was the unit of analysis.

¹⁵Simpson's D is calculated by summing the squared proportions and subtracting the sum from 1.0 ($D = 1 - \sum p_i^2$). See McDonald and Dimmick (2003) for a discussion of the differences among multiple measures of diversity.

Table 6: Distribution of AJ-as-source Topics, Using Article as Unit of Analysis

Major AJ-as-source Topic	Pro-war Paper		Anti-war Paper		Sig. ^a
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>	
Messages from U.S. enemy	57.4%	50.0%	41.7%	38.1%	$P<.05$
War information	11.1	22.4	13.5	21.1	$P<.10$
Regional affairs/opinions	9.3	10.2	22.4	21.1	$P<.05$
Events/issues specific to Al-Jazeera	16.7	9.2	15.4	15.6	<i>n.s.</i>
Others	5.6	8.2	7.1	4.1	<i>n.s.</i>
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
(<i>N</i> of articles)	(54)	(98)	(156)	(147)	
Simpson's <i>D</i>	.618	.674	.729	.740	

Note. Post 9/11 news stories including AJ-sourced content were examined. News stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the calculation.

^aThe *p* value for each category was acquired based on the chi-square distribution, by pitting the percentages of the category in question against the summed percentages of all other categories.

Table 6 presents the distributions of AJ-as-source topic whose categories were collapsed into five major categories. The data in Table 6 can be interpreted as showing, for each newspaper, how diversified was the journalistic use of Al-Jazeera as a source of information in terms of the source of enemy messages, war information, regional news and opinions, events and issues specific to Al-Jazeera, and others. According to the Simpson's *D* values at the bottom of Table 6, the two countries' anti-war newspapers showed a higher degree of content diversity than did their hawkish counterparts. Specifically, the *Guardian* (.740) ranked first, followed by the *Times* (.729) and the *Telegraph* (.674) as the second and the third, respectively; finally, the *Journal* (.618)

marked the lowest degree of content diversity. With a closer look into each of the AJ-as-source topic categories, four points can be made as follows:

First, the biggest difference between the pro-war and anti-war newspapers was found in the proportion of the “message from U.S. enemy” category. The *Journal* showed the highest degree of concentration (57.4%) on this category, followed by the *Telegraph* (49.0%). In contrast, the percentages of the same category from the two anti-war newspapers stayed around 40% (41.7% for the *Times* and 38.1% for the *Guardian*). The differences in the percentage of this category among the four newspapers were statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 8.280$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .042$). This suggests that the pro-war newspapers were more likely than the anti-war newspapers to raise the bar in selecting information coming from Al-Jazeera, thus in general limiting the use of the Arabic media outlet as a source of news to the quotation of Al-Qaeda and other oppositional leaders’ propagandistic messages.

Second, a noticeable difference between the U.S. press and the British press, regardless of their political leanings, was found in the proportions of the “war information” category. For both British newspapers, the percentages of this category exceeded 20% (22.4% for the *Telegraph* and 21.2% for the *Guardian*), whereas in the U.S. media outlets the percentages of the same category stayed a little higher than 10% (11.1% for the *Journal* and 13.5% for the *Times*). The proportional differences among the four newspapers was not exceedingly great, but they were statistically significant at .10 level ($\chi^2 = 6.687$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .083$). This gives an impression that the British newspapers, regardless of their editorial stances, were more active than the U.S. press in picking up the war-related information supplied by Al-Jazeera and incorporating it into news discourse.

Third, the *Times* and the *Guardian* seemed to be more active than their pro-war counterparts in using Al-Jazeera as a source of regional news and Arab or Muslim opinions. More than 20% of news stories including AJ-sourced content in the anti-war press were classified into the “regional affairs/opinions” category (22.4% of *Times* stories and 21.1% of *Guardian* stories). In contrast, for the two pro-war newspapers, the percentages of the same category remained around 10% (9.3% of *Journal* stories and 10.2% of *Telegraph* stories). The differences in this category among the newspapers were statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 9.933$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .019$).

Finally, from all the newspapers except the *Telegraph*, there were found substantial portions of news stories whose AJ-as-source topic was classified into the category of “events or issues specific to Al-Jazeera.” The percentages of this category in the three newspapers reached a little higher than 15%, while in the *Telegraph* the percentage remained at 9.2%. The inter-newspaper differences in this category, however, were not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 2.709$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .439$). It is worth noting that, despite the relatively low percentage of this category in the *Telegraph*, the number of *Telegraph* stories classified into this category was indeed the same as the number of *Journal* stories (9 articles). While the proportional differences just mentioned may be viewed as indicating that the *Telegraph* was less interested than others in featuring the Arabic news outlet, the data in Table 6 alone seems to be insufficient for supporting this interpretation.

In addition, the overall distributive patterns reported above did not change when the news stories shorter than 151 words (at the first stage) and pre-9/11 stories (at the second stage) were added into the analysis.¹⁶

¹⁶In fact, when the extremely short articles were included, the *Journal* distribution of AJ-as-source topic showed an even higher degree of concentration than before on the category of “messages from U.S. enemy,” with the percentage of this category going up from 57.4% (in Table 6) to 61.3%. After the pre-9/11 raw data was added, the percentage of the category just mentioned in the *Journal* stories became

To gain a better insight into the general features of the news stories that contained AJ-sourced content, Table 7 presents the distributions of AJ-as-source topic, involving detailed categories. Due to the increase in the entire number of categories used, the overall level of Simpson's D went up this time (i.e., the value of D is affected by the increased number of categories), but the rank order in content diversity among the four newspapers still remained unchanged, with the *Guardian* ranking the first, followed by the *Times*, the *Telegraph*, and finally the *Journal*, in the order of ranking.

The first row section of Table 7 gives the percentages of two subcategories under the major topic category of "messages from U.S. enemy." The figures indicate that the *Journal*, of the four news organizations, was the most likely to use Al-Jazeera solely as an outlet of Al-Qaeda leaders' propagandistic statements in news reporting (55.6%). Even under the U.S. enemy message category, three other newspapers showed higher percentages than did the *Journal* on the topic of messages from "other U.S. enemy," which referred to the statements from leaders of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan or officials of the Hussein regime in Iraq. Specifically, the percentage of the "messages from other U.S. enemy" category was merely 1.9% from the *Journal*, while the percentages of the same category ranged from 6.1% to 8.6% in the other three newspapers.

The second row section of Table 7 shows the percentages of three subcategories under the topic of war information. These data indicate that the British newspapers, compared to their U.S. counterparts, carried relatively high percentages of news stories whose AJ-as-source topics were assigned to the two sub-topic categories of "military

58.5%. At the same time, the percentage of the *Journal* stories classified into the regional affairs/opinions category also went up from 9.3% (in Table 6) to 12.3%. These changes, however, did not seem to be meaningful, as the number of stories assigned to this category only increased from 5 to 8 stories. As for other newspapers, few proportional changes were found in the distribution of AJ-as-source topic after the inclusion of extremely short news stories and then pre-9/11 stories.

Table 7: Distribution of AJ-as-source Topics, Using Detailed Categories

AJ-as-source Topic	<u>Pro-war Paper</u>		<u>Anti-war Paper</u>	
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>
Messages from U.S. enemy				
From Al-Qaeda	55.6%	43.9%	34.6%	29.3%
From other U.S. enemy	1.9	6.1	6.4	8.8
Subtotal	57.4	50.0	41.7	38.1
War information				
Military developments	5.6	12.2	7.7	10.9
Dead/captured soldiers	3.7	7.1	3.3	6.1
Civilian damage	1.9	3.1	2.6	4.1
Subtotal	11.1	22.4	13.5	21.1
Regional affairs/opinions				
Palestinians-related	3.7	6.1	10.3	11.6
Other regional affairs/opinions	5.6	4.1	12.2	9.5
Subtotal	9.3	10.2	22.4	21.1
Events/issues specific to Al-Jazeera				
Performance of Al-Jazeera	7.4	3.1	8.3	6.8
Threat to Al-Jazeera activity	9.3	6.1	7.1	8.8
Subtotal	16.7	9.2	15.4	15.6
Others	5.6	8.2	7.1	4.1
Total (<i>N</i> of articles)	100.0 (45)	100.0 (77)	100.0 (125)	100.0 (114)
Simpson's <i>D</i>	.508	.691	.751	.758

developments” (12. 2% of *Telegraph* stories and 10.9% of *Guardian* stories versus 5.6% of *Journal* stories and 7.7% of *Times* stories) and “showing of dead/captured solders” (7.1% of *Telegraph* stories and 6.1% of *Guardian* stories versus 3.7% of *Journal* stories and 3.3% of *Times* stories). These figures may be viewed as suggesting that, especially regarding the “military development” subcategory, British journalists were more likely than their American colleagues to diversify sources of information in war coverage, in a manner of not solely relying on the government and military officials who routinely hosted press briefings in the periods of military conflicts. However, the story frequencies for the subcategories were quite low, which makes it difficult to give a reliable interpretation about the inter-newspaper differences at the subcategory level.¹⁷ It suffices to say that the relatively high percentage of the upper-level “war information” category in the British press was largely attributable to the percentages of the two subcategories of military development and showing of dead/captured soldiers.

The third row section of Table 7 is assigned to the presentation of data subsumed under the major topic category of regional affairs/opinions. This part of the data indicates that the *Times* and the *Guardian*, in terms of both frequency and proportion, were more likely than their conservative competitors to carry the news stories that cited Al-Jazeera as a source of news related to Palestinian-related affairs. Specifically, 10.3% of *Times* stories and 11.6% of *Guardian* stories including AJ-sourced content were classified into this category, whereas only 3.7% of *Journal* stories and 6.1% of *Telegraph* stories were assigned here. Markedly, more than half of the two anti-war newspapers’ stories that mentioned this AJ-as-source topic (10 out of 16 *Times* stories and 11 out of 17 *Guardian*

¹⁷Indeed, the frequencies of these two subcategories in *Telegraph* stories were similar to those in *Times* stories. In the case of the “military developments” category, both newspapers marked the same frequency (8 articles). In the “showing of dead/captured soldiers” category, the number of *Telegraph* stories classified into this category (7 articles) was slightly higher than that of *Times* stories (5 articles). Due to the gap in the size of raw data between the two newspapers, however, the percentages of these subcategories were higher in the *Telegraph* distribution than in the *Times* distribution.

stories) came out during the period of the Palestinian uprising (01/01/2002 – 09/11/2002). This can be viewed as indicating that *Times* and *Guardian* correspondents, in their coverage of the then-ongoing conflicts between Israelis and Palestinians, recognized the merit of Al-Jazeera as a source of pro-Palestinian news and perspectives. This point will be made again in the next section, which addresses the analysis of voice within AJ-sourced content.

Finally, the percentages under the upper-level category of “event/issues specific to Al-Jazeera,” which are presented in the fourth row section of Table 7, do not show remarkable differences among the four newspapers, except that the percentage of news stories whose AJ-as-source topic was the “performance of Al-Jazeera” seemed especially low in the *Telegraph* (3.1%). This percentage-based interpretation, however, does not appear meaningful, considering that the frequencies in this category were generally low, especially for the press on the pro-war side (3 *Journal* stories and 4 *Telegraph* stories). In addition, the percentages of the “threat to Al-Jazeera activity” category were roughly similar among the four news organizations (ranging between 6.1% and 9.3%). This topic category just mentioned covered both U.S.-involved cases and other cases. Of the stories whose AJ-as-subject topic was classified into this category, even though the overall frequencies were quite low, more than a half of the stories turned out to be the ones that referred to U.S.-involved cases. By this standard, the *Guardian* carried the highest number of stories that met this condition (8 out of 13 *Guardian* stories; for other newspapers, 6 out of 11 *Times* stories, 6 out of 9 *Telegraph* stories, and 5 out of 9 *Journal* stories). Indeed, the heavy volume of attention paid by the *Guardian* to the U.S.-involved misbehavior toward Al-Jazeera can be more clearly illustrated in later sections that deal with the presence of AJ-as-issue themes in media discourse.

Consideration of Content importance and Real-world Circumstances

It is worth noting that all of the findings described so far only dealt with the presence of Al-Jazeera as a source; the findings did not consider the relative weight given to AJ-sourced content within each story. It is possible that a story citing Al-Jazeera as a source did not attach much importance to the information coming from the TV network, and thus the informational value of AJ-sourced content was minimal. An example can be found that some news stories only mentioned in a passing manner the developments triggered by Osama bin Laden's appearance on the Al-Jazeera channel. For this reason, content importance — the prominence of AJ-sourced content in the story — was introduced as a controlling variable, which was measured at the coding stage in terms of high, medium, or low. Table 8 gives figures showing the distribution of AJ-as-source topics when the content importance was rated high or medium.

When the raw data was limited to the news stories whose AJ-sourced content had high or medium importance, the results shown in Table 8 show that the inter-newspaper differences in content diversity held essentially the same patterns as those reported in Table 6. Although this time the percentage of the “messages from U.S. enemy” category dropped from all of the newspapers, Simpson's D values indicate that there was no change in the rank order among the newspapers by content diversity. The *Guardian* still ranked top, followed by the *Times* and then the *Telegraph*; the *Journal* remained the lowest. The *Journal* was unchanged in its heavy concentration on the AJ-as-source topic category of “messages from U.S. enemy,” and, in this category, the differences among the newspapers remained significant at the level of .10 ($\chi^2 = 6.694$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .082$). As for other AJ-as-source topic categories, the overall distributive features were quite similar to those from the results of the previous analysis done without controlling, although inter-newspaper differences for the “war information” category, which had been significant in

Table 8: Distribution of AJ-as-source Topics, Under High or Medium Content Importance Condition

Major AJ-as-source Topic	Pro-war Paper		Anti-war Paper		Sig. ^a
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>	
Messages from U.S. enemy	51.1%	46.8%	36.0%	33.3%	$p < .10$
War information	13.3	24.7	14.4	22.8	<i>n.s.</i>
Regional affairs/opinions	11.1	10.4	24.0	21.9	$p < .05$
Events/issues specific to Al-Jazeera	20.0	11.7	19.2	19.3	<i>n.s.</i>
Others	4.4	6.5	6.4	2.6	<i>n.s.</i>
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
(<i>N</i> of articles)	(45)	(77)	(125)	(114)	
Simpson's <i>D</i>	.508	.691	.751	.758	

Note. Post 9/11 news stories including AJ-sourced content were examined. News stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the calculation.

the prior analysis, failed to reach the commonly accepted significance level ($\chi^2 = 5.315$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .150$). The differences for the “regional affairs/opinions” category remained statistically significant at the level of .10 ($\chi^2 = 6.694$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .082$), with the anti-war press showing higher percentages than the pro-war press.

It is worthwhile to note the result of the same analysis when the raw data included only the news stories whose AJ-sourced content had high importance. The overall story frequencies were quite low under this condition, and only two topic categories (“messages from U.S. enemy” and “events/issues specific to Al-Jazeera”) occupied

considerable percentages in the distribution from all of the newspapers.¹⁸ This result suggests that only the two topic categories — the release of Al-Qaeda messages via the Al-Jazeera network and the “character” of the news organization — were accepted by American and British reporters as newsworthy enough to justify their choice of Al-Jazeera as the primary source for reporting. This finding is not surprising, given that in the post-9/11 political climate Osama bin Laden dramatically emerged as “America’s most wanted” and Al-Jazeera suddenly became a major player in the international media business. When other kinds of AJ-source-topics are concerned, however, it would be somewhat unrealistic to expect this Arab TV channel to appear as the first source of news in Western media accounts of such events as the U.S.-led military campaigns or Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. In the news discourse describing these events and their related issues, Al-Jazeera, if it appeared, was usually cited as a supplementary or counterbalancing source.

Finally, real-world circumstances were considered as a possible covariate affecting the distributive patterns of AJ-as-source topics. Close examination of the tabulation data by time period suggested that some AJ-as-source topics had time-specific occurrences. For instance, Osama bin Laden issued his pre-recorded statements via Al-Jazeera three times in late 2001 (the “Afghanistan War” period in the research time frame) and once again in September of 2002 (the “pre-Iraq War debate” period), which grabbed a heavy volume of attention from U.S. and British media.¹⁹ AJ-sourced news content produced within these time periods is likely to contain a topic related to Al-Qaeda

¹⁸The total frequencies of news stories that met the condition of high content importance were 9 (the *Journal*), 33 (the *Telegraph*), 55 (the *Times*), and 42 (the *Guardian*). The percentages of the “message from U.S. enemy” category ranged from 47.6 % to 66.7%, and the percentages of the “events/issues specific to Al-Jazeera” category fluctuated between 18.2% and 33.3%. The percentages of these two AJ-as-source topic categories ranked the first and the second for all of the newspapers.

¹⁹Bin Laden’s pre-recorded video-taped statements were broadcast on Al-Jazeera on October 7, November 3, and December 26 of 2001. On September 16, 2002, bin Laden issued a statement, this time denying his involvement in the September 9th attacks of 2001, via Al-Jazeera.

messages in all the newspapers. Also, much of the AJ-sourced content produced during the “Palestinian uprising” period — the climax of the bloody conflict between Israelis and Palestinians — is likely to have described the regional affairs or Arab opinions related to the conflict. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that the AJ-sourced content produced during the two periods of the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War had a relatively high chance of falling into the AJ-as-source topic category of war information.

Therefore, in assessing the effects of newspaper editorial policy and national context on the distributive features of AJ-as-source topics, it was necessary to control for possible associations between some time periods and AJ-as-source topics. Using the data from news stories of medium or high content importance, a binary logistic regression was performed for each of three AJ-as-source topic categories: Al-Qaeda messages (a sub-category of the enemy messages category), regional affairs/opinions, and war information. Binary logistic regression is a statistical technique used to predict a particular value of a dichotomous dependent variable from a set of independent variables.²⁰ In this study, logistic regression was employed to estimate the effects of editorial policy, national context, and time-specific real-world circumstance in predicting the modeled AJ-as-source topic category.

²⁰Logistic regression analysis is similar to discriminant analysis, in that both analyses require that the dependent variable be categorical. Typically, discriminant analysis is employed when at least some of independent variables are continuous and all of them can be assumed normally distributed. Logistic regression analysis is an alternative method, especially when all of the predictors are categorical or they cannot be assumed normally distributed. Logistic regression function computes the probability that a case with a particular set of values for the independent variables will fall into the modeled category of the dependent variable. In the logistic regression equation, individual coefficients are expressed in natural log units. To compute the effect of a particular independent variable, the logistic regression coefficient (or simply, the logit coefficient) for the variable is used as the power to which the base of the natural logarithm is raised. The computed result indicates the odd ratio or the change in the “odds” (i.e., the ratio between being in the modeled category and not being in the category) of the modeled event associated with a one-unit change in the independent variable. See Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) for further discussion of logistic regression analysis.

In each logistic regression, the dependent variable was dichotomized in terms of the modeled topic category versus others. The five post-9/11 time periods (described in the section titled “overview of content analysis data”) were also collapsed and dichotomized differently in each regression: for the Al-Qaeda messages, the dummy category of the time period variable was the *bin Laden prominence* period (which combined the Afghanistan War period with the pre-Iraq War debate period); for the regional affairs/opinions, the dummy category was the Palestinian uprising period; for the war information, the dummy category was the *military campaign* period (which combined the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War periods). Since each newspaper editorial policy (“anti-war” = 1) and national context (“British” = 1) had two nominal values, all the variables tested were in a binary form. Interaction terms were not included in the analysis because the results of preliminary logistic regression analyses showed no interaction effect between newspaper editorial policy and national context.²¹

Table 9 depicts the results of two of the three logistic regression analyses, one for the Al-Qaeda messages topic (in the upper row section) and the other for the regional affairs/opinions topic (in the bottom row section). In both of these logistic regression models, the time period characteristic was strongly associated with the modeled topic category, yet newspaper editorial policy was also statistically significant in predicting that the AJ-sourced content would contain the particular AJ-as-source topic, while the national context factor had little impact.

²¹Given the relatively small data size, interaction terms were not included in the logistic regression analysis to limit the number of independent variables. Instead, without controlling for the impact of time period, a series of preliminary logistic regression analyses was performed to assess the effect of the interaction term of editorial policy \times national context. No significant interaction effect was found on any of the three AJ-as-source topic categories.

Table 9: Logistic Regression of AJ-as-source Topic on Predictors, Under High or Medium Content Importance Condition

<i>For Al-Qaeda messages</i>					
Predictor	b	SE	Wald ^a	sig.	Exp (b)
Time period (bin Laden prominence)	1.791	.252	50.400	<.001	5.995
Editorial policy (anti-war)	-.581	.257	5.106	.024	.559
National context (British)	-.169	.250	.458	.498	.844
Constant	.151	.229			
Initial -2 log likelihood		459.100			
-2 log likelihood		393.654			
Model χ^2		65.446 (d.f. = 3, $p < .001$)			
Cox & Snell R^2		.166			
Nagelkerke R^2		.230			
Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness of fit χ^2		2.057 (d.f. = 6, $p = .914$)			
Overall % of correct classification		69.8			
<i>For Regional affairs/opinions</i>					
Predictor	b	SE	Wald	sig.	Exp (b)
Time period (Palestinian uprising)	1.958	.319	37.688	<.001	7.087
Editorial policy (anti-war)	1.011	.356	8.072	.004	2.747
National context (British)	-.103	.293	.124	.725	.902
Constant	-.239	.324			
Initial -2 log likelihood		349.336			
-2 log likelihood		302.936			
Model χ^2		46.400 (d.f. = 3, $p < .001$)			
Cox & Snell R^2		.121			
Nagelkerke R^2		.195			
Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness of fit χ^2		1.691 (d.f. = 4, $p = .792$)			
Overall % of correct classification		82.0			

Note. N = 361 (n of news stories containing the AJ-sourced Al-Qaeda messages = 120, n of news stories containing the AJ-sourced regional affairs/opinions = 68).

^aSince each predictor's Wald statistic has one degree of freedom, this information is omitted.

In the logistic regression for Al-Qaeda messages, the bin Laden prominence period (i.e. the control variable) was positively associated with the modeled topic category ($b = 1.791$), whereas the anti-war newspaper policy was negatively associated with the dependent variable ($b = -.581$). The anti-war editorial stance had a statistically significant effect of lowering the odds (.559 times or 44.1% decrease) that the AJ-sourced content would describe a topic related to Al-Qaeda.²² This suggests that the anti-war newspapers were more likely to diversify their use of Al-Jazeera as a news source, treating the network as more than an outlet of terrorist propaganda. In the logistic regression for regional affairs/opinions, both the Palestinian uprising period ($b = 1.958$) and the anti-war editorial position ($b = 1.011$) were positively associated with the modeled topic category, that is, the anti-war newspapers, even after controlling for the impact of real-world circumstances, were more likely to cite Al-Jazeera as a source of regional news and opinion, especially in coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and their related Arab/Muslim views.

In contrast, the effect of national context on the production of the AJ-sourced content related to the third category, war information, was not clearly identifiable. In the logistic regression for this category, the occurrence of the AJ-as-source topic was strongly associated with the time period of military campaigns ($b = 1.444$; Wald = 22.983, $d.f. = 1$, $p < .001$) and was virtually unrelated to anti-war editorial stance ($b = -.036$; Wald = .015, $d.f. = 1$, $p = .904$). As to the national context factor, the Wald statistic

²²For interpretation, the logit coefficients in the original logistic equation are converted through the exponent function. The exponentiated value (e^b), which is denoted by Exp (b) in Table 9, represents the odds ratio (or the change in the odds) associated with the independent variable. Specifically, in the logistic regression for Al-Qaeda messages, the odd ratio for the bin Laden prominence period is 5.995. Thus, the odds for the AJ-sourced news content produced during the bin Laden prominence to contain the topic of Al-Qaeda messages is 5.995 times (or 499.5% greater than) the odds for the AJ-sourced news content produced in the remaining time period to contain the same topic. With regard to anti-war editorial policy, its odds ratio is .559. Thus, the odds for the AJ-sourced news content produced by the anti-war press to contain the topic of Al-Qaeda messages is .559 times (or 44.1% smaller than) the odds for the AJ-sourced news content produced by the pro-war press to describe the same topic.

for the British papers was statistically significant at the level of 10% ($b = .562$; Wald = 3.712, $d.f. = 1$, $p = .054$). Comparing two predictive models, however, one including only the time period variable and the other including all the three independent variables, the result of the likelihood ratio test indicated the statistical insignificance of the model's improvement after national context and editorial policy were added ($\chi^2 = 3.961$, $d.f. = 2$, $p = .138$).²³ The data failed to support the interpretation that British journalists were more active than Americans in using Al-Jazeera as an alternative source of war information.

In summary, regarding RQ 1, the results of the logistic regression analysis confirm the prior findings: even after the AJ-sourced content with low importance was removed and the time-specific real-world circumstances were considered, a newspaper's editorial policy had a significant impact on how diversified its use of Al-Jazeera as a source for news reporting was, while the impact of news context was far weaker.

Distribution of Voice within AJ-sourced Content

In addition, using the article as the unit of analysis, the researcher examined the presence of voices within AJ-sourced content (i.e., those quoted by U.S. and British reporters in the context of describing news content from Al-Jazeera or comments made by Al-Jazeera employees) in the news discourse produced by the U.S. and British press. Table 10 presents the distributions of voices within AJ-sourced content from the four newspapers. As the table shows, the two pro-war newspapers showed a higher degree of

²³In logistic regression modeling, the likelihood ratio test (commonly called LR test) is used to test the difference between a proposed model and its nested model having been estimated in a prior step. The difference is measured in a chi-square term, which represents the difference in likelihood ratios (i.e., the difference between two $-2 \log$ likelihoods) for the two models. For the LR test, degree of freedom is the difference in degrees of freedom for the two models. The chi-square difference is used to help decide which variables to drop from or add to the model. If the result of the LR test shows statistical insignificance of model improvement, the model with a fewer number of independent variables is preferred on the basis of parsimony. Usually, the LR test is a better criterion than the Wald statistic when considering whether and which variables to drop from the logistic regression model (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989).

Table 10: Distribution of Voice Within AJ-sourced Content

Voice Within AJ-sourced Content	<u>Pro-war Paper</u>		<u>Anti-war Paper</u>		Sig. ^a
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>	
U.S. enemy	60.4%	63.2%	42.8%	41.3%	$p < .01$
Al-Jazeera employees, not during their TV programs	22.9	14.5	26.1	27.3	<i>n.s.</i>
Arab/Western Muslims					
Palestinian/radical Muslim leaders	2.1	6.6	10.1	14.9	
Other Arab/western Muslims	6.3	6.6	13.0	6.7	
Subtotal	8.4	13.2	23.1	21.5	$p < .10$
Others	8.3	9.2	8.0	9.9	<i>n.s.</i>
Total (<i>N</i> of articles) ^b	100.0 (48)	100.0 (80)	100.0 (138)	100.0 (121)	

Note. Post 9/11 news stories including AJ-sourced content were examined. Stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the analysis.

^aThe p value for each category was acquired based on the chi-square distribution, by pitting the percentages of the category in question against the summed percentages of all other categories. The p values for the two subcategories of Arab/Western Muslims were not calculated because the overall frequencies were too low.

^bThe number of news stories in which any voice within the AJ-sourced content was present.

concentration on the voice category of U.S. enemy (60.4% for the *Journal* and 63.2% for the *Telegraph*) than their countries' anti-war counterparts (42.8% for the *Times* and 41.3% for the *Guardian*). The differences in the percentages in this category was statistically highly significant ($\chi^2 = 13.585$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .004$), which goes in tandem with

the previous findings showing the relatively high concentration in the pro-war press of the AJ-as-source topic of “messages from the U.S. enemy.”

The percentages of Al-Jazeera employees within AJ-sourced content (excluding those quoted from Al-Jazeera’s own news programs) were similar among the three newspapers (ranging between 22.9% and 27.3%) but differed from *Telegraph* (14.5%). This low percentage in *Telegraph* data might be viewed, in combination with the previous findings regarding AJ-as-source topic, as strengthening the interpretation that this British newspaper remained less active in featuring the Arabic satellite TV station. The differences among the newspapers, however, seemed to be too small to be conclusive ($\chi^2 = 4.874$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .181$).

As for the category covering a variety of Arab/Western Muslim voices within AJ-sourced content, both the *Times* and the *Guardian* marked relatively high percentages (23.1% and 21.5%, respectively) on this category, while the *Telegraph* stayed at a slightly lower percentage (13.2%) and the *Journal* remained the lowest (8.4%). The inter-newspaper differences on this category were significant at the level of .10 ($\chi^2 = 7.474$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .058$). Although the percentages of all Arab/Western Muslim voices within AJ-sourced content were similar in *Times* and *Guardian* stories, there was a noticeable difference in the sub-distribution within the “Arab/Western Muslims” category between the two anti-war newspapers. The *Guardian* seemed to be more concerned than the *Times* with picking up Palestinian and radical Muslim voices from the news material aired by Al-Jazeera. Specifically, about 70% of *Guardian* stories including Arab or Muslim voices within AJ-sourced content (18 out of 26) were classified into the category of Palestinian/radical Muslim leaders. In contrast, about 45% of *Times* stories under the same condition (14 out of 32) were assigned to that voice category. This proportional difference suggests that, even within the news organizations that had similar anti-war

editorial policy, the British anti-war newspaper was more aggressive in utilizing the kind of Palestinian or Arab voices likely to be the most critical of the U.S. approach to the Palestinian problem and the Arab/Muslim world.

As a next step of analysis, content importance of Al-Jazeera in the news story was introduced as a control variable into the analysis of voices within AJ-sourced content, just as the same adjustment was made in the previous analysis of AJ-as-source topic. Table 11 shows the distributions of voice within AJ-sourced content when news stories were limited to the ones whose content importance was rated high or medium. Even after the news stories whose AJ-sourced content had low importance were removed, the differences among the newspapers in the percentage of the “U.S. enemy” voice category remained statistically highly significant ($\chi^2 = 13.970$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .003$), which confirms again the differentiation between the pro-war and the anti-war newspapers in the concentrated use of Al-Jazeera as a source of enemy propaganda.

On the other hand, the differences in the percentage of the “Al-Jazeera employees” category, after controlling, became even smaller than before ($\chi^2 = 2.978$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .395$), which suggests that, in comparison with the other newspapers, the *Telegraph*’s apparently low willingness to feature the Arabic news organization was not indeed particularly meaningful. The differences among the newspapers in the percentages of Arab/Western Muslim voices were still statistically significant in the same direction at the level of 0.10 ($\chi^2 = 7.144$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .067$), which is congruent with the previous findings in the analysis of AJ-as-source topics that showed that both the *Times* and the *Guardian* were more willing than their countries’ pro-war press to taking advantage of Al-Jazeera as a source of regional news and points of view.

This last point is noteworthy in relation to media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and their related issues. With a closer examination into the *Times*

Table 11: Distribution of Voice Within AJ-sourced Content, Under High or Medium Content Importance Condition

Voice Within AJ-sourced Content	Pro-war Paper		Anti-war Paper		Sig. ^a
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>	
U.S. enemy	56.4%	61.4%	37.5%	35.8%	$p<.01$
Al-Jazeera employees, not during their TV programs	25.6	19.3	29.5	31.9	<i>n.s.</i>
Arab/Western Muslims	10.3	13.3	25.0	23.2	$p<.10$
Others	7.7	7.0	8.0	9.5	<i>n.s.</i>
Total (<i>N</i> of articles) ^b	100.0 (39)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (112)	100.0 (95)	

Note. Post 9/11 news stories including AJ-sourced content were examined. Stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the analysis.

^aThe *p* value for each category was acquired based on the chi-square distribution, by pitting the percentages of the category in question against the summed percentages of all other categories.

^bThe number of news stories in which any voice within the AJ-sourced content was present.

and *Guardian* stories that secondhand-quoted Palestinian or radical Muslim leaders by way of Al-Jazeera, there were found cases of “counterbalancing,” in the sense that Israeli officials’ accounts of the Palestinian uprising were contrasted with quotes from such Palestinian figures as Hamas leaders who originally appeared on Al-Jazeera news programs. There has been much criticism of the nature of U.S. media portrayals of the Palestinian issue (Said, 1997; Wolfsfeld, 1997), and, from a journalistic point of view, one of the reasons for a “pro-Israel” bias in media coverage has been identified as the problem of access – while Israeli spokespersons are easily accessed, interviewing the

Palestinian side is more difficult due to such obstacles as the checkpoints, the curfews, and the violence in the streets (Hassan, 2003). Considering these circumstances, the efforts made by some Western journalists in the recent wartime to relay the Palestinian and radical Arab voices mediated by Al-Jazeera, if continued, might help achieve more “balanced” reporting of the unremitting regional conflicts.

Finally, parallel to the previous analysis of AJ-as-source topics, time period characteristic was introduced as a control variable in assessing the effects of editorial policy and national context on voice within AJ-sourced content. Using the voice frequency data from news stories of high or medium Content importance, a binary logistic regression was performed for each of two voice categories: U.S. enemy and Arab/Muslim voices.

In each logistic regression, the time period variable was dummy-coded differently: for the U.S. enemy voice, the dummy category of the time period variable was the *bin Laden prominence* period (which combined the Afghanistan War period and the pre-Iraq War debate period); for the Arab/Muslim voice, the dummy category was the *Palestinian uprising* period. Essentially the same logic as in the earlier logistic regression for the AJ-as-source topic was employed: a voice cited through AJ-sourced content within the bin Laden prominence period (which involved Al-Jazeera’s broadcasts of bin Laden’s statements) was expected to have a high chance of being the one belonging to the U.S. enemy category; a voice cited through AJ-sourced content within the Palestinian uprising period (which involved the intense conflict between Israelis and Palestinians) was expected to have a high chance of falling into the Arab/Muslim voice category.

Table 12 depicts the results of the two logistic regression analyses. In both of these logistic regression equations, the time-specific real-world circumstances were strongly associated with the modeled voice categories, yet newspaper editorial policy was

Table 12: Logistic Regression of Voice within AJ-sourced Content on Predictors, Under High or Medium Content Importance Condition

<i>For U.S. enemy voice</i>					
Predictor	b	SE	Wald	sig.	Exp (b)
Time period (bin Laden prominence)	1.250	.246	25.789	<.001	3.489
Editorial policy (anti-war)	-.720	.263	7.499	.006	.487
National context (British)	.007	.249	.001	.978	1.007
Constant	-.124	.239			
Initial -2 log likelihood			420.100		
-2 log likelihood			381.889		
Model χ^2			38.212 (<i>d.f.</i> = 3, <i>p</i> < .001)		
Cox & Snell R ²			.117		
Nagelkerke R ²			.157		
Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness of fit χ^2			.888 (<i>d.f.</i> = 6, <i>p</i> = .990)		
Overall % of correct classification			65.8		
<i>For Arab/Western Muslim voice</i>					
Predictor	b	SE	Wald	sig.	Exp (b)
Time period (Palestinian uprising)	1.859	.326	32.539	<.001	6.417
Editorial policy (anti-war)	.700	.349	4.024	.045	2.014
National context (British)	.079	.303	.068	.795	1.082
Constant	-.306	.334			
Initial -2 log likelihood			316.968		
-2 log likelihood			280.777		
Model χ^2			36.191 (<i>d.f.</i> = 3, <i>p</i> < .001)		
Cox & Snell R ²			.111		
Nagelkerke R ²			.173		
Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness of fit χ^2			5.397 (<i>d.f.</i> = 4, <i>p</i> = .249)		
Overall % of correct classification			78.8		

Note. *N* = 307 (*n* of news stories that cited a U.S. enemy voice within AJ-sourced content = 133, *n* of news stories that cited an Arab/Western Muslim voice within AJ-sourced content = 65)

also statistically significant in predicting the particular voice categories. The national context, in contrast, showed virtually no impact in prediction.

In the logistic regression for U.S. enemy voice (in the upper row section), the logit coefficient for the anti-war press had a negative sign ($b = -.720$), which indicated that the anti-war editorial policy had a statistically significant effect of lowering the odds that a voice cited through AJ-sourced content would originate from the U.S. enemy (Wald = 7.499, $d.f. = 1$, $p < .01$). In other words, the anti-war newspapers were more likely than the pro-war papers to use Al-Jazeera as a source of non-enemy voices. In the logistic regression for Arab/Muslim voice (in the bottom row section), the logit coefficient for the anti-war editorial policy had a positive sign ($b = .700$), indicating that the anti-war stance had an effect of raising the odds that a voice within AJ-sourced content would be Arab or Muslim (Wald = 4.024, $d.f. = 1$, $p < .05$). This suggests that the anti-war press, even after controlling for the impact of time period characteristic, were more likely to cite Al-Jazeera as a source of Arab/Muslim voices.

Therefore, findings from the logistic regression analysis support the interpretation that the two countries' anti-war papers were more active than the pro-war papers in picking up non-enemy and particularly Arab/Muslim voices from the stream of news content coming from Al-Jazeera. Returning to RQ 1, which asked whether and how news organization policy and national context were related to journalistic use of Al-Jazeera as a news source, both of the analyses of AJ-as-source topic and voice within AJ-sourced content yielded a key finding: newspaper editorial policy had a far more pronounced effect than national context on the diversified use of Al-Jazeera as a news source in post-9/11 wartime reporting.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDIA DISCOURSE ADDRESSING AJ AS SUBJECT

As noted in the theoretical review, critical media scholars have been concerned with American media's heavy dependence on official sources especially in coverage of U.S.-involved foreign affairs. Throughout the recent "War on Terror" period, which involved military campaigns in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, officials of the U.S.-led war-waging forces had a great deal of difficulty in managing the wartime public relations campaign. Markedly, Al-Jazeera's wartime journalism involved the dissemination of alternative images of war, provoking U.S. and British government and military officials' criticism of the Arabic news outlet for its alleged collaboration with U.S. enemies and its violation of media ethics.

Considering this circumstance, RQ 2 asks how the U.S. and British institutions of journalism opened or closed the news gate to a variety of voices expressing their views about Al-Jazeera or issues involving the Arabic news network. Specifically, in coverage of controversies related to Al-Jazeera, did the two countries' journalists select sources largely within the boundaries of the debate initiated by government or military officials? Or, as suggested in some scholars' discussion of journalistic use of "news icon" (Bennett & Lawrence, 1995; Lawrence, 1996), did the journalists recognize the near-iconic status of Al-Jazeera and, by shifting the story beyond the official debate, bring the nonofficial voices of Arab media workers and members of the Al-Jazeera audiences into the mainstream forum of debate? The following sections explore this issue by presenting findings from the analysis of AJ-as-subject source as well as news context.

Distribution of AJ-as-subject Sources

In operational terms, the objectives of RQ 2 are to examine the distribution of AJ-as-subject sources in the news discourse of American and British major print outlets and, by doing so, to seek potential variances across the newspapers that held different editorial policies. As an initial step of data presentation, Table 13 shows the presence-based distribution of AJ-as-subject sources for each of the four newspapers. For this article-unit analysis of source presence, the originally coded data, in which the unit of analysis was a unique source, were converted into presence-based ones, where the criterion of re-coding was whether or not any unique source belonging to a certain AJ-as-subject source group was “present” in the news story.²⁴

From the source presence data presented in Table 13, the most noticeable difference is between the pro-war and anti-war papers in the percentage of the “U.S./British officials” source category. When the total was set as the number of news stories that mentioned any AJ-as-subject source,²⁵ the percentages of the stories that cited at least one U.S. or British official as an AJ-as-subject source were far higher in the two pro-war newspapers (65.6% of *Journal* stories and 61.4% of *Telegraph* stories) than in the remaining anti-war newspapers (39.3% of *Times* stories and 40.3% of *Guardian*

²⁴Originally, the news material including AJ-evaluative content was coded under the guide of the source-unit coding protocol, as described in the section titled “source-unit analysis” in Chapter 3. Through the data conversion, a news story that mentioned at least one unique source suiting a certain AJ-as-subject category (say, “U.S./British officials”) received the same score (“present”) on the category, regardless of how many unique sources belonging to a group referred to by the source category were quoted in the story.

²⁵In the article-unit analysis of AJ-as-subject source presence, the total for each newspaper was set as the number of stories quoting any AJ-as-subject source, not the number of all news stories including AJ-evaluative content (i.e., the full range of news material examined in the source-unit analysis). Logically, the AJ-evaluative content in a news story can originate solely from the reporter, not from the source(s) quoted by the reporter. Therefore, a news story including AJ-evaluative content does not necessarily cite an AJ-as-subject source. Considering this, to make a “fair” comparison across the newspapers, the total for each newspaper was decided as the number of stories quoting at least one AJ-as-subject source. In fact, the results of the analysis remained virtually unchanged even when the total was set as the number of all news stories including AJ-evaluative content. Under this totaling condition, the inter-newspaper differences on the source category of U.S./British officials were statistically significant at the level of .10 ($\chi^2 = 7.710$, *d.f.* = 3, *p* = .052).

Table 13: Presence-based Distribution of AJ-as-subject Source, Using Article as Unit of Analysis

AJ-as-subject Source Category	Pro-war Paper		Anti-war Paper		Sig.
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>	
U.S./British officials	65.6%	61.4%	39.3%	40.3%	$p < .05$
U.S./British others	21.9	15.9	34.4	30.6	<i>n.s.</i>
Al-Jazeera employees	43.8	25.0	34.4	33.9	<i>n.s.</i>
Arab/Muslim others	25.0	31.8	16.4	19.4	<i>n.s.</i>
Others	6.3	9.1	9.8	11.3	<i>n.s.</i>
Total (<i>N</i> of articles) ^a	100.0 (32)	100.0 (45)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (62)	

Note. Post 9/11 news stories including AJ-evaluative content were examined. Stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the calculation.

^aThe number of news stories in which at least one AJ-as-subject source was present. Since the presence-based percentage of each category is independent of the percentages of other categories, the sum of the percentages in each column does not add up to 100%.

stories). The differences among the newspapers were statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 10.372$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .016$), which suggests that the two countries' anti-war newspapers were more likely than their counterparts to cite comments from their government or military officials in coverage of events and issues related to Al-Jazeera.

With regard to the percentages of other AJ-as-subject source categories, however, none of the proportional differences among the newspapers were statistically significant.²⁶ The *Telegraph* data, though, compared with other newspapers' data, showed

²⁶The chi-square values for all other categories were as follows: for "U.S./British others," $\chi^2 = 5.279$, $d.f. =$

somewhat low percentages in the two categories of “U.S./British others” and “Al-Jazeera employees,” and a somewhat high percentage in the category of “Arab/Muslim others.” In addition, the *Times* and the *Guardian*, in comparison with their pro-war competitors, marked relatively high percentages in the “Arab/Muslim others” category. Still, considering that none of these irregularities turned out to be statistically significant, it seems hard to give a further interpretation about the discrepancies among the news organizations in their selection of non-official voices in coverage of events and issues related to Al-Jazeera.

The results of the article-unit content analysis just mentioned, however, do not give a complete picture about those who were given a say about Al-Jazeera or issues involving the Arabic network in the media-constructed forum of debate, especially in that the presence-based data ignore the frequency with which AJ-as-sources within a certain source category appeared in a news story. In this regard, it is worthwhile to examine the results of the frequency analysis, which are presented in Table 14. The unit of analysis here was the unique source.

First, the percentages of U.S./British official sources were far higher in the pro-war newspapers (44.4% of sources for the *Journal* and 43.7% for the *Telegraph*) than in the anti-war newspapers (24.6% for the *Times* and 26.5% for the *Guardian*). The inter-newspaper differences on this category were statistically highly significant ($\chi^2 = 12.838$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .005$). This confirms again the findings from the previous presence-based analysis telling that the anti-war news outlets were more likely than their pro-war competitors to give non-official voices a say in the media discussion of such issues as the journalistic identity of Al-Jazeera and the U.S. approach to the Arabic satellite TV channel.

3, $p = .152$; for “Al-Jazeera employees, not in their news programs,” $\chi^2 = 2.954$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .399$; for “Arab/Muslim others,” $\chi^2 = 3.994$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .399$; and for “others,” $\chi^2 = .620$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .892$.

Table 14: Distribution of AJ-as-subject Source, Using Unique Source as Unit of Analysis

AJ-as-subject Source Category	Pro-war Paper		Anti-war Paper		Sig.
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>	
U.S./British officials	44.4%	43.7%	24.6%	26.5%	$p<.01$
U.S./British others	14.3	9.9	25.4	21.3	$p<.05$
Al-Jazeera employees	20.6	19.7	22.8	25.5	<i>n.s.</i>
Arab/Muslim others	17.5	21.1	19.3	17.0	<i>n.s.</i>
Others	3.2	5.6	7.9	9.6	<i>n.s.</i>
Total (<i>N</i> of unique sources)	100.0 (63)	100.0 (71)	100.0 (114)	100.0 (94)	

Note. All unique sources were found in the post 9/11 news stories including AJ-evaluative content. Stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the analysis.

Second, unlike the findings from the previous article-unit analysis that showed the proportions of all nonofficial source categories did not differ significantly across the newspapers, there was found a significant difference between the pro-war and the anti-war papers in the percentage of the “U.S./British others” category. The percentages of sources classified into this category were higher from the *Times* (25.4%) and the *Guardian* (21.3%) than from the *Journal* (14.3%) and the *Telegraph* (9.9%), and the inter-newspaper differences in this category were statistically significant at the level of .05 ($\chi^2 = 8.150$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .043$). The source category of “U.S. and British others” mainly consisted of media professionals and those cited as having expertise in Arab media or Middle East politics. This suggests that the reporters at the *Times* and the

Guardian, compared with their colleagues at the pro-war press, were relatively active in getting opinions from the circles of professionals and experts in their countries and thereby expanding the scope of the controversies involving Al-Jazeera or the U.S. approach to Arab media.

Third, except for the two source categories just mentioned, the proportions of the sources assigned to the remaining categories did not differ significantly across the newspapers. For the “Al-Jazeera employees” category, both the *Times* and the *Guardian* cited a higher number of sources inside the Al-Jazeera news organization (26 for the *Times* and 24 for the *Guardian*) than did their pro-war competitors (13 for the *Journal* and 14 for the *Telegraph*). The differences among the newspapers, however, turned out to be quite small ($\chi^2 = 0.942$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .815$). The percentages of sources classified into the “Arabs/Muslim others” category seemed to be quite similar among the four newspapers, and therefore no significant difference was found ($\chi^2 = 0.539$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .910$).

In summary, this analysis shows that both the *Times* and the *Guardian*, in coverage of issues involving Al-Jazeera, were more likely than the *Journal* and the *Telegraph* to bring into the forum of debate non-official voices from a variety of domestic and foreign sectors. Markedly, in order to construct relevant parties in this expanded scale of debate, the journalists at the two anti-war newspapers were aggressive, compared with their colleagues on the pro-war side, in using their domestic source pools of media professionals and other experts. Indeed, the anti-war newspapers also cited a higher number of Al-Jazeera employees and people in the Arab/Muslim communities than did the pro-war newspapers, although the proportions of Al-Jazeera and other

Arab/Muslim sources in the AJ-as-subject source distribution were similar between the pro-war and anti-war newspapers.²⁷

In relation to the media selection of AJ-as-subject sources just described, one question can be raised: Did the degree of source diversification in the media-mediated debate also affect the journalistic balancing of the overall direction of opinions about Al-Jazeera within the entire group of AJ-as-subject sources? Table 15 gives one answer. As shown in this table, for the three categories of source tone toward Al-Jazeera (i.e., favorable/contextually favorable, unfavorable/contextually unfavorable, and mixed/unclear), none of the proportional differences among the newspapers was statistically significant. For instance, the percentages of the AJ-as-subject sources whose tone was measured as favorable/contextually favorable were a little higher for the anti-war newspapers (37.7% for the *Times* and 42.6% for the *Guardian*) than for the pro-war newspapers (34.9% for the *Journal* and 33.8% for the *Telegraph*). The differences in these percentages, however, were not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 1.610$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .657$). In a similar fashion, the percentages of the sources whose tone was unfavorable or contextually unfavorable differed somewhat among the newspapers (ranging from 42.1% to 49.3%), but the proportional differences among the newspapers were statistically insignificant ($\chi^2 = 1.220$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .748$).

These findings indicate that, although the pro-war newspapers relied more on official sources than did the anti-war newspapers, there were few differences between the

²⁷There are two combined reasons for this result. One reason is related to the discrepancies in the size of data between the pro-war and anti-war papers. The anti-war newspapers showed higher totals of unique AJ-as-subject sources (113 from the *Times* and 94 from the *Guardian*) than the pro-war newspapers (67 from the *Journal* and 71 from the *Telegraph*). Thus, it is possible that the percentage of a certain category is similar between the pro-war and anti-war newspapers even though the frequency of the category is higher in the anti-war press than in the pro-war press. The other reason is associated with the distributional features. In the case of pro-war newspapers, the percentages of the “U.S./British others” and “others” categories were quite low, which resulted in the rise in the proportions of the remaining AJ-as-source categories, including Al-Jazeera employees and Arab/Muslim voices.

Table 15: Distribution of AJ-as-subject Source Tone

Source Tone Toward Al-Jazeera	<u>Pro-war Paper</u>		<u>Anti-war Paper</u>		Sig.
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>	
Favorable/contextually favorable	34.9%	33.8%	37.7%	42.6%	<i>n.s.</i>
Unfavorable/contextually unfavorable	47.6	49.3	42.1	42.6	<i>n.s.</i>
Mixed/unclear	17.5	16.9	20.2	14.8	<i>n.s.</i>
Total (<i>N</i> of unique sources)	100.0 (63)	100.0 (71)	100.0 (114)	100.0 (94)	

Note. All unique sources were found in the post 9/11 news stories including AJ-evaluative content. Stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the analysis.

two newspaper groups in the likelihood of citing sources having one of the following tones: favorable, unfavorable, and ambivalent toward Al-Jazeera. It is worth noting, however, that there existed subtle differences among the newspapers when the ratio of favorable (or contextually favorable) sources to unfavorable (or contextually unfavorable) sources was considered. By this standard, the *Telegraph* (.686) was rated the lowest, followed by the *Journal* (.733) as the second lowest. On the other hand, the ratios for the *Times* (.896) and the *Guardian* (1.000) were relatively high. Therefore, when only the dichotomy of favorable versus unfavorable tone was considered, the pro-war paper distribution of source tone toward Al-Jazeera was tilted toward a negative

direction, although this leaning, compared with the almost equally balanced tone of the anti-war paper distribution, was not statistically significant.²⁸

All in all, the results of the source analysis in Table 15 suggest that the journalistic norm of balancing was at least apparently at work in the media discussion of matters related Al-Jazeera. Still, these findings do not rule out the possibility that there existed nuanced forms of differences among the two countries' elite press in their coverage of events and issues involving the Arabic news organization. A closer examination would be useful to explore the ways in which certain groups of voices were granted access to and privilege in the media-constructed forum of debate. The next section deals with this topic.

Consideration of News Context and Real-world Circumstances

The foregoing discussion on the differences among the newspapers in the journalistic selection of AJ-as-subject sources does not consider the context of news discourse in which certain categories of voices appeared as the sources commenting on such subjects as the character of the Al-Jazeera network, the journalistic quality of the news material aired by Al-Jazeera, or the U.S. behavior toward this Arabic news outlet.

For this reason, as described in Chapter 3, additional measurement was done on the news material at the coding stage to determine the news context that surrounded the quotation of AJ-as-sources, in terms of either beats-oriented news, icon-driven news, or other news context. Using the story as a unit of analysis, Table 16 shows the proportions of three types of news contexts in the news stories that mentioned at least one AJ-as-

²⁸When the category of "mixed/unclear" in Table 15 was removed, the proportional difference between the two groups of the pro-war and the anti-war newspapers was still not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 1.250$, *d.f.* = 1, $p = .264$).

Table 16: Distribution of News Context in the AJ-evaluative Content, Using Article as Unit of Analysis

News Context Type	Pro-war Paper		Anti-war Paper		Sig.
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>	
Beats-oriented news	43.8%	50.0%	26.2%	29.0%	$p < .05$
Icon-driven news	25.0	20.5	34.4	33.9	<i>n.s.</i>
Other/unclear	31.3	29.5	39.3	37.1	<i>n.s.</i>
Total (N of articles) ^a	100.0 (32)	100.0 (44)	100.0 (61)	100.0 (62)	

Note. Post 9/11 news stories including AJ-evaluative content were examined. Stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the calculation.

^aThe number of news stories that cited at least one AJ-as-subject source.

subject source. Most remarkably, the percentages of beats-oriented news, in which the most newsworthy information or points of view came from government/military-controlled beats, differed considerably across the newspapers ($\chi^2 = 8.439$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .038$). The two pro-war newspapers showed higher percentages of this category (43.8% of *Journal* stories and 50.0% of *Telegraph* stories) than did the remaining anti-war newspapers (26.2% of *Times* stories and 29.0% of *Guardian* stories). This is congruent with the prior findings that the two countries' pro-war news outlets were more likely than their anti-war counterparts to limit the debate to the confines of official voices.

Shifting the focus into the category of icon-driven news, the percentages of stories assigned to this news context were higher in the anti-war press (34.4 % of *Times* stories and 33.9% of *Guardian* stories) than were in the pro-war press (25.0% of *Journal* stories and 20.5% of *Telegraph* stories). The differences in percentage in this category among the newspapers, however, failed to meet the commonly accepted significance level ($\chi^2 =$

3.312, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .346$). Next, in the category of other/unclear news context, the percentages were slightly higher in the anti-war press (39.3 % of *Times* stories and 37.1% of *Guardian* stories) than in the pro-war press (31.3% of *Journal* stories and 29.5% of *Telegraph* stories), but the inter-newspaper differences were not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 1.393$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .707$).

Although the inter-newspaper differences in the percentage of icon-driven news stories were statistically insignificant, there existed noticeable differences in story frequency between the pro-war and anti-war papers. The story frequencies of icon-driven news in the anti-war press (21 each for the *Times* and the *Guardian*) were more than twice the number found in the pro-war press (8 *Journal* stories and 9 *Telegraph* stories). Moreover, when the unit of analysis was the unique source, not the story, clear differences were found between the pro-war and anti-war newspapers in the percentages of both beats-oriented news and icon-driven news. Table 17 presents the occurrence of AJ-as-subject sources by news context type. As shown in the data, especially in the anti-war press, a substantial proportion of AJ-as-subject sources were cited through icon-driven news reporting. In the pro-war newspapers, more than 40% of unique sources were cited in stories classified into beats-oriented news (44.4% for the *Journal* and 40.8% for the *Telegraph*), while the percentages of source occurrences in icon-driven news stories remained about 30% (28.9% for the *Journal* and 32.4% for the *Telegraph*). Conversely, in the anti-war newspapers, about 45% of AJ-as-subject sources appeared in the context of icon-driven news (43.9% for the *Times* and 46.8% for the *Telegraph*), while beats-oriented news context accounted for only about 25% of all source occurrences (28.3 % for *Times* and 24.5% for the *Guardian*).

Table 17: Citation of AJ-as-subject Source within Each News Context

News Context Type	<u>Pro-war Paper</u>		<u>Anti-war Paper</u>		Sig.
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>	
AJ-as-subject source is cited in					
Beats-oriented news	44.4%	40.8%	28.3%	24.5%	<i>p</i> <.05
Icon-driven news	25.4	32.4	43.9	46.8	<i>p</i> <.05
Other/unclear context	30.2	26.8	28.3	28.7	<i>n.s.</i>
Total (<i>N</i> of unique sources)	100.0 (63)	100.0 (71)	100.0 (114)	100.0 (94)	

Note. All unique sources were found in the post 9/11 news stories including AJ-evaluative content. Stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the analysis.

Concerning the proportions of source occurrences by news context type, the differences in percentages across the newspapers were statistically significant in the categories of beats-oriented news ($\chi^2 = 10.086$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .018$) and icon-driven news ($\chi^2 = 9.752$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .021$). On the other hand, the inter-newspaper differences in the percentage of source occurrences in the other/unclear news context were not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = .201$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .978$). These results suggest that the discrepancies in AJ-as-subject source patterns among the newspapers are largely attributable to the dichotomy of beats-oriented news and icon-driven news. Recalling that in the article-unit analysis the differences among the newspapers in the percentage of icon-driven news stories were statistically insignificant, the results of the source unit analysis indicate that the inter-newspaper discrepancies associated with icon-driven news became enlarged when the unique AJ-as-subject source was used as the unit of analysis.

Because the variable of news context was introduced as a parameter for evaluating the features of the news discourse, we can examine more closely how different types of news context were associated with the selection and the gravity of voices uttering AJ-related views. In short, icon-driven news, especially compared with beats-oriented news, provided a greater degree of source diversification in the portrayal of events, issues, and actors related to Al-Jazeera. The extent of source diversity within each news context can be examined in three aspects: the frequency of AJ-as-subject sources, the preference for certain source categories, and the direction of opinion among cited sources.

First, icon-driven news stories tended to cite a higher number of AJ-as-subject sources than did beats-oriented stories and other news stories. For the stories classified as icon-driven news, the average frequency of AJ-as-subject source per story throughout the four newspapers was 2.25 ($SD = 1.397$). In comparison, for the stories determined as beats-oriented news, the average frequency of source occurrence per story was 1.60 ($SD = 1.055$), and, for the stories assigned to other news context, the average frequency was 1.39 ($SD = .873$). These differences also explain how, in the case of the anti-war press, the percentage of icon-driven news stories stayed about 35% of all stories including any AJ-as-subject source (in Table 16), but, after the unit of analysis was converted into unique source, the percentage of AJ-as-subject sources cited in icon-driven news context rose to around 45% (in Table 17). The relatively high frequency of AJ-as-subject sources in the icon-driven news story resulted in an increased proportion of the icon-driven news category in the source-unit distribution, and this proportional rise was especially noticeable in the anti-war newspapers as they carried more icon-driven news stories than did their pro-war competitors.

Next, icon-driven coverage differed from beats-oriented coverage in that the former type of reporting frequently cited and gave gravity to non-official sources, especially nonmainstream voices of Arab media workers and Arab/Muslim audiences (including Western Muslims). Table 18 illustrates in the four newspapers the occurrences of AJ-as-subject sources within three types of news context: beats-oriented, icon-driven, and other/unclear news context. Indeed, the data presented in Table 18 can be seen as validating the measurement of news context in the coding, because, by operational definitions, U.S./British official voices should be dominant in beats-oriented news, while the voices of Al-Jazeera employees or other Arabs/Muslims should be so in icon-driven news. Specifically, for the stories determined as beats-oriented news (presented in the upper row section of Table 18), the percentages of U.S. and British official sources were predominant throughout all the newspapers, ranging between 53.1% and 75.9%, and the combined percentages of the official sources and others in U.S. and British society (excluding Muslims in the two countries) reached around 75% or higher from all of the newspapers. For the icon-driven news stories (in the middle row section of the table), in all the newspapers, the percentages of the voices identified as Al-Jazeera employees reached around 40% of all AJ-as-subject sources, and the combined percentages of Al-Jazeera employees and other Arab/Muslim sources (including residents in Western Muslim communities) fluctuated between 60% and 90%. In addition, for the stories belonging to the “other/unclear news context” category (in the bottom section of the table), no common feature in the AJ-as-subject source distribution was found to correspond to all the newspapers.²⁹

Finally, icon-driven news stories differed from beats-oriented news stories in the dominant tone of cited opinions. The relevant data is presented in Table 19. As this

²⁹Because the “other/unclear” news context category was assigned to news stories where neither official voices nor Arab/Muslim voices were dominant in the discussion of subjects related to Al-Jazeera

Table 18: Distribution of AJ-as-subject Source within Each News Context

AJ-as-subject Source Category	<u>Pro-war Paper</u>				<u>Anti-war Paper</u>			
	<i>Journal</i>		<i>Telegraph</i>		<i>Times</i>		<i>Guardian</i>	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
<i>In beats-oriented news</i>								
U.S./British officials	71.4	20	75.9	22	53.1	17	65.2	15
U.S./British others	14.3	4	6.9	2	28.1	9	8.7	2
Al-Jazeera employees	7.1	2	10.3	3	6.3	2	8.7	2
Arab/Muslim others	3.6	1	6.9	2	3.1	1	13.0	3
Others	3.6	1	0	0	9.4	3	4.3	1
Total	100.0	28	100.0	29	100.0	32	100.0	23
<i>In icon-driven news</i>								
U.S./British officials	12.5	2	26.1	6	6.0	3	15.9	7
U.S./British others	0.0	0	8.7	2	14.0	7	11.4	5
Al-Jazeera employees	43.8	7	39.1	9	40.0	20	45.5	20
Arab/Muslim others	43.8	7	17.4	4	36.0	18	15.9	7
Others	0.0	0	8.7	2	4.0	2	11.5	5
Total	100.0	16	100.0	23	100.0	50	100.0	44
<i>In other/unclear news context</i>								
U.S./British officials	31.6	6	21.1	4	25.0	8	11.1	3
U.S./British others	26.3	5	15.8	3	40.6	13	48.1	13
Al-Jazeera employees	6.0	4	10.5	2	12.5	4	7.4	2
Arab/Muslim others	15.8	3	42.1	8	9.4	3	22.2	6
Others	5.3	1	10.5	2	12.5	4	11.1	3
Total	100.0	19	100.0	19	100.0	32	100.0	27
Grand N of unique sources		63		71		114		94

Note. All unique sources were found in the post 9/11 news stories including AJ-evaluative content. Stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the analysis.

Table 19: Distribution of AJ-as-subject Source Tone by News Context

AJ-as-subject Source Tone	Pro-war Paper				Anti-war Paper			
	<i>Journal</i>		<i>Telegraph</i>		<i>Times</i>		<i>Guardian</i>	
	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>
<i>In beats-oriented news</i>								
Favorable/contextually favorable	17.9	5	6.9	2	15.6	5	17.4	4
Unfavorable/contextually unfavorable	64.3	18	75.9	22	59.4	19	82.6	19
Mixed/unclear	17.9	5	17.2	5	25.0	8	0.0	0
Total	100.0	28	100.0	29	100.0	32	100.0	23
<i>In icon-driven news</i>								
Favorable/contextually favorable	68.8	11	47.8	11	60.0	30	56.8	25
Unfavorable/contextually unfavorable	18.8	3	39.1	9	24.0	12	18.2	8
Mixed/unclear	12.5	2	13.0	3	16.0	8	25.0	11
Total	100.0	16	100.0	23	100.0	50	100.0	44
<i>In other/unclear news context</i>								
Favorable/contextually favorable	31.6	6	57.9	11	25.0	8	40.7	11
Unfavorable/contextually unfavorable	47.4	9	21.1	4	53.1	17	48.1	13
Mixed/unclear	21.1	4	21.0	4	21.9	7	11.1	3
Total	100.0	19	100.0	19	100.0	32	100.0	27
Grand <i>N</i> of unique sources		63		71		114		94

Note. All unique sources were found in the post 9/11 news stories including AJ-evaluative content. Stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the analysis.

table shows, in beats-oriented news, negative attitudes toward Al-Jazeera were prevalent in all the newspapers. The overall percentages of the AJ-as-subject sources classified into the tone category of unfavorable or contextually unfavorable toward Al-Jazeera ranged from 59.4% to 82.6% among the newspapers, whereas the percentages of sources with a favorable or contextually favorable tone stayed between 6.9% and 17.9%. In icon-driven news, conversely, the percentages of the favorable or contextually favorable sources reached around 50% or higher from all the newspapers, whereas the percentages of the unfavorable or contextually unfavorable sources were about 40% or less. For the category of “other/unclear” news context, the distributions of source tone were irregular among the news outlets, although the percentages of negative tone were somewhat higher than the percentages of positive tone for all the newspapers except the *Telegraph*.

Given all of these, the characteristics of icon-driven reporting suggest a further examination of the relationship among editorial policy, AJ-as-subject source selection, and the tone of cited opinion. Using the source-unit frequency data described above, binary logistic regression models were developed to estimate the effects of editorial policy, national context, and time period for each of two AJ-as-subject source tone categories: favorable/contextually favorable and unfavorable/contextually unfavorable. For each source tone category, news context, which was dummy-coded in terms of icon-driven news versus others, was introduced as a mediator variable within a two-stage causal framework. This mediator variable was selected because, as stated above, the news context factor mirrored source selection patterns and their associated types of reporting; these were assumed to be “prior to” the tone of a specific cited opinion in a story, yet “posterior to” antecedent variables such as editorial policy, which was beyond the control of individual journalists. For the control variable of time period, dates covering real-world circumstances likely to encourage icon-driven reporting about Al-Jazeera were

selected: the Afghanistan War, the pre-Iraq War debate, and the Iraq War periods which included the broadcast of bin Laden's messages, scoop coverage of the Afghanistan War, and the airing of the footage showing U.S. prisoners of war in Iraq.³⁰

The two-stage path model consisted of three binary logistic regression equations: two logistic regressions of the outcome variable (i.e., favorable/contextually favorable and unfavorable/contextually unfavorable source tones) on the antecedent variables and the mediator variable, and one logistic regression of the mediator variable (i.e., icon-driven news) on the antecedent variables.³¹ Table 20 shows the results of the analysis. In the logistic regression of the mediator variable, both the Al-Jazeera prominence period ($b = .965$) and the anti-war editorial policy ($b = .777$) significantly increased the chance for an AJ-as-subject source to be cited in icon-driven news stories. The British national context ($b = .230$), however, had no significant effect on the occurrence of an AJ-as-subject source in icon-driven news. In the logistic regression of the two outcome variable categories, only the mediator variable (i.e., icon-driven news) was significantly

³⁰This decision was grounded in the idea that icon-driven reporting is prompted by the occurrences of highly prominent "accidental" events associated with an object identifiable as a "news icon" (Lawrence, 1996). Applying this idea, the researcher selected time periods representing "Al-Jazeera prominence," based on the three highly prominent activities of Al-Jazeera: its broadcast of Osama bin Laden's messages, scoop coverage of Kabul during the Afghanistan War, and airing of footage showing U.S. prisoners of war during the Iraq War.

³¹Essentially, this statistical technique is a simple version of what can be called "logistic regression path analysis" (Knoke & Burke, 1980). This quasi-path analysis follows a sequence of model estimation which is logically equivalent to the more familiar linear regression path analysis. Unlike the linear regression path model, however, the logistic regression path model does *not* permit calculation of the magnitude of the indirect effects by multiplying them together. Despite this limitation, this approach allows the investigator to examine the significance of both direct and indirect effects and to rank the relative importance of study variables. In the linear regression path model, use of standardized coefficients is the norm. In the logistic regression path model, however, unstandardized logit coefficients, often in combination with their corresponding standard errors, are usually preferred over "standardized" ones, in that the standardized logit coefficients are neither easy to meaningfully interpret in terms of effect size nor are useful for decomposing the total effect of an independent variable into its direct and indirect effects. Admittedly, the comparison of unstandardized logit coefficients is often problematic because it does not consider the "rareness" of an event represented by a dummy-coded independent variable. If a particular event represented by the independent variable has a large effect size but is rare to observe, the effect tends to show a large standard error. Given this, one can divide the beta coefficient by its corresponding standard error (b/SE_b), giving a result (often called z-statistic) which can be used to rank the relative importance of the independent variables.

Table 20: Two-step Logistic Regression of AJ-as-subject Source Tone on Predictors

Predictor	B	SE	Wald	Sig.	Exp (b)
<i>For mediator variable (icon-driven news)</i>					
Time period (Al-Jazeera prominence)	.965	.261	13.719	<.001	2.625
Editorial policy (anti-war)	.777	.243	10.225	.001	2.175
National context (British)	.230	.231	.989	.320	1.259
Constant	-.243	1.355			
-2 log likelihood = 432.584, Model $\chi^2 = 24.498$ (d.f. = 3, $p < .001$), Cox & Snell $R^2 = .069$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .094$, Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness of fit $\chi^2 = .373$ (d.f. = 5, $p = .996$)					
<i>For outcome variable (favorable AJ-as-subject source tone)</i>					
News Context (icon-driven)	1.407	.246	32.703	<.001	4.085
Time period (Al-Jazeera prominence)	.061	.262	.055	.814	1.063
Editorial policy (anti-war)	.022	.248	.007	.931	1.022
National context (British)	.050	.238	.044	.835	1.051
Constant	-.362	.236			
-2 log likelihood = 427.726, Model $\chi^2 = 42.591$ (d.f. = 4, $p < .001$), Cox & Snell $R^2 = .117$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .157$, Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness of fit $\chi^2 = 6.207$ (d.f. = 8, $p = .624$)					
<i>For outcome variable (unfavorable AJ-as-subject source tone)</i>					
News Context (icon-driven)	-1.505	.256	34.590	<.001	.222
Time period (Al-Jazeera prominence)	.175	.250	.489	.485	1.191
Editorial policy (anti-war)	-.015	.239	.004	.951	.985
National context (British)	.117	.232	.255	.613	1.124
Constant	1.061	.252			
-2 log likelihood = 415.454, Model $\chi^2 = 37.814$ (d.f. = 4, $p < .001$), Cox & Snell $R^2 = .105$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .143$, Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness of fit $\chi^2 = 7.055$ (d.f. = 8, $p = .531$)					


Note. $N = 342$ (for the outcome variable, n of favorable AJ-as-subject source tone = 129 and n of unfavorable AJ-as-subject source tone = 153; for the mediator variable, n of source citation in icon-driven news = 133).

associated with the modeled source tone categories (for favorable tone, $b = 1.407$; for unfavorable tone, $b = -1.505$). The icon-driven news context was positively associated with the citation of a (contextually) favorable AJ-as-subject source and negatively associated with the citation of a (contextually) unfavorable AJ-as-subject source. None of the antecedent variables (i.e., editorial policy, national context, and time period characteristic), however, were significant in predicting either one of the two AJ-as-subject source tones.

Figure 1 shows the significant pathways revealed by the analysis: neither editorial policy nor time period had a direct effect on the tone of an AJ-as-subject source's opinion, but both did have indirect effects via the mediator variable of news context. Therefore, even after controlling for the association between the time-specific real-world conditions and icon-driven reporting, anti-war editorial policy significantly increased the possibility for AJ-as-subject source citation through icon-driven reporting. In turn, the citation of an AJ-as-subject source in an icon-driven news story significantly increased the possibility that the source would be favorable/contextually favorable and decreased the possibility that the source would be unfavorable/contextually unfavorable. The two-stage path model illustrates how editorial policy, interacting with real-world conditions and the journalistic norm of balancing, influenced the type of reporting and its associated AJ-as-subject source patterns.

In summary, returning to RQ 2, whose objective was to seek potential differences among the major print outlets in their news discourse that involved addressing of AJ as a subject of media-mediated debate, the results of the analyses indicated that there were discrepancies between the pro-war and the anti-war newspapers in their source patterns related to the construction of the media debate referencing Al-Jazeera. The two countries' pro-war newspapers were more likely than their anti-war counterparts to let officials

Figure 1: Pathways to Favorable and Unfavorable AJ-as-subject Source Citation



Note. The first value corresponding to each arrow is the beta coefficient from logistic regression analysis. The second value in the parenthesis is a z-statistic (i.e., the result of dividing each beta coefficient by its standard error).

set the tone for the media debate as illustrated in Tables 13 and 14 (in other words, the anti-war newspapers showed a higher degree of AJ-as-subject source diversification than did the pro-war newspapers). Furthermore, although all of the newspapers carried some news stories derived from icon-driven coverage, the implication of icon-driven news was bigger in the anti-war press discourse than in the pro-war press discourse, by the standard of both the number of icon-driven news stories (in Table 16) and the proportion of sources cited in the context of icon-driven news (in Table 17). It seems that both the *Times* and the *Guardian*, by opening the news gate to the voices of Arab media workers and citizens in the Arab/Muslim world, provided more depth and richness in coverage of a variety of issues that had a linkage to Al-Jazeera than did the *Journal* and the *Telegraph*.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDIA DISCOURSE ADDRESSING AJ AS NORMATIVE ISSUE

Throughout the entire research period, much discussion and analysis took place in Western media outlets about both the propaganda war being constructed by all sides concerned and on the importance of winning on the so-called battlefield of the “media war.” Markedly, in U.S. and British major news outlets, the controversies related to Al-Jazeera’s wartime performance played an important part in the discussion about the phenomenon of the media war. During the Iraq War, Al-Jazeera broadcast a tape of the Iraqi interrogation of U.S. prisoners of war and another that showed dead British servicemen, which then led to Coalition officials’ condemnation of the Arabic TV station for its alleged violation of media ethics. Al-Jazeera’s determined approach in war coverage that focused on civilian casualties also met criticism in Western society, in that the Arabic news channel allegedly concentrated too much on showing of horrific images of suffering and humiliation. On the other hand, Al-Jazeera accused the U.S. military of “deliberately” destroying Al-Jazeera offices and killing its employees in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

All of these ongoing and contentious accusations worked to shape a politicized context for the U.S. and British media debate on Al-Jazeera. It may be said that media portrayals of the controversies related to Al-Jazeera revealed an increased level of media self-reflexivity, in that editors and reporters took time to ponder their roles as well as the nature of government-press relations (Schwartz, 2004). Yet this journalistic self-consciousness was not played out in a political vacuum. Rather, as journalistic self-reflexivity was intertwined with partisan leanings of news organizations, different ideas and thoughts (e.g., media freedom, media responsibility, and the role of media in the Arab world) expressed in the politicized context of debate played rhetorical roles of

sponsoring or undermining positions of certain parties (e.g., Al-Jazeera or the war-waging forces) involved in a given controversy. In consideration of this, RQ 3 asks what kind of normative themes appeared in the media discourse, in a rhetorical context of either undercutting the legitimacy of Al-Jazeera or, to the contrary, advocating the value of Arab journalism and furthermore criticizing U.S. behavior toward the news organization.

Distribution of Story Tone

Before proceeding to the analysis of normative media themes, it is helpful to take a look at the overall tone of the news stories or opinion pieces that mentioned issues involving the Arabic news outlet. Table 21 gives two sets of figures, one from news stories and the other from opinion pieces, in regard to the “story tone” toward Al-Jazeera – the tone of the AJ-evaluative content measured on the basis of the article.

The figures in the upper row section of the table show the distribution of story tone in the news stories including AJ-evaluative content. It is worth noting that, in all of the newspapers, the percentages of the “mixed/unclear” tone category were dominant, hovering between 62.5% and 73.8%. A word of explanation about this phenomenon is needed. In general, especially when compared with the analysis of opinion pieces, it is difficult to measure objectively the “slant” of a journalist’s presentation of news. Given this, the predominance of the apparently neutral tone in news discourse can be viewed as reflecting the stylistic feature of journalistic writing.

Nonetheless, the overall features of the distributions in Table 21 suggest that, of the four news organizations, the *Journal* was most likely to reveal an unfavorable tone, while the *Guardian* was most likely to show a favorable tone toward Al-Jazeera even in the domain of objective journalism. In the distributions from the two pro-war

newspapers, the percentages of the news stories classified into the “favorable/contextually favorable” tone category were considerably smaller (4.2% of *Journal* stories and 6.1% of *Telegraph* stories) than were the percentages of the stories assigned to the “unfavorable/contextually unfavorable” category (35.4% of *Journal* stories and 21.2% of *Telegraph* stories). On the other hand, in the *Times* distribution, the percentage of positive stories (14.5%) was almost equal to the percentage of negative stories (15.5%). Markedly, in the *Guardian* distribution, the percentage of positive stories (22.4%) exceeded the percentage of negative stories (7.1%). By the ratio of positive story tone to negative story tone, the *Guardian* ranked first (3.143), the *Times* second (.923) and the *Telegraph* third (.286); finally, the *Journal* marked the lowest (.118).

The discrepancies across the newspapers are more evident in the analysis of opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content, which is shown in the bottom section of Table 21. There was a clear differentiation among the four news organizations in enforcing their editorial policies, with the *Journal* and the *Guardian* running in opposite directions. In the *Journal* distribution, 81.0% of the editorials or signed columns examined revealed a tone unfavorable or contextually unfavorable toward Al-Jazeera. In the *Guardian* distribution, to the contrary, 55.8 % of the opinion pieces examined were supportive of or at least contextually favorable toward the Arabic news channel. As for the rest of the news organizations, the “intensity” of opinion seemed to be weak in the *Telegraph* and *Times* op-ed pages. The *Telegraph* seemed to be somewhat disinclined to publicize voiced opinions about Al-Jazeera. Although in terms of a pro and con dichotomy the *Telegraph* distribution was tilted toward a negative direction, the frequencies of positive or negative articles were pretty low. In the case of the *Times*, this news organization seemed to make some efforts to “balance” the direction of opinion in

commentaries, although the percentage of the positive tone (34.5%) was somewhat higher than the percentage of the negative tone (24.1%) in the story-unit distribution.

Indeed, a further explanation is necessary to fully illustrate the distributive features about the story tone found in the *Times* Op-Ed pages. When the analysis included letters-to-the-editor pieces that included AJ-evaluative content, the percentage of positive tone in opinion pieces from the *Times* went up to 43.6% (from 10 to 17 articles). No remarkable change was found, however, in other newspapers' story tone distributions when letters-to-the-editor pieces were added into the raw data. Thus there seemed to be nuanced differences between the *Times* and the *Guardian* in publicizing "voiced opinions" in their op-ed pages. In *Guardian* op-ed pages, the predominance of the voices sympathetic toward Al-Jazeera was fairly stable, regardless of whether or not opinions from ordinary readers were counted. In *Times* op-ed pages, however, the same phenomenon became far weaker when grassroots opinions were excluded from the calculation.

Distribution of AJ-as-issue themes

A content analysis of AJ-as-issue themes was conducted on the news stories and opinion pieces that included AJ-evaluative content. AJ-as-issue themes refer to a range of normative themes invoked in the AJ-as-issue discourse that described such issues as Al-Jazeera's character as an institution of journalism, the quality of news content broadcast by the news outlet, the conduct of media workers at the news organization, and the nature of an interaction between the news channel and outside forces. As described in the section "theme-unit analysis" of Chapter 3, the AJ-as-issue theme list consisted of 14 theme categories, 7 positive and 7 negative. Each theme group (positive or negative) had 4 norm-based theme categories (which were further divided into subcategories), 2

interaction-based theme categories, and 1 “other/unspecific” theme category. Using a unique theme as the unit of analysis, Table 22 gives a simplified version of the AJ-as-issue theme distribution from the four newspapers, in terms of positive and negative themes. All AJ-as-issue themes used in this data presentation came from the post-9/11 articles with substantial length (i.e., news stories with more than 150 words and opinion pieces except letters to the editor).

When all AJ-as-issue themes found in both news stories and opinion pieces were combined, the distributive features (presented in the bottom section of Table 22) show that there existed highly significant differences across the newspapers in the proportion of positive themes to negative themes ($\chi^2 = 38.851$, $d.f. = 3$, $p < .001$). Congruent with the prior findings from the article-unit analysis of story tone, the *Journal* discourse was the least likely to invoke positive themes related to norms of news media in the evaluation of Al-Jazeera (31.8 % of AJ-as-issue themes), whereas the *Guardian* discourse showed the clearly opposite tendency (59.9% of themes). Within this continuum, the *Telegraph* fell closer to the *Journal*, and the *Times* was located nearer to the *Guardian*, in that 38.9% of themes from the *Telegraph* were positive, while 51.0% of themes from the *Times* were positive.

Furthermore, the differences among the newspapers were also statistically significant for both news stories and opinion pieces (for news stories, $\chi^2 = 14.554$, $d.f. = 3$, $p = .002$; for opinion pieces, $\chi^2 = 30.507$, $d.f. = 3$, $p < .001$). It is worthwhile to note that the differences were significant not only for opinion pieces but also for news stories in

Table 22: Distribution of AJ-as-Issue Themes in Terms of Positive and Negative

Theme type	<u>Pro-war Paper</u>		<u>Anti-war Paper</u>		Sig.
	<i>Journal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Guardian</i>	
<i>In news stories</i>					
Positive theme	36.4%	38.9%	50.5%	56.1%	$p<.01$
Negative theme	62.6	61.1	49.5	43.9	
Total (<i>N</i> of themes)	100.0 (107)	100.0 (108)	100.0 (184)	100.0 (198)	
<i>In opinion pieces</i>					
Positive theme	21.6	38.9	51.9	67.3	$p<.01$
Negative theme	78.4	61.1	48.1	32.7	
Total (<i>N</i> of themes)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (36)	100.0 (79)	100.0 (101)	
<i>When combined</i>					
Positive theme	31.8	38.9	51.0	59.9	$p<.01$
Negative theme	68.2	61.1	49.0	40.1	
Grand total (<i>N</i> of themes)	100.0 (157)	100.0 (144)	100.0 (263)	100.0 (299)	

Note. All themes were found in the post-9/11 news stories or opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content. News stories shorter than 151 words and letters to the editor pieces were excluded from the analysis.

the same direction. This indicates that the overall disparities across the newspapers based on the summation of themes from news stories and opinion pieces were not conflated by the inter-newspaper differences that solely originated from opinion pieces. Since the editorial policy governed both news and opinion as to the matter of the invocation of AJ-

as-issue themes in media discourse, the following presentation of further findings does not divide news stories and opinion pieces for the merit of simplicity.

As a next step, using the unique theme as the unit of analysis again, Table 23 gives an overview of the AJ-as-issue theme distribution from the four newspapers, grouping all theme categories within two classes, a positive and a negative theme group. Both theme groups consist of four categories based on media norms (*free/independent*, *professional/responsible*, *developmental/educational*, *alternative media*), two categories based on media-outside actor interactions (*target of bullying* and *enemy propaganda tool*, either in their original or contrary form), and one “other/unspecific” category. AJ-as-issue theme patterns divided into more detailed categories are shown in Appendix F.

In general, the two pro-war newspapers were markedly higher than the anti-war newspapers in three negative AJ-as-issue theme categories: the negative *professional/responsible media* theme, the negative *developmental/educational media* theme, and the *enemy propaganda tool* theme. Of all AJ-as-issue theme categories, the *Journal* was highest (25.3%) in the negative *professional/responsible media* theme, and the *Telegraph* was highest (21.1%) in the *enemy propaganda tool* theme. In contrast, both anti-war newspapers were relatively high in two positive theme categories: the positive *alternative media* theme and the *target of bullying* theme. The *Times* and the *Guardian*, however, showed noticeable differences in the positive themes favored by each: the *Times* was higher in the *professional/responsible media* (11.3%) and the *developmental/educational media* themes (8.8%). Notably, although in all the newspapers negative *professional/responsible media* themes outnumbered positive ones, the *Times* most frequently invoked the positive version of this theme. In the case of the *Guardian*, this British newspaper was distinctive in emphasizing the positive *alternative media* (16.4%) and *target of bullying* themes (15.4%).

Table 23: Distribution of AJ-as-issue Themes by Major Theme Category

AJ-as-issue theme	Pro-war Paper				Anti-war Paper			
	Journal		Telegraph		Times		Guardian	
Positive theme								
Free/independent media status	8.6% (n=14)		9.4% (n=17)		11.7%(n=33)		12.6%(n=40)	
Professional reporting /responsible conduct	4.9	(8)	6.7	(12)	11.3	(32)	6.6	(21)
Developmental/educational function	6.8	(11)	6.7	(12)	8.8	(25)	4.7	(15)
Alternative media role	3.7	(6)	6.3	(16)	9.5	(27)	16.4	(52)
Rebuttal of <i>propaganda tool</i>	1.9	(3)	1.7	(3)	4.2	(12)	2.8	(9)
Target of bullying	3.1	(5)	5.0	(9)	7.8	(22)	15.4	(49)
Other/unspecific	1.9	(3)	0.7	(2)	3.2	(9)	3.8	(12)
Subtotal	30.9	(50)	39.4	(71)	56.5	(160)	62.3	(198)
Negative theme								
Not free/ independent	3.7	(6)	1.7	(3)	2.1	(6)	2.2	(7)
Not professional/ responsible	25.3	(41)	18.3	(33)	14.1	(40)	10.4	(33)
Not developmental/ educational	17.9	(29)	13.3	(24)	10.2	(29)	9.2	(29)
Not alternative	1.2	(2)	1.1	(2)	1.8	(5)	0.3	(1)
Enemy propaganda tool	16.7	(27)	21.1	(38)	9.9	(28)	10.1	(32)
Rebuttal of <i>target of bullying</i>	1.2	(2)	1.1	(2)	1.4	(4)	2.2	(7)
Other/unspecific	3.1	(5)	3.9	(7)	3.9	(11)	2.3	(11)
Subtotal	69.1	(112)	60.6	(109)	43.5	(123)	37.7	(120)
Total	100.0	(162)	100.0	(180)	100.0	(283)	100.0	(318)

Note. All themes were found in the post-9/11 news stories or opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content. Only articles of substantial length were examined.

To gain further insights in the AJ-as-issue theme patterns, the theme frequency data were converted into a matrix of article-based theme co-occurrences and then were submitted to a multidimensional scaling (MDS) program available in SPSS. A MDS algorithm accepts a matrix of item-item proximities, and then assigns the location of each item into a low dimensional space suitable for data mapping. The MDS technique has been widely used in the analysis of co-word, co-citation, co-membership, and other types of social interaction (Ahlgren, Jarneving, & Rousseau, 2003, p.557). Here, the objective was to visually summarize the co-invocation patterns of multiple types of AJ-as-issue themes from the four newspapers. The analytical procedure was as follows: (1) by modifying AJ-as-issue theme categories to select distinctive theme types, theme co-occurrences were arranged in a data matrix; (2) a proximity matrix was created to show the pair-wise “nearness” between the selected theme types and between each theme type and each newspaper; and (3) the proximity matrix was submitted to the MDS computer program.

In the first stage, the theme-unit data found in Table 23 were converted into article-based data by reviewing and modifying the AJ-as-issue theme categories to determine important theme types and create a matrix of theme co-occurrences. As stated above, the original AJ-as-issue theme list had 14 categories, 7 positive and 7 negative: 4 norm-based categories, 2 interaction-based categories, and 1 “other/unspecific” category. For each of the positive and negative theme groups, the 4 norm-based categories (which had been further divided into 8 subcategories) were re-arranged based on the frequency patterns at the subcategory level.³² As regards the two interaction-based categories, only

³²The norm-based theme subcategories were re-arranged according to three principles: (1) when both of the two subcategories in a norm had extremely low frequencies in all the newspapers, the data specific to this norm were eliminated (e.g., the negative theme subcategories for *free/independent* and *alternative media*); (2) when both of the two subcategories had similar frequency patterns in all of the newspapers or when one subcategory showed extremely low frequencies, these subcategories were collapsed into the larger category (e.g., the positive theme subcategories for *free/independent*, *professional/responsible*,

the original forms of theme invocation (not their “rebuttal” themes) were considered in the modified AJ-as-issue theme list.³³ The “other/unspecific” categories were eliminated. Finally, four dummy-coded newspaper variables (one for each newspaper) were created and added to the theme type vectors. As a result, the matrix of theme co-occurrences comprised 14 vectors: 5 positive theme types (*free/independent*, *professional/responsible*, *developmental/educational*, *alternative media*, and *target of bullying*); 5 negative theme types (*unprofessional/biased*, *sensational/unethical in handling graphic information*, *dysfunctional for Arab democracy*, *obstructive to pro-U.S./Western views*, and *enemy propaganda tool*); and 4 newspaper dummies. Due to the restrictions in the original theme coding protocol, each positive theme type had a possible maximum count of 6 and each negative theme type of 3 per article. These data were re-coded on an ordinal scale ranging between 1 and 3 (for counts of 3 or higher), which indicated the “strength” of the theme type in each article.

In the second stage of the MDS analysis, a matrix of proximities between themes was calculated, using Salton’s (1989) cosine coefficient.³⁴ The cosine similarity measure, a popular choice in research of inter-document similarity, was selected because it is relatively insensitive to a small number of particularly long documents that contain many

developmental/educational, and *alternative media*); and (3) when two subcategories had distinctive frequency patterns across the newspapers, each was treated separately (e.g., negative theme subcategories for *professional/responsible* and *developmental/educational media*).

³³If an article was multiple-coded for both an interaction-based theme and its rebuttal, the presence of the interaction theme in the article was accepted only when the count for the original theme exceeded the count for its rebuttal theme in the article.

³⁴The cosine similarity is the cosine of the angle between two vectors. For this study, the cosine measure between two objects O_1 and O_2 was defined as:

$$\cos(\theta_1, \theta_2) = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^n CO_{1j} \cdot CO_{2j}}{\sqrt{\left(\sum_{j=1}^n CO_{1j}^2\right) \left(\sum_{j=1}^n CO_{2j}^2\right)}}$$

where CO_{ij} is the value assigned to the co-occurrence (strength score for theme type and absence/presence score for newspaper) between i th row (article) and j th column (theme type or newspaper).

attributes simply due to their length.³⁵ For each of the theme types and newspaper dummies in the matrix, a corresponding weight term was created to take into account the relative frequency (i.e., the frequency relative to the highest count in the article-unit data set).³⁶ Calculation of proximities was based on the *strength* of each theme type, while calculation of weights was based on the *presence* of each theme type. Hence the weighted proximity data set contained two kinds of information about AJ-as-issue theme invocation patterns.

In the final stage of the MDS analysis, the cosine-based proximity matrix and the weights matrix were submitted to the PROXSCAL program (using the “full matrix,” “ordinal data level,” and “untie tied observations” options). Figure 2 presents the visual summary of the AJ-as-issue theme invocation patterns in the four newspapers. The specific coordinate values for each theme type and newspaper are presented in Table 24.

Since most positive AJ-as-issue themes were located to the left of the midpoint on the X-axis and most negative themes to the right of it, the eigenvector represented by the X-axis was interpreted as the positive-negative dimension. The two pro-war newspapers (the *Journal* and the *Telegraph*), as anticipated, were located in the negative side and the


³⁵The cosine similarity measure, however, assumes an interval scale of data, a condition not met here. For comparison, therefore, the same MDS procedure described above was repeated using Spearman’s rank order correlation as an alternative similarity measure. Since the results of the two MDS analyses were very similar, only the result of the one based on the cosine coefficient is reported here.

³⁶Since the SPSS program (PROXSCAL) accepts weight terms in a matrix, a matrix of pair-wise weights (or relative frequencies) was created by applying the following formula:

$$W(i,j) = \frac{f_i \cdot f_j}{f_i^m \cdot f_j^m}$$

where f_i (f_j) was the number of articles that contained (or belonging to) i th (j th) theme type (or newspaper), and f_i^m (f_j^m) was the highest frequency count either for the theme types (f_i^m) or for the newspapers (f_n^m) in the data set. For the AJ-as-issue theme types, the *enemy propaganda tool* theme showed the highest presence-based frequency ($f_i^m = 91$). For the newspaper variables, the *Guardian* dummy showed the highest frequency ($f_n^m = 117$). The formulation of weights was based on the “normalized function” method, one of the ways often used in research of online data retrieval to emphasize the effects of certain terms that are frequent in a corpus of documents. In the field of information science, several similarity measures and other weights parameters, including relative term frequency, have been proposed and assessed on the criterion of accurate data retrieval. For details, see Frakes and Baeza-Yates (1992); Salton and Buckley (1988).

Figure 2. Visualized AJ-as-issue Co-theme Patterns in the U.S. and British Press



two anti-war papers (the *Times* and the *Guardian*) in the positive side. On the Y-axis, the U.S. newspapers were located in the lower half and the British newspapers in the upper half, and thus the eigenvector represented by the Y-axis were interpreted as country differentiation. Remarkably, both British papers were located relatively close to the negative theme of *sensational/unethical in handling graphic information*. This can be

explained by the British-specific issue environment during the Iraq War, which involved controversy over the BBC's airing of Al-Jazeera footage of dead British soldiers. During the Iraq War, several British soldiers were missing; later it was discovered they had been captured and executed by Iraqis. Al-Jazeera broadcast footage showing the dead bodies. BBC's airing of part of the footage over the objections of the bereaved families sparked controversies related to media ethics. While the direct target of criticism was BBC rather than Al-Jazeera, British media coverage of and commentary on this topic often contained negative insinuations about Arab media behavior.

The positive-negative dimension clearly differentiates between the pro-war and anti-war newspapers in their AJ-as-issue theme invocation patterns. The county differentiation dimension is especially helpful for differentiating between the two pro-war newspapers: the *Journal* was located close to all negative themes except the *sensational/unethical in handling graphic information*, while this was the theme closest to the *Telegraph*. Both newspapers frequently invoked the interaction-based theme of *propaganda tool*, which was located around the midpoint between the two pro-war newspapers. The British media's focus on Al-Jazeera's handling of controversial footage, however, seems insufficient to explain the differentiation between the *Times* and the *Guardian*.³⁷ Although the *Guardian* was located close to the *sensational/unethical in*

³⁷This interpretation was backed by the results of an additional MDS analysis, using a weighted MDS (WMDS) procedure. Often called individualized differences scaling (INDSCAL), WMDS accepts multiple sub-group proximity data and allows the investigator to produce low-dimensional spaces, not only the one shared by all subgroups but also the one specific to each subgroup. Each group-specific space configuration is generated by applying the "dimension weights" derived from the common space configuration (for details, see Kruskal & Wish, 1978). For the WMDS procedure, the analytical steps described earlier were repeated, except that this time the newspaper dummy variables were not included in the proximity data. Instead, four matrices of newspaper-specific proximities, along with their corresponding weights matrices, were created in the MDS design of < 10 AJ-as-issue theme types × 10 AJ-as-issue theme types × 4 newspapers >. The coordinates from the prior MDS analysis were used as a starting configuration and the PROXSCAL program was run for iterations of one (the minimum allowed by the program), because the purpose of the analysis was to determine the dimension weights for each newspaper with regard to the two dimensions already known from the prior MDS analysis. The SPSS program yielded a two-dimensional weights plot, in which the dimension weights for each newspaper were projected on a two-dimensional space. On the positive-negative dimension, both of the pro-war papers showed higher weight values than

Table 20: Two-step Logistic Regression of AJ-as-subject Source Tone on Predictors

Predictor	B	SE	Wald	Sig.	Exp (b)
<i>For mediator variable (icon-driven news)</i>					
Time period (Al-Jazeera prominence)	.965	.261	13.719	<.001	2.625
Editorial policy (anti-war)	.777	.243	10.225	.001	2.175
National context (British)	.230	.231	.989	.320	1.259
Constant	-.243	1.355			
-2 log likelihood = 432.584, Model $\chi^2 = 24.498$ (d.f. = 3, $p < .001$), Cox & Snell $R^2 = .069$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .094$, Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness of fit $\chi^2 = .373$ (d.f. = 5, $p = .996$)					
<i>For outcome variable (favorable AJ-as-subject source tone)</i>					
News Context (icon-driven)	1.407	.246	32.703	<.001	4.085
Time period (Al-Jazeera prominence)	.061	.262	.055	.814	1.063
Editorial policy (anti-war)	.022	.248	.007	.931	1.022
National context (British)	.050	.238	.044	.835	1.051
Constant	-.362	.236			
-2 log likelihood = 427.726, Model $\chi^2 = 42.591$ (d.f. = 4, $p < .001$), Cox & Snell $R^2 = .117$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .157$, Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness of fit $\chi^2 = 6.207$ (d.f. = 8, $p = .624$)					
<i>For outcome variable (unfavorable AJ-as-subject source tone)</i>					
News Context (icon-driven)	-1.505	.256	34.590	<.001	.222
Time period (Al-Jazeera prominence)	.175	.250	.489	.485	1.191
Editorial policy (anti-war)	-.015	.239	.004	.951	.985
National context (British)	.117	.232	.255	.613	1.124
Constant	1.061	.252			
-2 log likelihood = 415.454, Model $\chi^2 = 37.814$ (d.f. = 4, $p < .001$), Cox & Snell $R^2 = .105$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .143$, Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness of fit $\chi^2 = 7.055$ (d.f. = 8, $p = .531$)					
Note. $N = 342$ (for the outcome variable, n of favorable AJ-as-subject source tone = 129 and n of unfavorable AJ-as-subject source tone = 153; for the mediator variable, n of source citation in icon-driven news = 133).					

did the anti-war papers, which indicated a differentiation between the pro-war and anti-war press. On the country differentiation dimension, however, a clear differentiation between the U.S. and British press was not observed, which suggested that the “country differentiation” dimension did not fully differentiate between the U.S. and British press.

handling graphic information theme, the two-dimensional plot revealed other noticeable differences between the two anti-war newspapers: relatively speaking, the *Times* favored the *professional/responsible* and *developmental/educational media* themes, while the *Guardian* favored the *alternative media* and especially the *target of bullying* theme.

Returning to RQ 3, all of the findings described so far make three points about the inter-newspaper differences as follows:

1. The anti-war newspapers were more likely than the pro-war newspapers to invoke positive themes related to Al-Jazeera.
2. The two pro-war newspapers were more likely than the other two anti-war newspapers to concentrate on the invocation of the negative themes suggesting either Al-Jazeera's unprofessional, sensational, or irresponsible behavior or its propagandistic practice without journalistic integrity.
3. When the two anti-war newspapers were compared, the *Times* was more likely to invoke the positive themes that focused on either the professional qualifications of Al-Jazeera or the developmental role of this news organization in bringing democratic changes to the Arab worldm while the *Guardian* was more likely to invoke the positive themes that highlighted either the role of Al-Jazeera as an alternative medium or an unjustifiable intimidation by outside forces toward the Arab network.

A meaningful interpretation of the differences between discourses of the two anti-war newspapers goes beyond a simplistic decision of which was "more favorable" toward Al-Jazeera. Rather, the findings suggest how differently journalists at the two newspapers used their discretion to project certain normative visions about news media onto events or

issues involving Al-Jazeera, thereby attempting to shift the focus of debate in a wartime environment politicized by the confrontation between the U.S.-led war forces and the Arab network. In strategic terms, the key difference between the *Times* discourse and the *Guardian* discourse can be explained through the analogy of defense and attack. While the *Times* was concerned with “defending” Al-Jazeera from the allegations that it was not a legitimate news organization by the standards of professional or developmental media, the *Guardian* took a confrontational approach, highlighting the role of Al-Jazeera in disseminating challenging views about the U.S. foreign policy and by “attacking” the U.S. government for its alleged intimidation and misconduct of the Arab network.

This interpretation just given can be documented by comparing the two newspaper’s editorials that mentioned Al-Jazeera during the major military campaigns in Iraq. In this period, three *Times* editorials and two *Guardian* editorials expressed views about issues related to Al-Jazeera. Although these editorials constituted only a small part of the entire AJ-as-issue discourse, they establish a strong basis from which the strategic positions of the two news organizations can be best inferred. As a supplementary discussion, the following section gives a brief qualitative analysis of the editorials that were published at the zenith of hostility from the two anti-war newspapers.

Further Analysis of Anti-war Newspaper Discourse

It is worth noting that the Iraq War period involved two controversies related to the Arab TV network. One issue was Al-Jazeera’s broadcast of the footage showing U.S. prisoners of war in Iraq as well as dead American and British servicemen, which was intensely criticized by Coalition leaders. The other was the U.S. military’s attacks on a hotel in Baghdad that killed foreign journalists including an Al-Jazeera employee, which this time, incurred accusations of the U.S. Command in the Arab world. Because these

two events had very different political implications for the ongoing tensions between the Arab broadcaster and the U.S. government, a supplementary review of the two newspapers' editorial responses to these incidents helps clarify the differences between the U.S. and British anti-war newspapers in their rhetorical use of the Al-Jazeera case in the politicized context of debate.

Two of the three aforementioned *Times* editorials were intended to comment on the New York Stock Exchange's temporary expulsion of two Al-Jazeera reporters, which happened shortly after the controversial broadcast. In its second editorial on this topic, titled "Why Al-Jazeera matters," this newspaper criticized the stock exchange's decision and gave an excuse for the practice of Al-Jazeera as follows:

The exchange's complaint against Al-Jazeera is that it is not "responsible." This is a cryptic allegation but it seems linked to the television stations' decision last Sunday to show images of dead American and British soldiers as well as P.O.W.'s in Iraq. But Al-Jazeera says that after the Pentagon asked it to remove the pictures until families had been notified it did so for eight hours, while the television stations of numerous countries continued to show them (March, 30, 2003).

In comparison, the *Guardian* took a different rhetorical strategy. In its editorial titled "The Geneva Convention can't be applied selectively," the British newspaper acknowledged Rumsfeld's claim that Al-Jazeera's showing of images of U.S. prisoners of war in Iraq was a violation of the Geneva Convention, by stating that the kind of journalistic practice that Al-Jazeera showed "smacks more of political manipulation for propaganda purposes than journalism." However, the British newspaper soon quickly shifted its tone by pointing out a U.S. double standard:

Such practices are revolting and should not be allowed to occur. Rumsfeld was right to say so. But he would be in a better position to stick up for the Geneva

Convention if he applied it himself. He does not. He was among the very first leading members of the U.S. administration who refused – and who still refuses – to grant the status of P.O.W.’s to the hundreds of people captured during the campaign in Afghanistan who are being held at the U.S. base in Guantanamo, Cuba (April, 3, 2003).

Thus, the examples above suggest that the key difference between the two newspapers fits into the analogy of defense and attack; the *Times* was concerned with locating Al-Jazeera’s controversial conduct within the realm of legitimate journalism, while the *Guardian* made use of the incidence in turning the brunt of criticism to the disadvantage of the U.S. government.

The other incident, the U.S. air raid on a Baghdad hotel that housed Al-Jazeera offices and its following tank shelling firing on the same building, took place on the 10th of April in 2003 – one Al-Jazeera reporter was fatally wounded during the air strikes and two other foreign journalists were killed later due to the tank fire. The Arab news channel’s editor-in-chief and some other journalists claimed that the building has been deliberately targeted to stifle coverage of the ongoing events in Baghdad. Immediately after the tragedy occurred, the *Times* editorially responded to these accusations. For instance, in “Covering the war,” this U.S. newspaper expressed sympathy toward those killed, but denounced Al-Jazeera employees’ claim that the U.S. military deliberately targeted foreign journalists to stifle coverage of the events in Baghdad, by saying:

It is not surprising that Al-Jazeera staff members lashed out angrily in a moment of great pain, but their suspicions were groundless. The Bush administration has gone out of its way to accommodate the Arab media, particularly Al-Jazeera, the first completely uncensored TV channel in the Arab world. The last thing the military wanted to do so, with dozens of cameras from all over the world focused on its activities, was to assault the one foreign news network where it most covets favorable coverage (April, 10, 2003).

In contrast, the editorial page of the *Guardian* gave much more credit to the allegation that the U.S. military deliberately targeted the hotel. In its editorial titled “Excessive force by U.S. makes covering Iraq war deadly,” the *Guardian* pointed out that the U.S. Command had been aware of the hotel where most foreign journalists covering the war in Baghdad had been staying. The editorial at first described the U.S. tank shell firing on the hotel that killed two cameramen, one a Reuters reporter and the other a cameraman from Spanish TV channel Telecinco. Based on testimony by witnesses, the British newspaper rejected the Pentagon’s claim that the tank took a reflex action against initial firings from the hotel, and characterized the American fire as a “cool, calm, and deliberate act.” The editorial then mentioned the death of Al-Jazeera’s special correspondent Tarig Ayub that occurred hours before on the same day due to the U.S. air strikes on the building. This British newspaper, after describing the enraged reactions in the Arab world and among foreign journalists, concluded:

The attack on the Palestinian hotel says much about the tactics used by the American army in Baghdad, which call for a massive barrage of firepower to deal with the slightest threat or apparent threat. The number of civilian victims probably runs into hundreds. [...] What is at issue here is a type of military culture that does not balk at using massive force against the smallest danger, whatever impact on civilians (April, 17, 2003).

The differences in the editorial tone between the two newspapers just shown suggest that the *Guardian* was far more skeptical of the fundamentally benevolent nature of American power intervening in foreign regions – a core belief or a national ideology of which the *Times* did not make an issue, at least in its own editorial statements. As a matter of fact, this U.S. newspaper, a few days after the abovementioned editorial came

out, put up a letter-to-the-editor piece that criticized the news organization's view. In the name of the Committee to Protect Journalists, the piece titled "Deaths of journalists" said:

[T]he allegation by the staff of Al-Jazeera that the coalition directly targeted its offices was not merely an emotional reaction to the loss of a colleague. Al-Jazeera's office in Kabul, Afghanistan, was also destroyed by an American missile in November 2001. The bombing of the Baghdad office of Al-Jazeera came on the same day as strikes on two other media facilities in Baghdad: the office of Abu Dhabi TV was damaged by tank fire, and the Palestinian hotel was struck by a tank round, killing two more reporters (April, 14, 2003).

The example above shows that a strong suspicion of the unjustifiable U.S. intimidation of Arab journalism did exist in the *Times* discourse. Yet this news organization's editorial view, along with its treatment of this outsider perspective also suggests that non-mainstream or "radical" voices critical of an American-led war were marginalized under the hierarchy of access in the media-constructed debates over concerns related to Al-Jazeera.

This does not mean that the *Times* was editorially uncritical of the Bush administration's approach to problems related to Al-Jazeera. In the early phase of the War on Terror period and thereafter, this newspaper carried some news analyses and opinion pieces that criticized the White House's inability to recognize the influence of the TV network in the Arab world and to utilize the news channel for a public relations campaign in a war to win the hearts and minds of the Arab Muslims. Still, such criticisms of the U.S. handling of Al-Jazeera seemed to have been contained under the news organization's editorial policy that governed the overall coverage of the post-9/11 U.S.-involved foreign crises – a political stance and its related rhetorical strategy that concentrated on problems with the U.S. performance, rather than on the ultimate

soundness of the government policy in favor of a militaristic solution to foreign problems.

This editorial line is documented by a *Columbia Journalism Review* article (Mooney, 2004), which examined editorial responses of major U.S. newspapers to the U.S. decision of going to war in Iraq and concluded that all the newspapers examined, including the *Times*, remained uncritical of the ambiguous U.S. claims of the Iraq possession of weapons of mass destruction. Even in the case of anti-war newspapers, according to the article, the specific reasons given for their opposition to the war had less to do with the credibility of the government-claimed case for a war than with problems regarding the implementation of the war, especially the insufficient international support for the proposed U.S. plan to overthrow the Iraq regime.

Not only did the *Times* suppress the strongly suspected U.S. military misconduct toward Al-Jazeera, the newspaper occasionally relied on the effectiveness of the government's war-promoting rhetoric to underscore a U.S. need to respect Al-Jazeera's way of doing journalism. For instance, a few days earlier than the abovementioned "Why Al-Jazeera matters," the *Times* published an editorial titled "Stock Exchange follies" in a series of commentaries on the New York Stock Exchange's ban of Al-Jazeera reporters. In the editorial, this newspaper criticized the stock exchange's decision by making a reference to the Bush administration's claimed reasons for the Iraq War and the Pentagon's "embedding" program for journalists including Al-Jazeera reporters:

One of the stated purposes of the war in Iraq is to bring freedom to the Iraqi people – including, presumably, freedom of speech and freedom of the press. To underscore the message, the Pentagon made sure that reporters from Al-Jazeera, the hugely influential Arab network, were included among all the other correspondents traveling with the United States military. It is thus, the height of irony, if not foolishness, that the New York Stock Exchange has now seen fit to

revoke the credentials of two Al-Jazeera reporters who have covered the exchange without incident for more than five years (March, 26, 2003).

The example above gives an illustration of how this news organization rhetorically managed its tone of voice, siding with Al-Jazeera in line with the dominant government policy position. Critical U.S. media researchers have noted that the mainstream U.S. news media, in coverage of the government's foreign policy and its implementation, tends to patrol the boundaries of an issue culture and keep discords within the bounds set by government officials (e.g., Hallin, 1986; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Mermin, 1996). Given this critique, the *Times*' editorial view on Al-Jazeera can be seen as staying within, rather than departing from, the general tendency of the U.S. media just noted.

In summary, the researcher's close reading of the editorial pages of the two news organizations helps in further understanding the politicized nature of the media discussion of normative concerns related to Al-Jazeera, against the background of the ongoing conflicts between the Arab broadcaster and the American/British government leaders. Recalling the results of the AJ-as-issue theme analysis in the previous section, much of the differences in theme invocation patterns between the *Times* and the *Guardian* can be recapped through the analogy of defense and attack in strategic terms. The *Times* discourse underscored Al-Jazeera's independent status in the Arab world and engaged itself in matters of whether the Arab news channel is professionally responsible or developmentally desirable, to defend the TV station from the charges of deviant media behavior. In comparison, the *Guardian* discourse depicted Al-Jazeera as an alternative source of suppressed news and views in the political environment of a confrontation between the Arab world and the U.S.-led forces. This approach laid out groundwork for

the newspaper's editorial attacks on U.S. "bullying" or its "double standard" implying the questionable nature of the U.S. militaristic foreign policy.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This research project, as the title of this dissertation suggests, has attempted to uncover how American and British editors and reporters at major news organizations paid attention to and made use of Al-Jazeera, through their journalistic efforts to describe and comment on part of the complex reality on the U.S.-led war on terror and its subsequent war in Iraq. To grasp the multifaceted journalistic use of Al-Jazeera, the researcher identified three modes of media discourse related to the Arab TV network, addressing AJ either as a source of information, as a subject of media-mediated debate, or as a normative issue related to the principles of journalism. For the purpose of a comparative content analysis, this case study introduced into the research design two possible sources of variation, one being a newspaper's editorial policy toward the war (pro-war versus anti-war) and the other being the national context (American versus British).

With regard to RQ 1, the followings are the characteristics of the newspaper discourses addressing AJ as source:

1. The pro-war newspapers (i.e., the *Journal* and the *Telegraph*) were more likely than their anti-war counterparts (i.e., the *Times* and the *Guardian*) to restrict the use of Al-Jazeera as a source of news to cover matters related to Osama bin Laden or the Al-Qaeda organization. In comparison, the anti-war newspapers showed a

higher level of content diversity in picking up information from Al-Jazeera for news reporting.

2. The anti-war newspapers were more likely than the pro-war newspapers to cite Al-Jazeera as a source of regional news, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stories, and opinions originating from the Middle East.

With regard to RQ 2, the followings are the characteristics of the newspaper discourses addressing AJ as subject of media-mediated debate:

3. The pro-war newspapers were more likely than the anti-war newspapers to let the voices of their government/military officials set the tone for the debate in the news discourse describing the controversies involving Al-Jazeera.
4. All of the newspapers examined carried some news stories suggesting journalistic use of Al-Jazeera as a news icon, through which the voices of Al-Jazeera employees and audience members in the Arab/Muslim communities were given a priority in the media-constructed debate of the subjects related to the Arab TV network.
5. Icon-driven reporting was more extensive in the anti-war press than in the pro-war press. By the criteria of both quantity and quality of icon-driven news stories, the two anti-war newspapers provided more depth and richness than did their pro-war competitors in the coverage of the issues involving Al-Jazeera.

Finally, with regard to RQ 3, the followings are the characteristics of the newspaper discourses addressing AJ as normative issue:

6. In both reporting and commentary, the pro-war newspapers were more likely than the anti-war newspapers to invoke negative themes in the media description and evaluation of Al-Jazeera.
7. The pro-war newspapers were more likely to invoke negative themes implying Al-Jazeera's irresponsible conduct, unprofessional reporting, or its role in spreading anti-U.S. propaganda. Meanwhile, the anti-war newspapers were more likely to invoke positive themes suggesting the role of Al-Jazeera as an alternative media outlet or its status under an unjustifiable intimidation by outer forces.
8. Between the anti-war newspapers of the two countries, differences were found in the types of positive themes frequently invoked. Relatively speaking, the *Times* invoked more frequently positive themes advocating Al-Jazeera's professional qualifications or its role in liberalizing the Arab world, while the *Guardian* was mainly concerned with highlighting the status of Al-Jazeera as a source of challenging views and also with criticizing the U.S. government and military for its problematic conduct toward the Arab broadcaster.

Generally speaking, regarding the two-by-two factorial research design, the findings indicate that the differences between the pro-war and anti-war press were far more pronounced than were the differences between the U.S. and British press. Therefore, the factor of newspaper editorial policy (pro-war versus anti-war) accounted for most of the variances within media discourse in three areas of examination: media discourse addressing AJ as a source of information, as a subject of media-mediated debate, and as a normative issue of journalism. In both the U.S. and British newspapers, the anti-war press showed a higher degree of content diversity in terms of AJ-as-source topic than did the pro-war press. The degree of the AJ-as-subject source diversification

was also higher in the anti-war press than in the pro-war press. Finally, the newspapers of the anti-war policy category invoked favorable AJ-as-issue themes more frequently than did the pro-war newspaper delineation.

The other two-conditional factor, national context (American versus British, which was assumed to lead to country-specific media practices), proved limited in its ability to account for the features of the media discourse concerning Al-Jazeera. To a limited extent, some findings indicated cross-national differences. Specifically, the analysis of AJ-as-source topics showed that the two British newspapers, regardless of their editorial policy, showed a higher percentage of the war information category than did their American counterparts. This may suggest that the two British newspapers were more likely than the two U.S. newspapers to incorporate into their news discourse the war-related information supplied by Al-Jazeera. However, the results of the same analysis failed to support this interpretation when the raw data were limited to news stories whose AJ-sourced content had medium or high importance.

Therefore, national context, at least as an isolated factor, did not seem to greatly affect much the features of AJ-sourced or AJ-evaluative content. However, it is important to note that some cross-national differences were found in the thematic expressions in AJ-evaluative content when the condition of newspaper policy was anti-war. The *Times* and the *Guardian*, although both newspapers invoked favorable AJ-as-issue themes more often than unfavorable ones, were differentiated in that the U.S. newspaper frequently invoked the kind of themes “defending” Al-Jazeera, while the British broadsheet frequently invoked themes “attacking” the U.S. government.

On the surface, these discrepancies in the AJ-as-issue theme distribution seem to originate from the “unique” characteristic of each individual news organization under the same condition of anti-war policy. At a deeper level, however, the use of the analogies of

defense and attack, which characterize the differences in the rhetorical strategies between the *Times* discourse and the *Guardian* discourse, can be seen as reflecting the influence of national context in a subtle form. As illustrated in the additional editorial analysis, the *Times* refrained from expanding its defense of Al-Jazeera to the extent of questioning the soundness of the U.S. decision to go to war, while the *Guardian* demonstrated little reservation for criticizing the U.S. government by making a reference to Al-Jazeera. Critical media scholars, as mentioned at the end of Chapter 4, have noted the ideologically limited nature of American journalism patrolling the boundary of an issue culture, especially with regard to U.S.-involved foreign affairs (e.g., Hallin, 1986; Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Considering this, national context, which was defined in the Introduction (Chapter 1) as a national issue culture providing a meaningful context for media reporting and commentary, can be thought of as establishing a certain degree of “permissible” ideas expressed in media criticism of the government policy. In this sense, the possible “effect” of a nationalistic issue culture (i.e., a condition that represents a high degree of cultural restraint on permissible media criticism) would occur largely in the press opposing the government policy, not in the press favoring the government policy.³⁸ The findings from the cross-national analysis of AJ-as-issue media discourse suggest that British journalists, compared with their American colleagues, were surrounded by a less nationalistic issue culture, thus maintaining a wider latitude for the journalistic use of the

³⁸To paraphrase this interpretation, the presumed effect of national context can be thought of as establishing a certain degree of cultural restraint on permissible media criticism. Then, the effect of national context would be largely interactional with newspaper editorial policy, depending on the condition of the latter variable (pro-war versus anti-war). Specifically, the size of the interaction effect (in a negative direction) would be more pronounced in the anti-war newspaper condition than in the pro-war newspaper condition. As a result, under the two-by-two research design of this study, the anti-war newspaper group (i.e., the *Times* and the *Guardian*) would show a higher level of differentiation due to the different conditions of national context (high cultural restraint versus low cultural restraint) than would the pro-war newspaper group (i.e., the *Journal* and the *Telegraph*).

Al-Jazeera references and sources as a means of criticizing the U.S.-leading war-oriented policy.

In summary, the whole results of this study indicate both the shared and the particular features of the U.S. and British media discourses concerning Al-Jazeera. First, in both countries' newspapers, a parallel form of polarization was found between the pro-war and anti-war papers, in the extent of (1) giving gravity to Al-Jazeera as a legitimate source of news, (2) expanding the range of voices uttering views regarding Al-Jazeera, and (3) describing favorably Al-Jazeera or describing unfavorably political actors in conflict with the news organization. Second, the difference in terms of defense and attack in the theme invocation patterns between the *Times* and the *Guardian* can be interpreted as reflecting a combined influence (or an “interaction effect”) of a news organization's political stance and country-specific issue culture.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS

The findings summarized above also provide useful data for further interpretations with regard to the theoretical issues identified in Chapter 2 – the diversity of news content in the international news flow from Al-Jazeera to the U.S. and British press; journalistic use of accidental events related to Al-Jazeera as a catalyst for bringing non-mainstream views into news discourse; and the rhetorical role of media-related norms in the politicized debate of the Al-Jazeera case.

Diversified International News Flow

This case study began with the researcher's comment on the relay by Western media of content supplied by Al-Jazeera – an interesting anomaly, given the international

flow of news that usually runs from the West to the East (or from the North and to the South). However, concerning the range of the Al-Jazeera-sourced news material picked up by American and British reporters, one may raise the following question: after all, was the Arab news outlet able to provide to the American and British news discourse not only much-hated Al-Qaeda messages but also alternative accounts of war and “Arab-oriented” perspectives on the post-9/11 U.S. military intervention within the Arab/Muslim region and on the continuing Israeli-Palestinian problem? This question has significance in the discussion of whether and how much the “reverse” news flow contributed to the U.S. and British media’s broadened, comprehensive, and evenhanded approach in coverage of the Arab world during the period of hostility.

In short, the answer to the question seems to be yes, but certainly within a limited range and with substantial variations among the two countries’ press examined. The positive answer is especially relevant to the *Times* and the *Guardian*, the newspapers that editorially criticized their governments’ decision of going to war in Iraq. The two newspapers, in their selection of the news content broadcast by Al-Jazeera, seem to have treated the Arab news outlet more than as a propaganda outlet chosen by Osama bin Laden. Certainly, one main purpose for both newspapers of quoting the satellite TV station was to report and analyze bin Laden’s chilling statements and their related incidents. Yet each news outlet also provided a considerable number of news stories that included news contents from Al-Jazeera or opinions of its employees in the U.S. or British press coverage of other affairs, such as war developments in Afghanistan and Iraq, the second Intifada in the West Bank, and Arab opinions concerned with the ongoing crises in the Middle East. Given that few sources of news existed outside of the Pentagon’s version of events during the Gulf War in 1991, Al-Jazeera’s availability to the

Western media in recent years made less successful the U.S. military's control of the factual and contextual information getting out to the American and British news outlets.

Admittedly, this interpretation should accompany an important warning; that is, quoting a non-Western TV station is not the same as accepting it as a trustworthy source of information. The content analysis of AJ-sourced content yielded a finding that, in all of the newspapers, Al-Jazeera was usually cited as a supplementary or counterbalancing source of information, except when it appeared as the first source in breaking news stories about Osama bin Laden's latest messages. In addition, the researcher found that the U.S. and British newspapers occasionally showed strong reservation about the credibility of the war-related information supplied by Al-Jazeera, by treating the TV station as an unconfirmed source of battle reports or allegations made by the "U.S. enemy" about American military setbacks. All in all, the distribution of AJ-as-source topics in the *Times* and the *Guardian* shows that correspondents working for the news organizations made use of Al-Jazeera as a convenient hub of Arab news, in order to cope with difficulties accessing radical voices and scenes of violent conflicts in the Middle East. This does not mean, however, that the two countries' media granted the Arab TV network as much credibility as major Western news agencies or other West-based institutions of journalism would usually receive.

Journalistic Use of News Icon in Foreign Affairs Coverage

Another theoretical issue underlying this research is concerned with a question of whether and to what degree the U.S. news media are independent from the clout of official sources, especially in coverage of U.S. foreign policy. As discussed in the theoretical review, many researchers agree that American reporters tend to give an excessive priority to views expressed in the mainstream governmental debate while

marginalizing grassroots and activist opinions. Yet scholarship on this topic also suggests two conditions for a departure from this media habit. One possibility comes from the journalistic formula requiring counterbalancing. According to this view, journalists can seek out oppositional voices and foreign elite sources outside the official circle of debate to meet the journalistic norms of balancing and conflict, especially under a condition in which members of the opposition party in Congress do not dare to challenge a dominant policy position (e.g., Althaus, 2003; Althaus, Edy, Entman, & Phalen, 1996). This scenario seems to have been realized during the period of the pre-Iraq War debate at U.N. Security Council, for U.S. journalists had good reason to cite French and German leaders as legitimate foreign elite opinions opposing the U.S.-led war plan.

The other possibility concerns the characteristics of accident- or icon-driven news. Some studies shed light on the journalistic use of an accidental occurrence beyond the control of official sources as a challenging “news icon,” a means of symbolically addressing a broader issue beyond the specific incident itself and expanding the range of views expressed in news stories (e.g., Bennett & Lawrence, 1995; Lawrence, 1996). Prior research on icon-driven news, however, focused on media coverage of domestic issues, not on U.S. foreign policy or its implementations. This case study recognizes that the rise and performance of Al-Jazeera was one of the most dramatic examples signifying the foreign challenge to U.S. policymakers. The results of this study indicate that, in the media presentation of news topics related to Al-Jazeera, there existed competing types of news reporting – especially between the routine coverage occurring largely within government- or military-controlled beats and the non-routine coverage implying Al-Jazeera’s near-iconic status in the practices of wartime journalism. Markedly, the anti-war newspapers displayed a higher level of critical independence by more frequently

employing occurrences related to Al-Jazeera as symbolic pegs on which to hang Arab Muslim points of view or criticisms of the administration policy.

However, it would be an overstatement to say that the media accounts of the events involving Al-Jazeera mainly came from accident- or icon-driven reporting. The U.S. and British officials exercised their influence to play down the credibility of Al-Jazeera-sourced information and played catch-up with the unexpected political spin-offs to suppress their negative effects on the wartime public relations campaign. Markedly, the pro-war newspapers seemed to have let the authoritative sources set the agenda and the tone of the media debate. Furthermore, it must be noted that news reports about Al-Jazeera and its related incidence were, after all, only a part of the entire media coverage of the U.S.-led War on Terror policy and its following war in Iraq. Thus, the findings from the analysis of AJ-as-subject discourse should be interpreted as indicating, not the overall features of the post-9/11 media coverage of U.S. foreign policy, but the unique characteristics in the journalistic construction of a side issue in wartime, where the presence of non-routine news contributed to a wider distance between the White House's preferred version of foreign affairs and the ways the media actually reported them.

Politicization of the Normative Character of Journalism

The third theoretical topic is connected to the rhetorical significance of media-related cultural norms in public debates over issues related to news media or government policy involving the media. As noted in the theoretical review, normative thinking about news media has an important status in our understanding of democracy and politics. At the same time, the normative aspects of journalism have a pluralistic and contestable nature in discursive practices, which is exploitable by various interests including government officials, journalists, media owners, and other actors engaged in the

discussion of media-related affairs. Successful political communication requires the framing of events, issues, or actors in ways that promote certain perceptions and interpretations that benefit one side while hindering the other (Entman, 2003, p.416). Framing theorists have noted the significance of culturally salient ideas and narratives in the framing process, stating that frames that employ culturally resonant terms have greater potential for influence (e.g., Gamson, 1992; Snow & Benford, 1988). In this regard, familiar media-related notions such as media freedom and responsibility can be thought of as widely-accepted cultural themes resonating with certain facets of events/issues/actors which are selected and highlighted through framing efforts.

With this theoretical premise, the researcher examined how the U.S. and British newspapers, in news reporting and commentary, underscored certain event/issue/actor characteristics out of the stream of occurrences involving Al-Jazeera, in ways that invoked media-related normative themes, and subsequently conveyed moral judgments about the situation described. The findings indicated that the two countries' pro-war press frequently presented negative evaluations of Al-Jazeera based on professional or responsible media criteria, while their anti-war counterparts more often gave either positive evaluations of Al-Jazeera or negative evaluations of political actors who were in conflict with the Arab news outlet, on the basis of cultural norms related to alternative media or unjustifiable threat to press freedom. Furthermore, a supplementary review of the editorial pages of the *Times* and the *Guardian* in the Iraq War period suggests that many of the features of the AJ-as-issue discourse were the outcome of the news organization's political consideration — the editorial issue position and its related rhetorical strategy in wartime reporting. Specifically, the *Times* was mainly concerned with presenting Al-Jazeera as a “legitimate” source of oppositional voices, while the *Guardian* concentrated on taking advantage of the Al-Jazeera case to symbolically

recount the problematic nature of the U.S. military invasion and the resistance of the Arab/Muslim world. The discrepancies in the normative theme invocation pattern among the American and British newspapers support an interpretation that the organizational filter of editorial policy played an important role in determining the direction of the media reflection on the practices of Arab journalism and the nature of the U.S. information management.

FINAL COMMENT

The most important finding from this cross-national study is that, in all the three areas of examination (i.e., the analyses of the media discourse addressing AJ as source, subject, and normative issue), the differences associated with newspaper editorial policy were much greater than the differences associated with country-specific national context. Therefore, the *Journal* was closer to the *Telegraph* than to the *Times*, not only in the editorial view of Al-Jazeera but also in other features of reporting — specifically, in the degree of limiting both the scope of information supplied by Al-Jazeera and the range of voices expressing their views about the Arab broadcaster. A news organization's editorial stance toward the dominant government policy seemed to govern the reporting and commentary of the newspaper in many aspects.

This result raises a warning signal against the oversimplification of media characteristics into country-specific terms, such as the discussion of some “common” features of American (or British) press. Some characteristics of a major U.S. news organization may not be applicable to other U.S. news organizations and may not be U.S.-specific. As discussed in preceding sections, the journalistic use of information sourced from Al-Jazeera was not limited to the relay of Al-Qaeda terrorist messages; nor was the media coverage of issues involving the Arab TV station reduced into the “routine

news” occurring within the government-controlled beats. These findings, however, were predominantly relevant to those news organizations that both possessed the personell and other types of resources needed to assign to foreign affairs coverage and also were editorially opposed the U.S.-led war; the findings were not relevant to U.S.- or U.K.-based news organizations in general. While it seems obvious that all news organizations are not the same, this fact may receive little consideration in a cross-national approach.

This is not to say that the nationality factor was meaningless. Regarding the media selection and presentation of issues related to Al-Jazeera, the analysis of normative AJ-as-issue theme invocation patterns showed that noticeable differences existed, not only between the pro-war and anti-war papers but also within the anti-war press of the U.S. and Britain. Concerning the latter result, the researcher suggested that national context, which can be interpreted as a national-level cultural restraint on the expression of critical ideas in media discourse, may have exercised a subtle form of influence especially on the press that editorially opposed the government policy. This helps explain why the *Times* discourse, which was situated in a relatively high national-level restraint condition (i.e., U.S. society), was differentiated from the *Guardian* discourse, in that the former discourse focused on defending the practice of Al-Jazeera while the latter discourse engaged in criticizing the U.S. government.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that national context, a country-specific factor introduced in this study’s research design, does not mean a country-specific media characteristic inherent in the practices of news organizations. Rather, national context, as a national issue culture constituting the work environment for the journalist, can be thought of as a cultural form of restraint establishing the boundary of “legitimate” media criticism. Logically, a nationalistic issue culture does not have to restrain the practice of *all* news organizations in the political culture when *some* news organizations choose to

favor the issue culture. Taking into consideration all of the findings from the multiple analyses, the overall results of this case study indicate that the national context factor, at least when considered alone, was not highly associated with the features of either AJ-sourced content or AJ-evaluative content. Consequently, U.S.-specific (or British-specific) characteristics in the media discourse concerning Al-Jazeera, independently from newspaper editorial policy, were not clearly identifiable. Considering this, for future cross-national research, it is advisable to clarify the meaning of “nationality” and examine under what conditions and to what extent some country-specific factors can exercise certain forms of influence on the practices of journalism.

As discussed in the introduction to this research project (Chapter 1), the recent dynamics of anti-war opinion around the world and the rise of Al-Jazeera are phenomena related to an emerging “global news arena” (Reese, 2004), where different versions of reality and related points of view from multiple and often cross-referencing sources compete with each other through varied forms of media. From this perspective, the U.S. and British media discourse concerning Al-Jazeera can be interpreted as showcasing how the two countries’ news media responded to the rise of Arab journalism in the emerging global news arena when U.S. war-oriented policy encountered worldwide resistance facilitated by the changing global media environment. For American and British editors and reporters in charge of gate-keeping and foreign affairs coverage, the central issue was whether Al-Jazeera — the unprecedented, non-Western, nonconformist satellite TV network from the Middle East — could be regarded as a “legitimate” news outlet that deserves as much credibility as Western news agencies or other institutions of journalism would receive. On this question, the two countries’ pro-war and anti-war press examined in this study, as illustrated in the thematic analysis, displayed a wide range of competing

and polarized views of Al-Jazeera that invoked such pluralistic norms as media freedom and responsibility.

This diversity in the media discourse inevitably makes us wonder about the “true” character of Al-Jazeera, or, more generally, the nature of Arab journalism in the global news environment. The rise of the new Arab media in recent years has been controversial both internally and externally. In the Arab world, criticism of Al-Jazeera involves issues of state-press relations, provocative news reporting, and the nature of televised political controversy in political communication. Although Al-Jazeera is generally regarded as the most independent Arab news outlet, some critics contended that the Qatari-based network, still partially funded by the state, avoids criticism of that country’s political elite; Al-Jazeera’s hard-hitting news reporting infuriated Arab government officials and its coverage of Palestinian resistance led to Israeli accusations of a pro-Palestinian bias; the confrontational talk show style that Al-Jazeera popularized generated concerns over whether it truly strengthens civic culture or only results in unhealthy extremism. In the post-9/11 wartime period, similar controversies also took place within American and British society, including allegations that the Arab network is committed to promoting anti-Americanism by airing bin Laden messages, distressing scenes of civilian casualties, and embarrassing images of Coalition soldiers.

These controversies suggest that Al-Jazeera is not immune from political pressures and economic constraints and has limits in journalistic autonomy and quality. For a fair-minded assessment, however, it is necessary to distinguish between limits that are *particular* to Al-Jazeera and limits that are *universal* to all news organizations (Miles, 2005). In this regard, one may want to compare the post-9/11 wartime journalism of the Arab broadcaster with American ones. Such a comparison helps us to put the praises and

criticisms of the Arab network into a relevant framework and distinguish between standards that are constructive rather than unrealistic and even ethnocentric.

For instance, the criticism of Al-Jazeera's lack of autonomy from the Qatari government may have an element of truth. When Secretary of State Colin Powell asked the Qatari Emir to tone down the Al-Jazeera channel in the winter of 2001, the Emir reportedly underscored the American value of press freedom. Behind the scenes, though, a deal seems to have been struck between Al-Jazeera and the U.S. government, allowing the White House to know the content of bin Laden tapes before they were aired by the network (Borger & Whitaker, 2003). This example may be interpreted as an incident compromising Al-Jazeera's autonomy in handling of the extremely sensitive terrorist messages. Yet, one should not fail to recall that Al-Jazeera's post-9/11 wartime coverage did not follow Qatar's pro-American policy and regularly challenged the U.S. version of what was happening in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine. Moreover, when considering U.S. networks' uncritical coverage of the Bush administration's "War on Terror" campaign, the American free broadcast media system — in other words, media dependence on the market for funding — does not seem to have provided a particularly better situation for journalistic independence than dependence on state sponsorship. The Arab network's "inferiority" when it comes to autonomy is more an assumption than a proven fact.

What about the criticism of Al-Jazeera's controversial broadcasts of dead or captured Coalition soldiers? When the Arab network aired footage of U.S. prisoners of war, the Coalition officials blamed the Iraqi regime and Arab media for the alleged violation of the Geneva Conventions. Certainly, the exposure of personal tragedies or embarrassments on television is morally problematic, especially when this media behavior can be interpreted as serving a warring party's propaganda purpose. Still, it is

unclear to which extent the “humane treatment” principle should apply to media coverage of war reality. The issue becomes more complicated when everyone does not feel the same way about the sensitivity of the media content at dispute. While family members of the soldiers were shocked at the scene of Iraqi interrogation, others — for example, German Red Cross President Knut Ipsen — saw the footage as part of media coverage of war, “just like footage of injured people in hospitals” (Lanz, 2003). In reality, neither the Iraqi regime nor the U.S. administration seemed to worry much about photographing those involved in the war when they were not on “our side.” In January of 2002, the Pentagon released pictures of detainees — “unlawful combatants,” not prisoners of war, according to the U.S. definition — at Guantanamo Bay, and the pictures appeared in American media (Rozenberg, 2003). In July of 2003, when American officials publicized pictures of the contorted, bloodied faces of Saddam Hussein’s two dead sons — one of whom appeared to have shot himself in the head — the major U.S. cable news networks did not hesitate to show the pictures (Pook, 2003). All of these taken together, Al-Jazeera’s showing of images of the military personnel was hardly more problematic than the American broadcasters’.

There have also been complaints over the bloody and gruesome images of war shown on Al-Jazeera TV. As an empirical matter, it is apparent that the Arab network gave much weight to negative rather than positive images of war. This may be called unbalanced journalism. But does it mean bad journalism? This is a subjective question, and the answer depends on the critic’s political stance. To some, Al-Jazeera’s news reporting unnecessarily overstated some inevitable tragedies of war. To others, Al-Jazeera’s journalism represented a humanitarian pursuit of the truth of the brutality of the war. It suffices to say that the introduction of Al-Jazeera TV into the recent global news environment provided the world with a better chance than ever of accessing two different

versions of what was happening in the U.S.-led war — with one being the “bloody” version of the war coming from the Arab media and the other being the “sanitized” version of the war supplied by the Western, especially U.S., media — and making their own decisions about how to put together the competing war stories. In these circumstances, Al-Jazeera’s accounts of war significantly improved our understanding of the underlying reality.

All of the discussions thus far do not mean that Al-Jazeera is an ideal news organization and that all criticisms of the network are baseless. Al-Jazeera, like other news organizations in the real world, has only relative autonomy from political-economic constraints and may falter in some aspects of journalistic ideals. The point is that some apparently problematic aspects of the Arab news organization cannot justify the exclusion of it from the group of “legitimate” news organizations — Western news agencies and other institutions of journalism in the developed and free world. This is why certain types of criticism of Al-Jazeera were unwarranted and even ethnocentric in the politicized context of debate.

In this regard, the cleavage between the pro-war and anti-war newspapers — which was the most important finding of the present study — implies varying journalistic practices wavering between nationalistic and cosmopolitan values in reporting of and commentary on the so-called “Al-Jazeera” phenomenon. In addition, some findings from the thematic analysis of AJ-as-issue discourse and the qualitative editorial analysis suggest that media professionals at the *Times*, while they made a considerable effort to be fair-minded, were affected by a tendency to avoid offending the ideological tenets of the post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy. In the age of the global news arena, the question of how to reconcile nationalistic and cosmopolitan values will provide a continuing challenge for

all journalists, in the West and elsewhere, who think of their profession as a global business.

Appendix A

Table A1: Assessment of Inter-coder Reliability for Main Measures

Variable	Inter-coder agreement	Cohen's Kappa
<i>Preliminary coding of initial raw data^a</i>		
Type of AJ-related article	87%	.82
<i>Article-unit coding of AJ-sourced content^b</i>		
AJ-as-source topic		
Coder 1-coder 2 pair	87%	.83
Coder 2-coder 3 pair	84%	.79
Coder 3-coder 1 pair	85%	.81
Pairs average	85%	.81
Content importance		
Coder 1-coder 2 pair	89%	.82
Coder 2-coder 3 pair	93%	.89
Coder 3-coder 1 pair	86%	.81
Pairs average	89%	.84
Voice within AJ-sourced content		
Coder 1-coder 2 pair	93%	.89
Coder 2-coder 3 pair	89%	.84
Coder 3-coder 1 pair	89%	.84
Pairs average	90%	.86
<i>Source-unit coding of AJ-evaluative content^c</i>		
Identity of AJ-as-subject source	92%	.88
AJ-as-subject source tone	87%	.83

News context	88%	.82
<i>Theme-unit coding of AJ-evaluative content^d</i>		
AJ-as-issue theme	86%	.83
Story tone	85%	.77
Total average	88%	.83

Note. All coding procedures except the coding of AJ-sourced content involved participation of two coders. Three coders participated in the coding task of AJ-sourced content.

^aFor the assessment of inter-coder reliability in the preliminary coding stage, 100 randomly selected articles were used.

^bFor the assessment of inter-coder reliability in the article-unit stage, 75 randomly selected articles that included AJ-sourced content were used.

^cFor the assessment of inter-coder reliability in the source-unit coding stage, 50 randomly selected articles that included AJ-evaluative content were used. Specifically, a total of 69 coding decisions, which involved the identification of AJ-as-subject sources at least by one coder, was examined. For the variable “news context,” 50 coding decisions were tested because the coding decision was article-based.

^dFor the assessment of inter-coder reliability in the theme-unit coding stage, 50 randomly selected articles that included AJ-evaluative content were used. Specifically, a total of 124 coding decisions, which involved the identification of AJ-as-issue themes at least by one coder, was examined. For the variable “story tone,” 50 coding decisions were tested because the coding decision was article-based.

APPENDIX B

Codebook for Initial Data Categorization

1. Article ID

2. Name of newspaper

(1) *The Wall Street Journal*

(2) *The New York Times*

(3) *The Daily Telegraph/the Sunday Telegraph*

(4) *The Guardian/the Observer*

3. Date (mm/dd/yy)

3-1. (Only for British newspapers) Day of the week

(1) Weekdays (including Saturday)

(2) Sunday

4. Period

(1) Pre-9/11 (01/01/1997 – 09/10/2001)

(2) Afghanistan War (09/11/2001 - 12/31/2001)

(3) Palestinian uprising (01/01/2002 - 09/11/2002)

(4) Pre-Iraq War debate (09/12/2002 - 03/16/2003)

(5) Iraq War (03/17/2003 - 05/01/2003)

(6) Post-Iraq War (05/02/2003 - 12/31/2003)

5. Placement of news story

(1) Page 1

(2) Inside (other page)

6. Length of story

(1) Short (less than 151 words)

(2) Medium (151-1000 words)

(3) Long (1001 words or more)

Note: If the article is a compilation of short independent news or opinion pieces, accept only the portions including the content related to Al-Jazeera.

7. Type of story

(1) Straight news (standard news report)

(2) News analysis (interpretative news story)

(3) Feature (interview & story highlighting a person/group/organization)

(4) Nonpolitical news (e.g. stock price, book review, film review, travel guide, etc.)

(5) Transcript (e.g., transcript of bin Laden message)

(6) Editorial

(7) Signed column

(8) Letter to the editor

(9) Trivial content (e.g., News index, photo caption, list of past events, TV program listing without further description, list of bestsellers, etc – **stop coding for the article**)

Note. For further coding, category (1) – (4) are considered news stories, while category (6) - (8) are considered opinion pieces.

8. Type of AJ-related article

(1) Article only with AJ-sourced content (applies to a news story in which the reporter cites the news organization Al-Jazeera, an individual affiliated with Al-Jazeera, or some material broadcasted by Al-Jazeera, as a source of information)

(2) Article only with AJ-evaluative content (applies to a news story or opinion piece in which either the reporter, any source quoted by the reporter (for news stories), or the writer (for opinion pieces), shows a positive, negative, or mixed tone in describing or commenting on the news organization Al-Jazeera, an individual affiliated with Al-Jazeera, or some material broadcasted by Al-Jazeera, or the behavior of another actor toward Al-Jazeera)

(3) Article with both types of contents (applies to a news story that meets the conditions for both the first and the second categories)

(4) Article without any type of content (applies to a new story or opinion piece that does not meet the conditions for any of the prior categories)

Note. Mark on the upper side of the article the number of the category you determined. The category number will be used for later steps of content analysis.

Appendix C

Codebook for Article-unit Analysis of AJ-sourced Content

[1-7: the same as the codebook for the preliminary analysis].

8. AJ-as-source content topic

- (1) Messages from Osama bin Laden or other Al-Qaeda leaders
- (2) Messages from Taliban leaders or Saddam regime officials
- (3) Military developments (applies to Al-Jazeera's news content about, or an Al-Jazeera reporter's comments on, the military conflicts in Afghanistan or in Iraq)
- (4) Showing of dead/captured soldiers (applies to Al-Jazeera's broadcast of the footage that shows either U.S. servicepersons in Iraqi captivity or dead bodies of U.S. or other Coalition troops)
- (5) Civilian damage (applies to Al-Jazeera's coverage of civilian damage that occurred in either Afghanistan, Iraq, or a zone affected by the U.S./Coalition forces, except the violent conflicts between Israel and Palestine)
- (6) Palestinians-related affairs (applies to Al-Jazeera's news content about incidence related to Israel-Palestinian conflicts, which may involve civilian damage)
- (7) Other affairs & opinions in the Arab world (applies to Al-Jazeera-sourced Arab/Muslim opinions concerned with either the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East)

(8) Performance of Al-Jazeera (applies to information acquired from staffs or other employees at Al-Jazeera, regarding the performance of the news organization itself or other Arab media)

(9) Threat to Arab media activities, U.S.-involved (applies to Al-Jazeera's news content or its employee's statements regarding a U.S.-involved incident that can be interpreted as a threat to Arab media freedom)

(10) Threat to Arab media activities, except U.S.-involved cases

(11) Others

9. Content importance

(1) High (applies when the news organization Al-Jazeera or its employee was treated as either the first source in a breaking news story or a primary source in a news analysis or a feature)

(2) Medium (applies when the importance of the AJ-sourced content in the story fits neither the previous "high" nor the following "low" category and thus can be seen as falling between the two opposing ends)

(3) Low (applies when the AJ-sourced content meets two following conditions – first, it has a full length of no more than one paragraph; second, the content is located only at the end of the news story, or it describes only some "old" information that was covered previously)

10. Identity of voice within AJ-sourced content

(1) U.S. Enemy (Osama bin Laden and other leading members of the Al-Qaeda network, leaders of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and officials of the Hussein regime in Iraq)

(2) Al-Jazeera employees, not in their news programs (Al-Jazeera representatives, reporters, staffs, and other individuals affiliated with the news organization, not in the context of citing Al-Jazeera's own news stories but in other context)

(3) Palestinian/ radical Muslim leaders (officials of the Palestinian Authority and leaders of Palestinian factions, such as Hamas, and of Islamic militant groups. Al-Qaeda members are excluded here)

(4) Other Arab/ Western Muslims (other Arab Muslims and Muslim residents in the United States and Europe, including both Arab elites and ordinary people)

(5) Others (other sources quoted within the AJ-sourced content)

Appendix D

Codebook for the source-unit analysis of AJ-evaluative content

[1-7: the same as the codebook for the preliminary analysis].

8. Identity of AJ-as-subject source

(1) U.S./British government/military officials

(2) U.S./British others

(3) Al-Jazeera employees (applies when an individual affiliated with Al-Jazeera is cited as a voice commenting on the news organization itself or some issue involving Al-Jazeera)

(4) Arab/Muslim others

(5) Others.

Note 1. AJ-as-subject source refers to a range of sources, named or unnamed, who are directly or indirectly cited as those expressing their views on such subjects as the characteristics of Al-Jazeera, the content of some news material aired by Al-Jazeera, the conduct of Al-Jazeera employees, or the conduct of other (governmental) actors toward the news organization. Purely factual statements about Al-Jazeera offered by a source are ignored.

Note 2. Count an AJ-as-subject source only once for the article, regardless of the amount of the quotation (i.e., the portion allotted to the utterance of an AJ-related view) from the source. However, if there exist in a news story multiple AJ-as-subject sources all

of whom are coded into the same category, count all of these sources. For example, if the news story has three relevant quotes from Donald Rumsfeld and two relevant quotes from Tony Blair, count two AJ-as-subject sources, both of whom are coded on the category of (1) U.S./British government/military officials.

9. AJ-as-subject source tone

- (1) Favorable or contextually favorable
- (2) Unfavorable or contextually unfavorable
- (3) Mixed or unclear

Note. The term “contextually favorable (or unfavorable)” is applied to the case in which the source in question does not directly engage in the evaluation of Al-Jazeera but, by making a value judgment about either other news media in comparison or another actor’s conduct toward the Al-Jazeera, gives “contextually” an advantageous (or disadvantageous) statement toward the Arab news organization.

10. News context

(1) Beats-oriented news (applies when the predominant voices in the story originated from government- or military-controlled beats, including both the regular ones in Washington and the temporary ones set up by the U.S. Central Command at Doha during the military campaigns in Iraq)

(2) Icon-driven news (applies when the dominant portion of those voicing a perspective came from either Al-Jazeera employees, ordinary members of Arab/Muslim audiences of the news channel, or Arab media professionals and experts commenting on the news organization)

(3) Other/unclear news context (applies when any group of voices mentioned above does appear but does not dominate in news discourse and it is thus hard to choose between the two types of news context, or (b) when the news story highlights other kinds of voices or topics and therefore neither of the two news contexts seems relevant)

Note. The coding decision here is based on the article, not the individual AJ-as-subject source. Due to this, all AJ-as-subject sources cited in a news story are classified into the same category.

Appendix E

Codebook for the theme-unit analysis of AJ-evaluative content

[1-7: the same as the codebook for the preliminary analysis].

8. Instruction for coding of AJ-as-issue themes:

An AJ-as-issue theme meets two following conditions: (1) this theme should be applied to the evaluation of either the news organization Al-Jazeera, output from Al-Jazeera, an individual affiliated with Al-Jazeera, or an outside force whose relations with Al-Jazeera were brought into focus; (2) the theme should reflect some “normative” idea about news media. A list of these normative ideas is given at the end of this instruction (See Table A2 following this instruction). Solely performance-based evaluations of Al-Jazeera on the basis of either journalistic activity (e.g., Al-Jazeera’s scoop on the U.S. military setback) or media business (e.g., increased subscription to Al-Jazeera channel in wartime) are ignored.

Familiarize yourself with the multiple types of AJ-as-issue themes suggested by the table below. Since on the same normative basis Al-Jazeera may be advocated (e.g., “Al-Jazeera is an independent news outlet”) or criticized (e.g., “Al-Jazeera is not as independent as it may seem”), all the themes found in the article should be coded as either “positive” or “negative,” according to the instructions of the table.

When a linguistic expression is found as reflecting one of the four normative criteria presented below (e.g., “Al-Jazeera is a professional news organization,” which reflects *professional reporting/responsible conduct criterion*) but is too ambiguous to tell

which specific theme was invoked, the assertion in question should be assigned to the first theme within the relevant theme-group category (e.g., for the prior example, the *objective/impartial news reporting* theme). If some thematic elements are found within a quotation, make a coding decision in conjunction with the inferable intention of the reporter or the writer. This said, if the reporter/writer cited a source in a favorable or neutral fashion, the presence of a theme within the quote are accepted. However, when the reporter/writer expressed doubts about or rebutted the source's claim, the thematic elements within the quote should be ignored (when doubted) or interpreted as constituting a theme in a reverse direction (when rebutted).

Use your best judgment to identify the presence of ANY AJ-as-issue theme listed below for each PASSAGE containing AJ-evaluative content. You are encouraged to code multiple AJ-as-issue themes from a passage as long as each theme is coded into a DIFFERENT category. However, do NOT count more than once the same theme from a single passage. In addition, the highest number of times to count the same theme from a single story is limited to THREE. Therefore, do not count four times or more for the same theme in the story.

When you read the contents of the table, you can notice some examples carry a qualification of "in a derogatory tone." This means that purely factual or neutral statements referring to the characteristic of Al-Jazeera in question are NOT regarded as a negative theme. For example, factual statements about Al-Jazeera's financial dependence on the Qatari government are not counted as a negative form of *free press without outside control* unless the description carries a derogatory tone.

Table A2: List of AJ-as-issue Themes

Media norm	Positive invocation	Negative invocation
Free/independent media status		
Free press without outside control	1. the most independent media in the Arab world; no state censorship 2. (rebuttal of the negative theme)	1. state ownership; government control; financial dependence on the state (in a derogatory tone) 2. (rebuttal of the positive theme)
Adversary to authoritarian regime	1. vigorous criticism of the Qatari/other Arab government 2. (rebuttal of the negative theme)	1. editorial timidity toward the Qatari/other Arab government 2. (rebuttal of the positive theme)
Professional reporting/responsible conduct		
Professional/balanced reporting	1. objective; impartial; neutral; fair; balanced; unbiased 2. (rebuttal of the negative theme)	1. unfair, biased; pro-Palestinian slant (in a derogatory tone) 2. (rebuttal of the positive theme)
Non-sensational/ethical handling of graphic information	1. non-sensational; not rating-driven; meeting public taste and decency 2. responsible; ethical; respecting human dignity; minimizing harm to family members (in the context of praising withholding of sensitive graphic information) 3 (rebuttal of the negative theme)	1. inflammatory; emotive; hate-provoking; sensational; rating-driven 2. irresponsible; unethical; violating the Geneva Convention (in the context of criticizing releasing sensitive graphic information) 3. (rebuttal of the positive theme)
Developmental/educational media function		
Catalyst for Arab democracy	1. bringing democratic changes/free and open debate to the Arab world 2. (rebuttal of the negative theme)	1. causing instability in the Arab world (in a derogatory tone) 2. (rebuttal of the positive theme)

(table continues)

(continued)

Educator of pro-U.S./Western view	1. correcting anti-U.S./Western attitudes 2. (rebuttal of the negative theme)	1. spreading anti-U.S./Western extremism (in a derogatory tone) 2. (rebuttal of the positive theme)
<hr/> Alternative media role		
Source of oppressed voices/views	1. providing Arab-oriented perspectives (in an affirmative tone)	1. (rebuttal of the positive theme)
Antidote of Western bias	1. counterbalancing Western bias/stereotyped views	1. (rebuttal of the positive theme)
<hr/> Media-outside actor interaction		
Target of bullying	1. under unjustifiable intimidation by others (sympathetic toward Al-Jazeera or derogatory toward its counter-party)	1. (rebuttal of the positive theme)
Enemy propaganda tool	1. (rebuttal of the negative theme)	1. bin Laden's mouthpiece; propaganda outlet (in a derogatory tone)
<hr/> Other/unspecific		
	1. (applies to a positive evaluation of Al-Jazeera on an anti-U.S./Western, other "irrational," or unspecific basis)	1. (applies to a negative evaluation of Al-Jazeera on an anti-U.S./Western, other "irrational," or unspecific basis)

9. Story tone

(1) Favorable or contextually favorable

(2) Unfavorable or contextually unfavorable

(3) Mixed or unclear

Note 1. The term "contextually favorable (or unfavorable)" is applied to the case in which the source in question does not directly engage in the evaluation of Al-Jazeera but, by making a value judgment about either other news media in comparison or another

actor's conduct toward the Al-Jazeera, gives "contextually" an advantageous (or disadvantageous) statement toward the Arab news organization.

Note 2. The coding decision here is based on the article, not the individual AJ-as-issue normative theme. Due to this, all AJ-as-issue themes invoked in a news story are classified into the same category.

Appendix F

Table A3: Distribution of AJ-as-issue Themes by Detailed Category

AJ-as-issue theme	<u>Pro-war Paper</u>				<u>Anti-war Paper</u>			
	<i>Journal</i>		<i>Telegraph</i>		<i>Times</i>		<i>Guardian</i>	
	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>
Positive theme								
Free media without outside control	4.9	8	7.2	13	6.0	17	8.5	27
Adversary to authoritarian regimes	3.7	6	2.2	4	5.7	16	4.1	13
Professional/balanced news reporting	3.1	5	5.0	9	10.6	30	6.3	20
Nonsensational/ethical handling of graphic information	1.9	3	1.7	3	0.7	2	0.3	1
Catalyst for Arab democracy	5.6	9	5.6	10	6.4	18	3.5	11
Educator of pro-U.S./western views	1.2	2	1.1	2	2.5	7	1.3	4
Source of oppressed news/views	2.5	4	7.2	13	6.7	19	9.7	31
Antidote of western bias	1.2	2	1.7	3	2.8	8	6.6	21
Rebuttal of <i>enemy propaganda tool</i>	1.9	3	1.7	3	4.2	12	2.8	9
<i>Target of bullying</i>	3.1	5	5.0	9	7.8	22	15.4	49
Positive, unspecific	1.9	3	1.1	2	3.2	9	3.8	12
Subtotal	30.9	50	39.4	71	56.5	160	62.3	198
Negative theme								
Negative, free media without outside control	1.9	3	1.1	2	0.7	2	0.9	3
Negative, adversary to authoritarian regime	1.9	3	0.6	1	1.4	4	1.3	4

(table continues)

(continued)								
Negative, professional/balanced news reporting	13.6	22	8.9	16	11.0	31	2.5	8
Negative, nonsensational/ethical	11.7	19	9.4	17	3.2	9	7.9	25
Negative, catalyst for Arab democracy	6.8	11	5.6	10	2.8	8	1.9	6
Negative, educator of pro-U.S./western views	11.1	18	7.8	14	7.4	21	7.2	23
Negative, source of oppressed news/views	1.2	2	1.1	2	0.0	0	0.3	1
Negative, antidote of western bias	0.0	0	0.0	0	1.8	5	0.0	0
<i>Enemy propaganda tool</i>	16.7	27	21.1	38	9.9	28	10.1	32
Rebuttal of <i>target of bullying</i>	1.2	2	1.1	2	1.4	4	2.2	7
Negative, unspecific	3.1	5	3.9	7	3.9	11	3.5	11
Subtotal	69.1	112	60.6	109	43.5	123	37.7	120
Total	100.0	162	100.0	180	100.0	283	100.0	318

Note. All themes were found in the post-9/11 news stories or opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content. News stories shorter than 151 words and letters to the editor pieces were not examined.

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Vita

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